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Board of Directors' Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence

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García Lara, Juan Manuel, Osma, Beatriz García, Penalva, Fernando · 2007 · European Accounting Review
Cited by 213

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Using a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period 1997–2002 we find that firms where the CEO has a low influence over the functioning of the board of directors show a greater degree of accounting conservatism. We measure the influence of the CEO over the board of directors using two aggregate indexes combining six (eight) characteristics of the functioning of the board of directors and its monitoring committees: board size, proportion of non-executive directors, proportion of independent directors, whether the chairman of the board is an executive director, the number of board meetings, and the existence of an audit committee, a nomination/remuneration committee and an executive committee. We define conservatism as the asymmetric recognition speed of good and bad news in earnings, and we measure it following Basu (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24, pp. 3–37, 1997 Basu, S. 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24: 3–37. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and Ball and Shivakumar (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, pp. 83–128, 2005 Ball, R. and Shivakumar, L. 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39: 83–128. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Our results are robust to alternative specifications and specific controls for investment opportunities and for the endogenous nature of corporate governance and earnings quality. Overall, our evidence shows that firms with strong boards use conservative accounting numbers as a governance tool, even in an institutional setting with low litigation risk such as Spain.

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Metadata

Authors
García Lara, J. M., Osma, B. G., & Penalva, F.
Venue
European Accounting Review
Published
2007-12
Volume
16
Issue
4
Pages
727-755
ISSN
  • 0963-8180 (ISSN-L)
  • 1468-4497
OpenAlex
W2069420381
Cited by
213
References
7
FWCI
24.64
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Board of Directors' Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/09638180701706922
The paper
García Lara, J. M., Osma, B. G., & Penalva, F. (2007). Board of Directors' Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence. European Accounting Review. https://doi.org/10.1080/09638180701706922

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