The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 33 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
External Auditors, Audit Committees and Earnings Management in France
Abstract
We investigate the effect of various audit quality dimensions (i.e. auditor reputation and tenure, audit committee existence and independence) on earnings management in France. We thus contribute to the empirical audit quality literature in a Continental European environment that markedly differs from the USA in terms of auditing and corporate governance. The main findings are that: (1) the presence of an audit committee (but not the committee's independence) curbs upward earnings management; and (2) the presence of a Big Five auditor makes no difference regarding earnings management activities. Implications of these findings are discussed with regard to the specificities of the French auditing and governance settings. In particular, although the audit committee acts as a device to control the more egregious (i.e. income-increasing) forms of earnings management, the monitoring incentive of outside directors may be hampered by the collective board responsibility for financial reporting quality. Second, the lack of differentiation among Big Five auditors in terms of accounting conservatism is consistent with the lower litigation risk offered by the French Civil Code (vs. the US Common Law system), which is likely to eliminate the deep pockets incentive for investors.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250042 · Cited by 18,025
Legal Determinants of External Finance
LA PORTA, R., LOPEZ‐DE‐SILANES, F., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb02727.x · Cited by 9,783
Earnings Management During Import Relief Investigations
Jones, J. J. (1991) · Journal of Accounting Research · doi:10.2307/2491047 · Cited by 8,353
Watts, R. L., & Zimmerman, J. L. (1985) · Andalas University Repository (Andalas University) · Cited by 5,838
Auditor size and audit quality
DeAngelo, L. E. (1981) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(81)90002-1 · Cited by 5,813
Audit committee, board of director characteristics, and earnings management
Klein, A. (2002) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(02)00059-9 · Cited by 4,622
DECHOW, P. M., SLOAN, R. G., & SWEENEY, A. P. (1996) · Contemporary Accounting Research · doi:10.1111/j.1911-3846.1996.tb00489.x · Cited by 4,065
(2012) · Asian Financial Statement Analysis · doi:10.1002/9781119204763.ch4 · Cited by 3,821
The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance
Klein, B., & Leffler, K. B. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260996 · Cited by 3,653
Cited by
Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review
Brown, P., Beekes, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2011) · Accounting & Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1467-629x.2010.00385.x · Cited by 614
When does ownership matter? Board characteristics and behavior
Desender, K. A., Aguilera, R. V., Crespi, R., & GarcÍa‐cestona, M. (2013) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2046 · Cited by 315
Female Auditors and Accruals Quality
Ittonen, K., Vähämaa, E., & Vähämaa, S. (2013) · Accounting Horizons · doi:10.2308/acch-50400 · Cited by 307
Metadata
- Authors
- Piot, C., & Janin, R.
- Venue
- European Accounting Review
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2007-07
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 429-454
- ISSN
- 0963-8180 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-4497
- OpenAlex
- W2025880900
- Cited by
- 296
- References
- 33
- FWCI
- 32.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: External Auditors, Audit Committees and Earnings Management in France. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/09638180701391030
- The paper
- Piot, C., & Janin, R. (2007). External Auditors, Audit Committees and Earnings Management in France. European Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180701391030
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.