Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 5 of the 5 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Neoclassical economics assumes that individuals have stable and context-independent preferences, and uses preference satisfaction as a normative criterion. By calling this assumption into question, behavioural findings cause fundamental problems for normative economics. A common response to these problems is to treat deviations from conventional rational choice theory as mistakes, and to try to reconstruct the preferences that individuals would have acted on, had they reasoned correctly. We argue that this preference purification approach implicitly uses a dualistic model of the human being, in which an inner rational agent is trapped in an outer psychological shell. This model is psychologically and philosophically problematic.
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Cites
Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1992) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1007/bf00122574 · Cited by 15,467
A perspective on judgment and choice: mapping bounded rationality.
Kahneman, D. (2003) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.58.9.697 · Cited by 5,540
Models of ecological rationality: The recognition heuristic.
Goldstein, D. G., & Gigerenzer, G. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.109.1.75 · Cited by 1,352
Beyond Revealed Preference: Choice-Theoretic Foundations for Behavioral Welfare Economics *
Bernheim, B. D., & Rangel, A. (2009) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.1.51 · Cited by 599 · cited 1×
“Bernheim and Rangel (2007, 2009) propose an approach to behavioural welfare economics that is similar to preference purification.”
Wason, P. C., & Evans, J. S. B. T. (1974) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(74)90017-1 · Cited by 575
Cited by
Self-nudging and the citizen choice architect
REIJULA, S., & HERTWIG, R. (2022) · Behavioural Public Policy · doi:10.1017/bpp.2020.5 · Cited by 130
Metadata
- Authors
- Infante, G., Lecouteux, G., & Sugden, R.
- Venue
- Journal of Economic Methodology
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2016-01-02
- Volume
- 23
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-25
- ISSN
- 1350-178X (ISSN-L)
- 1469-9427
- OpenAlex
- W2280738422
- Cited by
- 188
- References
- 5
- FWCI
- 15.46
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- hybrid
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- Infante, G., Lecouteux, G., & Sugden, R. (2016). Preference purification and the inner rational agent: a critique of the conventional wisdom of behavioural welfare economics. Journal of Economic Methodology. https://doi.org/10.1080/1350178x.2015.1070527
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