Order effects in moral judgment
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Explaining moral intuitions is one of the hot topics of recent cognitive science. In the present article we focus on a factor that attracted surprisingly little attention so far, namely the temporal order in which moral scenarios are presented. We argue that previous research points to a systematic pattern of order effects that has been overlooked until now: only judgments of actions that are normally regarded as morally acceptable are susceptible to be affected by the order of presentation, and this in turn is only the case if the dilemma is immediately preceded by a dilemma in which the proposed action was considered as not morally acceptable. We conducted an experiment that largely confirmed this pattern and allowed us to analyze by what individual level responses it was generated. We argue that investigating order effects is necessary for approaching a complete descriptive moral theory. Furthermore, we discuss the implications of these findings for moral philosophy.
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Citations
Cites
The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7455683 · Cited by 18,497 · cited 1×
“Framing effects like different wording or context (e.g., ordering) are typical examples of effects that are caused by factors that are commonly believed to be morally irrelevant (Kern & Chugh, 2009; Nadelhoffer & Feltz, 2008; Petrinovich & O’Neill, 1996; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).”
BackgroundThe emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgment.
Haidt, J. (2001) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.108.4.814 · Cited by 8,048
The Neural Bases of Cognitive Conflict and Control in Moral Judgment
Greene, J. D., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2004.09.027 · Cited by 2,620 · cited 2×
“As Greene and his collaborators have shown, footbridge-like dilemmas are much more likely to activate brain regions associated with emotional processing than switch-like cases (Greene et al., 2001, 2004).”
BackgroundHow (and where) does moral judgment work?
Greene, J., & Haidt, J. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)02011-9 · Cited by 1,945 · cited 1×
“Lanteri and colleagues (2008) attempted to explain their results following Green and colleagues’ (Greene et al., 2001, 2004; Greene & Haidt, 2002) notion that scenarios containing ‘‘personal’’ moral features such as Push trigger hard-wired moral emotions to a greater extent than ‘‘impersonal’’…”
BackgroundCognitive load selectively interferes with utilitarian moral judgment
Greene, J. D., Morelli, S. A., Lowenberg, K., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2008) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2007.11.004 · Cited by 1,231
A Dissociation Between Moral Judgments and Justifications
HAUSER, M., CUSHMAN, F., YOUNG, L., KANG‐XING JIN, R., & MIKHAIL, J. (2007) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2006.00297.x · Cited by 666 · cited 3×
“…differ on a number of these dimensions, including physical contact (Cushman et al., 2006), personal force (Greene et al., 2009), locus of intervention (Waldmann & Dieterich, 2007), and whether the victim constitutes a means or a side-effect in rescuing the five workers (e.g., Hauser et al., 2007).”
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Cited by
Bergmann, L. T., Schlicht, L., Meixner, C., König, P., Pipa, G., Boshammer, S., & Stephan, A. (2018) · Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnbeh.2018.00031 · Cited by 96
Large Language Models Show Amplified Cognitive Biases in Moral Decision-Making
Cheung, V., Maier, M., & Lieder, F. (2025) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/aj46b_v3 · Cited by 53
Lay beliefs in moral expertise
Schmittat, S. M., & Burgmer, P. (2020) · Philosophical Psychology · doi:10.1080/09515089.2020.1719053 · Cited by 5
“Results, however, indicated that philosophers’ judgements were by no means unbiased (Schwitzgebel & Cushman, 2012, 2015; Tobia, Buckwalter, & Stich;Wiegmann & Okan, 2012; Wiegmann, Okan, & Nagel, 2012).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Wiegmann, A., Okan, Y., & Nagel, J.
- Venue
- Philosophical Psychology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-12
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 813-836
- ISSN
- 0951-5089 (ISSN-L)
- 1465-394X
- OpenAlex
- W2100973578
- Cited by
- 92
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 3.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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