Predictive processing, source monitoring, and psychosis
Open accessAbstract
A comprehensive understanding of psychosis requires models that link multiple levels of explanation: the neurobiological, the cognitive, the subjective, and the social. Until we can bridge several explanatory gaps, it is difficult to explain how neurobiological perturbations can manifest in bizarre beliefs or hallucinations, or how trauma or social adversity can perturb lower-level brain processes. We propose that the predictive processing framework has much to offer in this respect. We show how this framework may underpin and complement source monitoring theories of delusions and hallucinations and how, when considered in terms of a dynamic and hierarchical system, it may provide a compelling model of several key clinical features of psychosis. We see little conflict between source monitoring theories and predictive coding. The former act as a higher-level description of a set of capacities, and the latter aims to provide a deeper account of how these and other capacities may emerge.
AI snapshot
Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This conceptual review argues that predictive processing (PP) can complement and deepen source monitoring accounts of psychosis by explaining source-monitoring deficits as emergent from disturbed prediction-error weighting and inference. It proposes that a hierarchical, dynamic PP framework can account for key clinical features including delusion persistence, social content, negative affect, and bizarreness.
Key findings
- PP and source monitoring are not competing accounts: source monitoring is a higher-level description of capacities, while PP aims to provide a deeper computational account of how those capacities emerge.
- Source monitoring attributions are framed as abductive inferences about the most likely cause of an event under noise, ambiguity, and uncertainty; prediction error is proposed as a crucial signal for internal source monitoring.
- A hierarchical and dynamic PP system may explain the evolution of delusions from early flexibility to later fixity, as well as why delusions often have social content, negative emotional tone, and bizarre content.
- No primary numerical results are reported; the paper is a theoretical synthesis rather than an empirical study.
Methods
- Design: conceptual/theoretical review and model-building paper, not an empirical study.
- Data or sample: no new sample or dataset is reported; the argument draws on prior literature on predictive processing, source monitoring, schizophrenia, delusions, hallucinations, and related cognitive neuroscience.
- Main analysis: narrative synthesis and theoretical extension, linking PP concepts such as prediction error, precision, hierarchical inference, and adaptive learning to source monitoring and psychotic symptoms.
Limitations
- The paper states that PP applications have been largely descriptive, have yet to be fully and formally tested by novel predictions, and that internal inconsistencies remain regarding neurobiological implementations of PP.
- The paper repeatedly describes parts of its account as speculative, including proposed links between prediction-error dysregulation, source monitoring, agency attribution, and delusion formation.
- Evident from the text: there is no empirical test, systematic review, meta-analysis, or new quantitative data; the claims are conceptual and require future formal testing.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Claims the paper makes
0 of 117 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged
- Premisecitation
People with chronic schizophrenia show impairments in the flexible generalisation of correctly learned and accurately remembered associations to novel contexts.
“People with chronic schizophrenia show impairments in the flexible generalisation of (correctly learned and accurately remembered) associations to novel contexts (Shohamy et al 2010)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Shohamy et al 2010
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
Psychosis could be characterised by fundamental disturbances in adapting learning responses to both prediction error variability and environmental volatility.
“recent theoretical work suggests that psychosis could be characterised by fundamental disturbances in adapting learning responses to both PE variability and environmental volatility (Adams et al 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Adams et al 2013
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Unmedicated people in their very first episode of psychosis show an increased tendency to update in response to prediction error.
“Schlagenhauf et al (2010) demonstrated an increased tendency to update in response to prediction error in unmedicated people in their very first episode of psychosis.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schlagenhauf et al (2010)
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The aberrant and apparently irrational perceptions and beliefs that characterise psychosis may fruitfully be considered within the predictive processing framework.
“we argue that the aberrant and apparently irrational perceptions and beliefs that characterise psychosis may fruitfully be considered within this framework.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Context-dependent adaptive coding of rewards is disrupted in schizophrenia.
“there is recent evidence that such context-dependent adaptive coding of rewards is disrupted in schizophrenia (Kirschner et al 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kirschner et al 2016
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The predictive processing perspective complements rather than replaces other higher-level cognitive accounts such as source monitoring deficits.
“We do not see this perspective as necessarily replacing, or contradictory of, other influential, higher-level cognitive accounts such as those invoking source monitoring deficits, but rather as a means of complementing these descriptions”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Prediction error signalling is linked to dopaminergic function.
“The link between prediction error signalling and dopaminergic function (Schultz et al 1997)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schultz et al 1997
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
When considered as a dynamic and hierarchical system, predictive processing extends to provide a compelling model of several key clinical features of psychosis.
“how it easily extends, when considered in terms of a dynamic and hierarchical system, to provide a compelling model of several key clinical features of psychosis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Over time, delusions become epistemically insulated and inert: people who once challenged counterevidence may ignore it or fail to acknowledge it as relevant to the content of their delusion.
“Over time, delusions become epistemically insulated and inert: people who once would have strenuously challenged counterevidence may ignore it altogether, and in some cases even fail to acknowledge it as relevant to the content of their delusion (Roessler 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Roessler 2013
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
There is little conflict between source monitoring theories and predictive coding.
“Crucially, we see little conflict between source monitoring theories and predictive coding.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Predictive processing may underpin and complement source monitoring theories of delusions and hallucinations.
“We show how it may underpin and complement source monitoring theories of delusions and hallucinations”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Reality monitoring relies heavily on discriminating which cognitive operations were involved in causing the representation in question, itself a form of metacognition.
