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Cited by 244Misinformation and Its ImpactsDigital Media and PhilosophyMedia Influence and Politics

Media, Knowledge and Trust: The Deepening Epistemic Crisis of Democracy

Dahlgren, Peter·2018·Javnost - The Public
DOI 10.1080/13183222.2018.1418819
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Abstract

The argument has two related parts: firstly, we are witnessing an “epistemic” crisis in public spheres that threatens to undermine political agency. This crisis has to do with the massive amounts and speed of information, the processes by which we construct knowledge, as well as the new forms of knowledge deriving from digital technologies. Many developments in information technologies benefit democracy, but there is a growing concern about cognitive dilemmas. Secondly, in the present tumultuous juncture of Western democracies, dominated by the populist revolt, traditional distrust of media has turned into an assault on basic Enlightenment premises, eroding shared understandings of reality and compatible discourse. “Knowledge” becomes legitimated via emotionality. Critical rationality and progressive politics must engage more with these developments.

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Crossref · 10.1080/13183222.2018.1418819

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19 of 19 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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  • Contemporary concerns with epistemic trust in political communication pay insufficient attention to issues of social power and to the idea that social disadvantage can produce unjust epistemic disadvantage.

    “This exploration has great potential and it suggests, for example, that contemporary concerns with epistemic trust in political communication (Dahlgren, 2018) pay insufficient attention to issues of social power and to the idea that 'social disadvantage can produce unjust epistemic disadvantage' (Fricker, 2007, p. 2).”

    From Epistemic injustice and education in the digital age (2024) · cites this paper as Dahlgren, 2018

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Authors
Dahlgren, P.
Affiliations
Lund University (SE)
Corresponding author
Dahlgren, Peter
ORCID
Dahlgren, Peter
Venue
Javnost - The Public
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
2018-01-31
Volume
25
Issue
1-2
Pages
20-27
ISSN
  • 1318-3222 (ISSN-L)
  • 1854-8377
DOI
10.1080/13183222.2018.1418819
OpenAlex
W2793216696
Cited by
237
References
21
Citations by year
2026: 48 · 2025: 30 · 2024: 43 · 2023: 38 · 2022: 32 · 2021: 22 · 2020: 12 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 3
FWCI
26.17
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Javnost - The Public (publishedVersion)
  • Lund University Publications (Lund University) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Misinformation and Its Impacts
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Computer Science Applications › Digital Media and Philosophy
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Media Influence and Politics
Keywords
epistemic crisis, democracy, media, trust, populism, information overload, digital technologies, knowledge construction, political agency, emotionality, critical rationality, Enlightenment, public sphere

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