Board of Directors' Characteristics and Conditional Accounting Conservatism: Spanish Evidence
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 7 of the 7 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Using a sample of Spanish listed firms for the period 1997–2002 we find that firms where the CEO has a low influence over the functioning of the board of directors show a greater degree of accounting conservatism. We measure the influence of the CEO over the board of directors using two aggregate indexes combining six (eight) characteristics of the functioning of the board of directors and its monitoring committees: board size, proportion of non-executive directors, proportion of independent directors, whether the chairman of the board is an executive director, the number of board meetings, and the existence of an audit committee, a nomination/remuneration committee and an executive committee. We define conservatism as the asymmetric recognition speed of good and bad news in earnings, and we measure it following Basu (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24, pp. 3–37, 1997 Basu, S. 1997. The conservatism principle and the asymmetric timeliness of earnings. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 24: 3–37. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) and Ball and Shivakumar (Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39, pp. 83–128, 2005 Ball, R. and Shivakumar, L. 2005. Earnings quality in UK private firms: comparative loss recognition timeliness. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 39: 83–128. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]). Our results are robust to alternative specifications and specific controls for investment opportunities and for the endogenous nature of corporate governance and earnings quality. Overall, our evidence shows that firms with strong boards use conservative accounting numbers as a governance tool, even in an institutional setting with low litigation risk such as Spain.
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Citations
Cites
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243 · cited 3×
“See Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Tirole (2001) and Becht et al. (2003) for more detailed reviews of corporate governance mechanisms.”
Risk, Return, and Equilibrium: Empirical Tests
Fama, E. F., & MacBeth, J. D. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260061 · Cited by 14,258
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1986) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261385 · Cited by 8,408 · cited 2×
“…economic, social and legal tradition of Spanish directors (Recalde, 2003), there may be doubts that the first condition is met, particularly in the case of outside directors – as institutional directors assume the monitoring role of institutional investors identified by Shleifer and Vishny (1986).”
Corporate Governance and Equity Prices
Gompers, P., Ishii, J., & Metrick, A. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530360535162 · Cited by 6,120
Are CEOs Rewarded for Luck? The Ones Without Principals Are
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2001) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/00335530152466269 · Cited by 1,740 · cited 7×
“5Following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001), we use unit weights to create IndGov6 and IndGov8; this is in accordance with the recommendations of Grice and Harris (1998), who show that aggregate measures built using unit weights have better psychometric properties.”
MethodInfluentialGovernance Mechanisms and Equity Prices
CREMERS, K. J. M., & NAIR, V. B. (2005) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.00819.x · Cited by 1,220
Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems
Bushman, R., Chen, Q., Engel, E., & Smith, A. (2004) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2003.09.005 · Cited by 1,059
Cited by
Corporate governance, accounting and finance: A review
Brown, P., Beekes, W., & Verhoeven, P. (2011) · Accounting & Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1467-629x.2010.00385.x · Cited by 614
Metadata
- Authors
- García Lara, J. M., Osma, B. G., & Penalva, F.
- Venue
- European Accounting Review
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2007-12
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 727-755
- ISSN
- 0963-8180 (ISSN-L)
- 1468-4497
- OpenAlex
- W2069420381
- Cited by
- 213
- References
- 7
- FWCI
- 24.64
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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