“reality monitoring (‘was this real, or did I imagine it?’) relies heavily on discriminating which cognitive operations were involved in causing the representation in question (Johnson et al 1979, Johnson et al 1981) – itself a form of metacognition.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Johnson et al 1979
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Johnson et al 1981
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Auditory hallucinations may result from inner or subvocal speech being misidentified as externally caused.
“Thus, auditory hallucinations may result from inner or subvocal speech being misidentified as externally caused (Moseley et al 2013, Frith & Done 1989)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Moseley et al 2013
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Frith & Done 1989
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Cues are combined and weighted according to their reliability or precision.
“cues are combined and weighted according to their reliability or precision (Moore & Fletcher 2012, Knill & Pouget 2004).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Moore & Fletcher 2012
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Knill & Pouget 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Source monitoring deficits are an emergent feature of predictive processing imbalance.
“We argue that source monitoring deficits are an emergent feature of PP imbalance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Predictive processing accounts of passivity phenomena in psychosis have mainly concerned internal source monitoring errors.
“PP accounts of passivity phenomena in psychosis have been mainly concerned with what the source monitoring literature terms ‘internal source monitoring’ errors”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Blakemore et al 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Frith et al 2000
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Frith 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationnone given
Not all self-generated experiences will be fully predicted.
“it is important to note that not all self-generated experiences will be fully predicted.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Predictive processing-based explanations complement rather than compete with source monitoring accounts of psychosis, by reframing such accounts in terms of the mechanisms that underlie how one makes a decision about the source of an input.
“We suggest that PP-based explanations complement rather than compete with source monitoring accounts of psychosis, by reframing such accounts in terms of the mechanisms that underlie how one makes a decision about the source of an input”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Patients with psychosis do not merely attribute their movements to some accidental external force; the movement is inferred to have been caused by an external agent.
“Patients with psychosis do not merely attribute their movements to some accidental external force – rather, the movement is inferred to have been caused by an external agent (Pacherie et al 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pacherie et al 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The source monitoring account has been especially compelling in relation to passivity phenomena, such as delusions of control and thought insertion.
“The source monitoring account of psychosis has been especially compelling in relation to ‘passivity phenomena’, such as delusions of control and ‘thought insertion’”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nelson et al 2014a
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
One shortcoming of the source monitoring account is that it is not well specified at a computational level.
“However, one shortcoming of the source monitoring account, with respect to its potential for clinical translation, is that it is not well specified at a computational level (Huys et al 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Huys et al 2016
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Source monitoring problems predict transition in nonpsychotic clinical patients and high-risk groups.
“predict transition in nonpsychotic clinical patients and high-risk groups (Nelson et al 2012, Parnas et al 2011)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Nelson et al 2012
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Parnas et al 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Prediction error offers itself as a crucial signal for internal source monitoring (inferring whether the cause of an event was me or something else).
“Prediction error therefore offers itself as a crucial signal for ‘internal source monitoring’ (inferring whether the cause of an event was me or something else).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The ultimate inference (self or external? Agent or accident?) may also be shaped by higher level prior expectations.
“The ultimate inference (self or external? Agent or accident?) may also be shaped by higher level prior expectations.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Source monitoring and episodic memory are not fundamentally different psychological constructs.
“Source monitoring and episodic memory are not fundamentally different psychological constructs (Johnson 2005, Johnson 2006)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Johnson 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Johnson 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Source monitoring problems are relatively specific to schizophrenia spectrum disorders.
“source monitoring problems are relatively specific to schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Nordgaard and Parnas 2014, Parnas et al 2003, Haug et al 2012a)”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Nordgaard and Parnas 2014
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Parnas et al 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Haug et al 2012a
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Delusions of threat may result from intrusive memories of past trauma being misidentified as psychic premonitions rather than memories.
“delusions of threat may result from intrusive memories of past trauma being misidentified as (for example) psychic premonitions rather than memories (Holmes & Steel 2004, Steel et al 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Holmes & Steel 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Steel et al 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The functional correlates of source monitoring and of its deficits in schizophrenia are well characterised.
“The functional correlates of source monitoring, and of its deficits in schizophrenia, are well characterised (Johnson et al 2009)”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Johnson et al 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The organism is repeatedly faced with the challenge of integrating an array of sometimes competing cues to produce the best explanation for an input.
“the organism is repeatedly faced with the challenge of integrating an array of (sometimes competing) cues to produce the best explanation for an input (Lindsay and Johnson 2000).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Lindsay and Johnson 2000
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Only through integration of cues is it possible to make key source decisions, such as whether an input was caused by an external source or is the consequence of one's own actions.
“Only through such integration is it possible to make key source decisions (e.g. did I cause this or was it some external agent?).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Given that the need to make abductive inferences is at the heart of predictive processing frameworks, these frameworks must concern themselves directly with source monitoring and its disruptions.
“Given that the need to make abductive inferences is at the heart of PP frameworks, it becomes clear that these frameworks must concern themselves directly with source monitoring and its disruptions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Source monitoring accounts may provide powerful explanations for an array of psychotic symptoms, particularly given that source monitoring must extend to representations brought to mind by recall as well as by interoceptive and exteroceptive signals.
“source monitoring accounts may provide powerful explanations for an array of psychotic symptoms, particularly given that source monitoring must extend to representations brought to mind by recall as well as by both interoceptive and exteroceptive signals.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Source monitoring problems are associated with the most debilitating functional impairments: suicidality, lack of insight, and social dysfunction.
