Belief inflexibility in schizophrenia
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 6 of the 6 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
BACKGROUND: Previous studies using delusion-neutral material have demonstrated that patients with schizophrenia, particularly those with delusions, display a bias against disconfirmatory evidence (BADE). In the current study we investigated the moderating impact of belief strength on this effect. METHODS: Thirty-three schizophrenia patients, 18 patients with obsessive compulsive disorder, and 25 healthy control participants, were consecutively presented with delusion-neutral statements that provided increasingly detailed information about a scenario. They were asked to re-rate the plausibility of four descriptions of the scenario. The correct ("true") interpretation appeared poor on the first statement and then increasingly gained plausibility, whereas "lure" interpretations appeared plausible initially to varying degrees, but became implausible once all information was presented. RESULTS: Schizophrenia patients displayed a BADE for strong beliefs, in that they were biased against revising their ratings of lure items in light of new disconfirming evidence compared to the mixed control group. However, like controls, patients with schizophrenia were willing to revise weak beliefs. CONCLUSION: This confirms that schizophrenia patients are generally impaired in their ability to integrate disconfirmatory evidence, even for material that does not touch on delusional themes. This response pattern was more pronounced for strong beliefs, and this may contribute to the fixation of false ideas (i.e., delusions).
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Citations
Cites
The Yale-Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale: I. Development, Use, and Reliability
Goodman, W. K. (1989) · Archives of General Psychiatry · doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1989.01810110048007 · Cited by 7,712 · cited 1×
“The YaleBrown Obsessive-Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989) mean total score was 24.71 (SD 6.83, min: 13, max: 40).”
MethodInfluentialConfirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises
Nickerson, R. S. (1998) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.2.2.175 · Cited by 7,267
HADDOCK, G., McCARRON, J., TARRIER, N., & FARAGHER, E. B. (1999) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291799008661 · Cited by 1,461 · cited 1×
“It is possible that the BADE effect is more pronounced for patients with strong conviction in their delusions, highlighting the importance of rating scales that index conviction, such as the PSYRATS ( Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier, & Faragher, 1999 ).”
BackgroundThe Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS): rationale and standardisation
Kay, S. R., Opler, L. A., & Lindenmayer, J.-P. (1989) · British Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1192/s0007125000291514 · Cited by 1,016
Cognitive approaches to delusions: a critical review of theories and evidence.
Garety, P. A., & Freeman, D. (1999) · British Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1348/014466599162700 · Cited by 794 · cited 1×
“…of reasoning (Maher, 1988), recent work has revealed a number of aberrations in logical thinking and data gathering in schizophrenia patients with current or past delusional ideas (for reviews see Bell, Halligan, & Ellis, 2006; Blackwood, Howard, Bentall, & Murray, 2001; Garety & Freeman, 1999).”
BackgroundJonas, E., Schulz-Hardt, S., Frey, D., & Thelen, N. (2001) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.80.4.557 · Cited by 725 · cited 1×
“A reluctance to integrate disconfirmatory evidence, and an enhanced willingness to integrate confirmatory evidence, may be natural consequences of holding a strong belief (Hemsley, 1988, p. 118; Jonas, Schulz-Hardt, Frey, & Thelen, 2001; Nickerson, 1998).”
Background
Cited by
Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia
Fletcher, P. C., & Frith, C. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2536 · Cited by 1,462
Sowing the seeds of doubt: a narrative review on metacognitive training in schizophrenia
Moritz, S., Andreou, C., Schneider, B. C., Wittekind, C. E., Menon, M., Balzan, R. P., & Woodward, T. S. (2014) · Clinical Psychology Review · doi:10.1016/j.cpr.2014.04.004 · Cited by 325
Self-citationSpeechley, W. J., Whitman, J. C., & Woodward, T. S. (2010) · Journal of Psychiatry and Neuroscience · doi:10.1503/jpn.090025 · Cited by 202
Self-citationMoritz, S., Veckenstedt, R., Andreou, C., Bohn, F., Hottenrott, B., Leighton, L., Köther, U., Woodward, T. S., Treszl, A., Menon, M., et al. (2014) · JAMA Psychiatry · doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2014.1038 · Cited by 163
Self-citationPredictive processing, source monitoring, and psychosis
Griffin, J. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2017) · Annual Review of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-clinpsy-032816-045145 · Cited by 133
Metadata
- Authors
- Woodward, T. S., Moritz, S., Menon, M., & Klinge, R.
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2008-05
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 267-277
- ISSN
- 1354-6805 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0619
- OpenAlex
- W2064855746
- Cited by
- 121
- References
- 6
- FWCI
- 2.92
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Woodward, T. S., Moritz, S., Menon, M., & Klinge, R. (2008). Belief inflexibility in schizophrenia. Cognitive Neuropsychiatry. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546800802099033
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