“are associated with the most debilitating functional impairments: suicidality, lack of insight, and social dysfunction (Haug et al 2012b, Parnas et al 2013, Haug et al 2013).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Haug et al 2012b
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Parnas et al 2013
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Haug et al 2013
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Cues (visual, auditory, sensory, proprioceptive) will not always be compatible with each other.
“cues – visual, auditory, sensory, proprioceptive – will not always be compatible with each other”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Knill & Pouget 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Inaccuracies in internal source monitoring relate to the 'missing information reference' communication disturbance, whereby the subject refers to something they have not mentioned before and which their interlocutor cannot possibly know.
“and to a specific type of communication disturbance - the ‘missing information reference’, whereby the subject refers to something which they have not mentioned before and which their interlocutor therefore cannot possibly know (Nienow et al 2005).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nienow et al 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
In psychosis, the fine-grained predictive model of the moment-to-moment changes in sensory input that are expected on the basis of one's own planned movement is relatively imprecise.
“We suggest that, in psychosis, the fine-grained predictive model of the moment-to-moment changes in sensory input that are expected on the basis of one’s own planned movement is relatively imprecise (Synofzik et al 2010, Voss et al 2010).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Synofzik et al 2010
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Voss et al 2010
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
PTSD flashbacks are a profound, state-dependent reality monitoring deficit in which the sufferer is unable, momentarily, to reliably distinguish memory from current reality, or mental images from real sensory evidence.
“In essence this is a profound, state-dependent reality monitoring deficit in which the sufferer is unable, momentarily, to reliably distinguish memory from current reality, or mental images from real sensory evidence.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationnone given
The predictive processing framework encompasses memory, current perception, reality monitoring, and discrimination between possible external sources within the same mechanisms of updating and inference.
“Note that, while the source monitoring literature has typically focussed on memory rather than on current perception, and on reality monitoring rather than on discrimination between possible external sources, the PP framework encompasses all of these within the same mechanisms of updating and inference.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The symptoms of psychosis may reflect a more subtle, but persistent, version of the PTSD reality monitoring disturbance: a reality monitoring deficit conferring undue weight on memories in shaping the current world model.
“To some extent, the symptoms of psychosis may reflect a more subtle, but persistent, version of this same disturbance: a reality monitoring deficit conferring undue weight on memories in shaping the current world model.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisecitation
Those same sensory inputs retain the perceptual qualities typical of self-propelled, goal-directed action and therefore accord with the model of the general characteristics of agentic action.
“However, those same sensory inputs nevertheless retain the perceptual qualities that are typical of self-propelled, goal-directed action and therefore they accord with our model of the general characteristics of agentic action (Cicchino et al 2011).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Cicchino et al 2011
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
By isolating the individual from the usual interpersonal 'checks' on epistemic reasoning, the maladaptive orientation may have the indirect effect of allowing idiosyncratic beliefs to develop and become entrenched.
“Moreover, by isolating the individual from the usual interpersonal ‘checks’ on epistemic reasoning, it may also have the indirect effect of allowing idiosyncratic beliefs to develop and become entrenched.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
A prediction error from a known reliable source should be weighted more strongly than one from a new source or a source that has proven itself unreliable.
“A prediction error from a known reliable source should be weighted more strongly than one from a new source or a source that has proven itself unreliable.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Knill & Pouget 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Moore & Fletcher 2012
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Representations of the social world could be the first to 'break' when the system encounters a relatively minor impairment in uncertainty-weighting inference.
“Consequently, representations of the social world could be the first to ‘break’ when the system encounters a relatively minor impairment in uncertainty-weighting inference.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
An important function of episodic memory is the facilitation of flexible, context-dependent behaviour.
“An important function of episodic memory is the facilitation of flexible, context-dependent behaviour (Suddendorf & Corballis 2007).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Suddendorf & Corballis 2007
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
People with psychosis would be compromised in their ability to identify an optimal balance between trusting and distrusting socially communicated information, depending on the reliability of the source.
“Given that people with psychosis have difficulty discriminating the source of verbal memory traces (Brébion et al 2005), it follows that they would be compromised in their ability to identify an optimal balance between trusting and distrusting socially communicated information, depending on the reliability of the source (see Fonagy and Allison 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fonagy and Allison 2014
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
Negative symptoms arise as a result of over-compensative adaptation to a pattern of dysregulation that initially led to the development of positive symptoms.
“This result accords with the idea that negative symptoms arise as a result of over-compensative adaptation to a pattern of dysregulation that initially led to the development of positive symptoms.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Storing and retrieving a representation of the source of a memory trace may be strongly relevant for learning, and especially generalisation.
“Moreover, storing and retrieving a representation of the source of a memory trace may be strongly relevant for learning, and (especially) generalisation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
A meta-analysis by Achim and Weiss (2008) found that source-monitoring deficits in schizophrenia are not specific; they are just one facet of a more general problem with associative memory.
“It is relevant too that a meta-analysis by Achim and Weiss (2008) found that source-monitoring deficits in schizophrenia are not specific: rather, they are just one facet of a more general problem with associative memory.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Achim and Weiss (2008)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Brébion et al (2002) discovered that certain source monitoring errors that were positively associated with positive symptoms were negatively associated with negative symptoms.
“Curiously, Brébion et al (2002) discovered that certain source monitoring errors that were positively associated with positive symptoms were negatively associated with negative symptoms: suggesting that ‘positive and negative symptomatology appear to have opposite links to the source monitoring errors observed in patients with schizophrenia’.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brébion et al (2002)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The content of psychotic experiences must reflect the knowledge, experiences and preoccupations of the individual.
“Notably, as pointed out elsewhere (Kapur 2003), the content must surely reflect the knowledge, experiences and preoccupations of the individual.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Kapur 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
People with psychosis have difficulty discriminating the source of verbal memory traces.
“Given that people with psychosis have difficulty discriminating the source of verbal memory traces (Brébion et al 2005), it follows that they would be compromised in their ability to identify an optimal balance between trusting and distrusting socially communicated information, depending on the reliability of the source (see Fonagy and Allison 2014).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Brébion et al 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
A psychotic experience that comes to clinical attention may be highly selected.
“In short, we should remind ourselves that a psychotic experience that comes to clinical attention may be highly selected.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
PTSD 'flashbacks' involve a transient psychosis-like state in which the person re-experiences a traumatic memory as though it were real, happening in the here and now.
“PTSD ‘flashbacks’ involve a transient psychosis-like state in which the person re-experiences a traumatic memory as though it were real, happening in the here and now.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The largely negative emotional tone of clinical psychosis may, in part at least, reflect the fact that such clinical characteristics are largely derived from studies of people who are help-seeking.
“To begin, it is important to consider that the largely negative emotional tone of clinical psychosis may, in part at least, reflect the fact that such clinical characteristics are largely derived from studies of people who are help-seeking.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
The current model of the world, and the ways in which it is updated in response to sensory evidence, fundamentally depend on priors formed from past experiences, which shape current expectations at multiple levels.
“This is an integral part of the PP framework: that the current model of the world, and the ways in which it is updated in response to sensory evidence, fundamentally depend on priors formed from past experiences, which shape current expectations at multiple levels.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Source monitoring is crucial for flexibly adjusting the degree to which simpler, lower-order associations can dictate behaviour, or can be updated, in any particular context.
“Consequently, source monitoring is crucial for flexibly adjusting the degree to which simpler, lower-order associations can dictate behaviour, or can be updated, in any particular context.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Source monitoring tasks draw on the same pool of processes and representations as do episodic memory tasks.
“Indeed, source monitoring tasks draw on the same pool of processes and representations as do episodic memory tasks (Johnson 2005, Johnson 2006).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Johnson 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Johnson 2006
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Perturbations in source memory might have especially severe manifestations in social functioning.
“This capacity may be particularly important and challenging in the social domain, and consequently any perturbations in source memory might have especially severe manifestations in social functioning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
In psychosis, the sensory consequences of one's own actions are associated with an unusually high prediction error at this level, suggesting that this was not one's own agentic movement.
“Thus, the sensory consequences of one’s own actions are associated with an unusually high PE at this level, suggesting that this was not one’s own agentic movement.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Different sources of a piece of evidence influence how it drives updating, being relevant both in making inferences about the meaning of the evidence and about its significance.
“Different sources of a piece of evidence will influence how it drives updating in complex ways, being relevant both in making inferences about the meaning of the evidence, and about its significance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Reduced discriminability between social sources could make everything and everyone seem uniformly unreliable, even suspicious.
“Just as reduced discriminability in PE signalling could lead to a consistent sense of unease or surprise, so too could reduced discriminability between social sources make everything (and everyone) seem uniformly unreliable - even suspicious.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Remembering who said what is important for prediction-error driven learning about who (not) to rely on, and who (not) to trust.
“The advice and information people share with you now can turn out later to have been much more or less useful than you anticipated, and remembering who said what is important for prediction-error driven learning about who (not) to rely on, and who (not) to trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
A potentially maladaptive orientation away from the shared social world may underlie the development of negative symptoms such as asociality and alogia.
“This kind of potentially maladaptive orientation away from the shared social world may underlie the development of negative symptoms such as asociality and alogia.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Because social evidence is ambiguous and uncertain, high-level priors may be particularly influential in socially-based inferences, compared with physically-based inferences for which the evidence can be more precise and less susceptible to such re-shaping.
“Indeed, because social evidence is so ambiguous and uncertain, high-level priors may be particularly influential in socially-based inferences, compared with physically-based inferences for which the evidence can be more precise and less susceptible to such re-shaping.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Social cues may be inherently more uncertain than non-social ones, since they rely on inferring intentions from ambiguous physical acts.
“Related to this, it is worth noting that social cues may be inherently more uncertain than non-social ones, since they rely on inferring intentions from ambiguous physical acts.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Inaccuracies in internal source monitoring relate specifically to thought disorder.
“Inaccuracies in internal source monitoring (‘did I say that aloud, or did I just think it?’) relate specifically to thought disorder (Nienow et al 2004), and to a specific type of communication disturbance - the ‘missing information reference’”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nienow et al 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
By identifying the source of some ostensibly predictive information, and retrieving that source memory at the time the outcome is expected, the system can make added use of any prediction error that then ensues.
“By identifying the source of some ostensibly predictive information, and retrieving that source memory at the time the outcome is expected, the system can make added use of any prediction error that then ensues.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The incorporation of a more dynamic perspective on how perceptions and beliefs unfold over time, together with a greater appreciation of how predictions can repeatedly shape sensory evidence, allows the predictive processing framework to offer powerful explanatory insights into why delusions are often so bizarre.
“We suggest that the incorporation of a more dynamic perspective on how perceptions and beliefs unfold over time, together with a greater appreciation of how predictions (particularly those experienced as being precise and reliable) can repeatedly shape sensory evidence, allows the PP framework to offer powerful explanatory insights into the question of why delusions are often so bizarre.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
The imposter hypothesis does not have to be accepted wholesale on the basis of just the initial experience, nor even on the basis of a cumulative succession of identical experiences.
“This is because the hypothesis doesn’t have to be accepted wholesale on the basis of just the initial experience, nor even on the basis of a cumulative succession of identical experiences.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The risk of psychotic disorder is elevated in people with a history of childhood trauma.
“It is also noteworthy in this regard that the risk of psychotic disorder is elevated in people with a history of childhood trauma (Schafer & Fisher 2011, Varese et al 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Schafer & Fisher 2011 source
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Varese et al 2012
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
A delusion, once in place, may become self-reinforcing as evidence is sampled and interpreted in accordance with expectations.
“A delusion, once in place, may therefore become self-reinforcing as evidence is sampled and interpreted in accordance with expectations.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
People with higher trait schizotypy may have a lower stress threshold beyond which memories are encoded via the amygdala-led route, rendering these individuals particularly prone to frequently experience unpredictable, vivid intrusions of moderately threatening memory fragments into conscious awareness.
“Moreover, people with higher trait schizotypy may have a lower stress threshold beyond which memories are encoded via the amygdala-led route (perhaps due to problems with hippocampal-mediated associative memory), rendering these individuals particularly prone to frequently experience unpredictable, vivid intrusions of moderately threatening memory fragments into conscious awareness (Steel et al 20”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Steel et al 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Helmsley et al 1994
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
In Bayesian terms, the imposter hypothesis' likelihood is higher, given this second experience, than it was given the first experience.
“In Bayesian terms, the imposter hypothesis’ likelihood is higher, given this second experience, than it was given the first experience.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
Given the centrality of unpredictability and vividness cues for successful reality monitoring, memories of traumatic events will be particularly susceptible to external misattribution.
“Given the centrality of unpredictability and vividness cues for successful reality monitoring, this will make memories of traumatic events particularly susceptible to external misattribution.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
There is evidence that the mere act of imaginatively entertaining a hypothesis raises its subjective probability next time it is entertained.
“In addition, there is evidence that the mere act of imaginatively entertaining a hypothesis raises its subjective probability next time it is entertained (Arkes 1991, Garry et al 1996, Roediger & McDermott 1978).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Arkes 1991
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Garry et al 1996
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Roediger & McDermott 1978
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
When a delusion is theorised to be an essentially rational response to strange experiences, it is hard to comprehend the highly improbable and prima facie irrational content of the belief itself compared to other equally possible, and much more probable, interpretations.
“In particular, when a delusion is theorised to be an essentially rational response to strange experiences (Kapur 2003, Maher 1974), it is hard to comprehend the highly improbable and, prima facie, irrational content of the belief itself (‘I am being followed by spies’) compared to other equally possible, and much more probable, interpretations (‘I am suffering from a mental illness which affects”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Kapur 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Maher 1974
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationcitation
People with, or at risk for, schizophrenia may be particularly susceptible to the imagination inflation effect, due to their trait-like tendency to experience particularly vivid mental imagery.
“This ‘imagination inflation’ effect is stronger the more vividly the hypothesis was imagined (Sherman et al 1985) - suggesting that people with, or at risk for, schizophrenia may be particularly susceptible to it, due to their trait-like tendency to experience particularly vivid mental imagery (Oertel et al 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Oertel et al 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Mental images 'seem to behave like weak versions of externally triggered perceptual representations'.
“Mental images ‘seem to behave like weak versions of externally triggered perceptual representations’ (Pearson et al 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Pearson et al 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Schmack and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that the effect of high-level knowledge on perceptual processing, in healthy subjects, increases with their tendency towards delusional ideation.
“Indeed, Schmack and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that the effect of high-level knowledge on perceptual processing, in healthy subjects, increases with their tendency towards delusional ideation – suggesting that highly schizotypal individuals are particularly prone to this self-reinforcing effect, which perhaps contributes to their elevated risk of psychotic disorder.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schmack and colleagues (2013)
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
The 'imagination inflation' effect is stronger the more vividly the hypothesis was imagined.
“This ‘imagination inflation’ effect is stronger the more vividly the hypothesis was imagined (Sherman et al 1985) - suggesting that people with, or at risk for, schizophrenia may be particularly susceptible to it, due to their trait-like tendency to experience particularly vivid mental imagery (Oertel et al 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Sherman et al 1985
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The very low prior probability of the imposter hypothesis is not ultimately a bar to its eventual acceptance.
“In acknowledging the dynamic nature of the updating process, we suggest that the very low prior probability of the imposter hypothesis is not ultimately a bar to its eventual acceptance.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
On the second occasion that he encounters his wife in the absence of the expected physiological response, predictive processing provides a mechanism by which merely having entertained the imposter idea at a high level could be enough for the idea to imbue the content of the experience itself with some of its semantic content.
“However, on the second occasion that he encounters his wife in the absence of the expected physiological response, PP provides a mechanism by which merely having entertained the imposter idea at a high level could be enough for the idea to imbue the content of the experience itself with some of its semantic content.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
From a computational standpoint, the relatively low precision of mental imagery could explain its low probability of contributing to updating priors.
“From a computational standpoint, the relatively low precision of mental imagery could explain its low probability of contributing to updating priors.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
The 'imagination inflation' effect is greater for emotional interpersonal events than it is for neutral ones.
“Interestingly, the ‘imagination inflation’ effect is greater for emotional interpersonal events than it is for neutral ones (Szpunar & Schachter 2013), perhaps contributing to the tendency for delusions to have a negative emotional tone.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Szpunar & Schachter 2013
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
A predictive processing exploration of the phenomenological characteristics of psychosis has the potential to make explanatory links with its specific aetiological risk factors.
“Thus, a PP exploration of the phenomenological characteristics of psychosis (e.g. the experiences’ unpleasantness) also has the potential to make explanatory links with its specific aetiological risk factors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Premisenone given
A key point, made explicit in predictive processing models, is that beliefs are not just 'caused' by evidence but themselves play a powerful subsequent role in determining how evidence is sampled, weighted and interpreted.
“A key point, one that is made explicit in PP models, is that beliefs are not just ‘caused’ by evidence but themselves play a powerful subsequent role in determining how evidence is sampled, weighted and interpreted.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Traumatic memories may be particularly susceptible to undergoing arousal-dependent or cue-dependent intrusions into consciousness, in a format that is both phenomenologically vivid and unpredictable given the context.
“Traumatic memories may (perhaps because they are processed via an amygdalar rather than hippocampal-led route (LeDoux et al 1988) be particularly susceptible to undergoing arousal-dependent or cue-dependent intrusions into consciousness, in a format that is both phenomenologically vivid, and unpredictable given the context (Brewin 2001, Holmes & Steel 2004, Steel et al 2008).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Brewin 2001
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Holmes & Steel 2004
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Steel et al 2008
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
Many sufferers see their current experiences as a re-enactment of previous traumatic events.
“Indeed, many sufferers see their current experiences as a re-enactment of previous traumatic events (Hardy et al 2005, Steel 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Hardy et al 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Steel 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisereasoning
One of the most informative cues available for reality monitoring is a representation's vividness.
“One of the most informative cues available for reality monitoring is a representation’s vividness.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Increased vividness of imagery does seem to be a trait-like feature of schizophrenia.
“and indeed, increased vividness of imagery does seem to be a trait-like feature of schizophrenia (Sack et al 2005, Oertel et al 2009).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Sack et al 2005
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Oertel et al 2009
Not checked in the free run.
- Premisecitation
High-level, abstract ideas can permeate down the representational hierarchy to disambiguate uncertainty at lower, more 'experiential' levels.
“High-level, abstract ideas can permeate down the representational hierarchy to disambiguate uncertainty at lower, more ‘experiential’ levels (Teufel & Nanay 2016).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Teufel & Nanay 2016
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The predictive processing framework offers a mechanism, via perturbed source and reality monitoring, by which traumatic past events could come to influence the current world model so profoundly and distressingly.
“The PP framework offers a mechanism, via perturbed source and reality monitoring, by which these traumatic past events could come to influence the current world model so profoundly and distressingly.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Premisecitation
Similar computations are involved in the important task of metacognitively discriminating between classes of internally-caused representations, in particular between beliefs and imaginings.
“It is likely that similar computations are involved in the important task of metacognitively discriminating between classes of internally-caused representations - in particular, between beliefs and imaginings (Johnson et al 1979, Johnson et al 1981).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Johnson et al 1979
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Johnson et al 1981
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
The type of tasks explored in the source monitoring framework are important examples of the causal inference problem that predictive processing addresses.
“The type of tasks explored in the source monitoring framework are important examples of this causal inference problem.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationreasoning
People with psychosis may well have trouble making accurate discriminations between classes of internally-caused representations, in particular between beliefs and imaginings.
“People with psychosis, therefore, may well have trouble making such discriminations accurately.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
Predictive processing relates more readily and directly to the brain than other approaches.
“It is possible to consider information processing in terms of physical systems as well as cognitive ones (Frith 2008) and, in this respect, predictive processing relates more readily and directly to the brain.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frith 2008
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
An account of psychosis as resulting from an imbalance in predictive processing strongly accords with, and extends, a source monitoring impairment theory expressed at a higher level.
“We have attempted to show that an account of psychosis as resulting from an imbalance in PP strongly accords with, and extends, a source monitoring impairment theory expressed at a higher level.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim - Interpretationcitation
The predictive processing framework can stimulate new conceptualisations of how seemingly disparate phenomena (such as perception and belief) may be less distinct at a lower level of description.
“Second, it can stimulate new conceptualisations of how seemingly disparate phenomena (such as perception and belief) may be less distinct at a lower level of description.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Teufel and Fletcher 2016
Not checked in the free run.
- Interpretationreasoning
Such a tendency to misidentify imaginings as beliefs could arise from a relatively subtle disturbance in predictive processing, of the same kind as suggested to give rise to the external misattribution bias on source monitoring tasks.
“Such a tendency could arise from a relatively subtle disturbance in PP, of the same kind as we have suggested gives rise to the external misattribution bias on source monitoring tasks.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim - Interpretationcitation
In a system that is already noisy and uncertain, there may be a system that is "hungry for priors" leading to excessive top down influences.
“However, in a system that is already noisy and uncertain, we may have a system that is “hungry for priors” (Dakin S, Personal communication) leading to excessive top down influences (Teufel et al, 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Teufel et al, 2015
Not checked in the free run.
- May combine two claims. 33
- Classified as probably not a substantial claim. 53
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe successful brain must model its world and generate accurate predictions about upcoming events to marshal preparatory responses.
“The successful brain must model its world (Conant & Ashby 1970). It needs to be able to generate accurate predictions about upcoming events, so that it can marshal preparatory responses.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Conant & Ashby 1970
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSource monitoring and the attribution of agency fall naturally within the ambit of predictive processing and prediction error minimisation.
“source monitoring and the attribution of agency (itself an important consideration in psychosis) fall naturally within the ambit of PP and prediction error minimisation.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationCulbreth et al (2016) demonstrated a similar increased tendency to update in response to prediction error in schizophrenia, which was mediated entirely by impaired activation in cingulate, parietal and frontal regions.
“Consistent with this, Culbreth et al (2016) demonstrated a similar tendency in schizophrenia, which they attributed to ‘unstable’ representations of value (but which they might equally have been attributed to ‘noisy’ or ‘imprecise’ prior representations of value) and which was mediated entirely by impaired activation in cingulate, parietal and frontal regions.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Culbreth et al (2016)
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationPeople with chronic schizophrenia classically have a perseverative, inflexible response pattern on probabilistic reversal learning tasks, consistent with a tendency to underutilise prediction errors.
“they classically have a perseverative, inflexible response pattern (consistent with a tendency to underutilise prediction errors) on probabilistic reversal learning (PRL) tasks (Elliott et al 1995, Kerns & Berenbaum 2002, Pantellis 1997 – although see also Waltz et al 2013).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Elliott et al 1995
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Kerns & Berenbaum 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Pantellis 1997
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenSource monitoring acts as a higher-level description of a set of capacities, while predictive coding aims to provide a deeper account of how these and other capacities may emerge.
“The former acts as a higher level description of a set of capacities, and the latter aims to provide a deeper account of how these and other capacities may emerge.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenInferences must be flexible in the face of change but robust in the face of noise.
“Put simply, inferences must be flexible in the face of change but robust in the face of noise.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningA persistent underlying disturbance could, as a result of ongoing adaptive processes, manifest in different ways across time.
“This is all speculative, but the key point is that a persistent underlying disturbance could, as a result of ongoing adaptive processes, manifest in different ways across time.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningA small but persistent disruption in the ability to optimally weight each prediction error could create sub-optimal adaptation, leading to initially high levels of prediction-error-driven updating followed by later downregulation of learning.
“One can envisage how a small but persistent disruption in the ability to optimally weight each PE could create sub-optimal adaptation, leading to evolving consequences such as initially high levels of PE-driven updating being followed by later downregulation of learning.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe proactive control system's ability to facilitate flexible, rapid updating in response to relevant information while preventing interference from irrelevant information depends on temporally precise dopaminergic neuromodulation of this network.
“This proactive control system’s ability to facilitate flexible, rapid updating in response to relevant information, while preventing interference from irrelevant information, has been suggested to depend on temporally precise dopaminergic neuromodulation of this network (Braver 2012).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Braver 2012
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationThe brain is foremost attempting to model the world and updates inferences by iteratively reducing prediction errors.
“the brain is foremost attempting to model the world (Conant & Ashby 1970) and that it does so by updating inferences through iteratively reducing ‘prediction errors’”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Conant & Ashby 1970
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationDopamine signals the magnitude of reward prediction errors and has been suggested to be critical in signalling the precision or epistemic value of incoming information, setting the gain on cortical prediction error signals.
“dopamine, in addition to signalling the magnitude of reward PEs (Schultz et al 1997) has been suggested to be critical in signalling the precision (Fiorillo et al 2003), or epistemic value (Schwartenbeck et al 2016) of incoming information, setting the gain on cortical PE signals.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Schultz et al 1997
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Fiorillo et al 2003
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Schwartenbeck et al 2016
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe persistent experience of a noisy, unreliable prediction error signal should cause an information-processing system to adapt by down-regulating updating in response to a given magnitude of prediction error signal.
“Preuschoff and Bossaerts (2007) consider, in computational terms, how the persistent experience of a noisy, unreliable (and hence informationally-devalued) PE signal should cause an information-processing system to adapt by down-regulating the updating that occurs in response to a given magnitude of PE signal.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Preuschoff and Bossaerts (2007)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe predictive processing framework has much to offer for understanding psychosis by linking multiple levels of explanation.
“We propose that the predictive processing framework has much to offer in this respect.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningA hierarchical and dynamic perspective on prediction error signalling in predictive processing has much to offer for understanding psychosis.
“arguing that a hierarchical and dynamic perspective has much to offer.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationTheoretical models of associative learning invoke simple error minimisation: the model is updated as a function of its failure to predict accurately.
“Theoretical models of associative learning invoke simple error minimisation to achieve this: the model is updated as a function of its failure to predict accurately (Rescorla & Wagner 1972).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Rescorla & Wagner 1972
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
PremisecitationThere is a need for a formal computational account that could bridge the explanatory gaps between brain, cognition and symptoms.
“There is a need for a formal computational account that could bridge the explanatory gaps between brain, cognition and symptoms (Frith 2015).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frith 2015
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationA failure to correctly identify the origin of a movement, thought or experience may capture the essential problem at the heart of other features of schizophrenia beyond passivity phenomena, so the source monitoring account could offer a truly fundamental description of the condition.
“since it has been suggested that a failure to correctly identify the origin of a movement, thought or experience may capture the essential problem that lies at the heart of other features of schizophrenia beyond those formally described as passivity phenomena, the source monitoring account could offer a truly fundamental description of the condition (Nelson et al 2014b).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Nelson et al 2014b
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe predictive processing framework points towards a bridge between brain, cognition and symptoms; it does not replace source monitoring ideas but offers them a deeper, computational foundation.
“The PP framework points towards this bridge. It does not replace source monitoring ideas but rather offers them a deeper, computational foundation.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThese are precisely the sorts of inferences with which predictive processing is concerned.
“These are precisely the sorts of inferences with which PP is concerned.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.
PremisecitationSource monitoring is a conclusion or inference to best account for the overall data; it is an abductive inference from the data back to the most likely cause.
“Ultimately, we see source monitoring as a conclusion or inference to best account for the overall data. That is, it is an abductive inference: an inference from the data back to the most likely cause (see Coltheart 2010).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Coltheart 2010
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Premisenone givenSource monitoring attributions can be thought of as inferences about what or who was the most likely cause of an event, made under conditions of noise, ambiguity and uncertainty.
“we can think of source monitoring attributions as inferences about what (or who) was the most likely cause of an event, made under conditions of noise, ambiguity and uncertainty.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSource information may be critical insofar as it could provide a marker for the reliability of information.
“this source information may be critical especially insofar as it could provide a marker for the reliability of this information.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
PremisecitationSource monitoring is a high level description of a cognitive capability, encompassing other processes, rather than being a specific cognitive process itself.
“Source monitoring is a high level description of a cognitive capability, one that encompasses other processes, rather than being a specific cognitive process itself.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenSource monitoring failure provides a compelling descriptive account of a core problem in psychosis: a failure to discriminate internal from external, reality from imagination.
“In short, source monitoring failure provides a compelling descriptive account of what is intuitively a core problem in psychosis: a failure to discriminate internal from external, reality from imagination.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationAccording to the source monitoring account, delusions and hallucinations result from incorrect attribution of imagined or self-generated representations to external causal sources.
“According to the source monitoring account, delusions and hallucinations result from incorrect attribution of imagined or self-generated representations to external causal sources.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningEven a subtle impairment in source monitoring ability could profoundly change one's world model.
“Clearly, it is critical to be able to do this, and even a subtle impairment in source monitoring ability could profoundly change one’s world model.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe predictive processing account can be naturally extended to encompass source attributions more broadly, offering a computational explanation for passivity experiences involving attribution to an external agent.
“the PP account can go further. It can be naturally extended to encompass source attributions more broadly, and in so doing, it has the potential to offer a computational explanation for a hitherto poorly understood characteristic of passivitiy experiences in schizophrenia: they involve not just the failure to recognise oneself as the agent of an action, but also its attribution to an external ag”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationSensory events for which I am the source are predictable in advance, while sensory events arising from external sources are not.
“sensory events for which I am the source are predictable in advance (Frith et al 2000, Blakemore et al 2002, Wolpert & Flanagan 2001) while sensory events arising from external sources are not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 3 sources checked- cites Frith et al 2000
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Blakemore et al 2002
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Wolpert & Flanagan 2001
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationEvents caused by agentic sources usually have features that distinguish them from those caused by external physical forces: they start and stop, speed up and slow down, take non-linear trajectories; they are relatively unpredictable without recourse to a higher-level model possibly involving goals and intentions.
“Events caused by agentic sources usually have features that distinguish them from those caused by external physical forces: they start and stop, they speed up and slow down, they take non-linear trajectories. They are, in short, relatively unpredictable without recourse to some higher-level model possibly involving goals and intentions.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Biro et al 2007
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Premack 1999
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationIn psychosis, as suggested for autism, loss of capacity or confidence in the social domain could lead to highly selective sampling of information, avoidance of especially uncertain sources of evidence, and a tendency to cut oneself off from information and beliefs passed on by other people.
“In psychosis, just as has been suggested for autism (Elsabbagh and Johnson 2016), the sometimes- profound loss of capacity (or confidence) in the social domain could lead to highly selective sampling of information, avoidance of especially uncertain sources of evidence, and a tendency to cut oneself off from a very valuable source of uncertainty resolution: the information and beliefs passed on to”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites Elsabbagh and Johnson 2016
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Ratcliffe 2015
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenSource monitoring underpins the kind of context-dependent learning necessary to deal with complex, higher-order worldly contingencies, and with cues that have differential reliability and predictive power.
“It underpins the kind of context-dependent learning necessary to deal with complex, higher-order worldly contingencies, and with cues that have differential reliability and predictive power.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Premisenone givenA notion central to predictive processing frameworks is that sensory evidence has the capacity to drive inference only insofar as it has sufficient precision or reliability to usefully update inference in the context of existing prior expectations.
“We suggest this because a notion central to PP frameworks is that sensory evidence has the capacity to drive inference only insofar as it has sufficient precision or reliability to usefully update inference in the context of existing prior expectations, and”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningInformation about the source of an event may be useful in guiding decision-making when the event is later recalled, and may be useful in ways that are not always predictable in advance; hence source memory is important for decision flexibility.
“Even if currently irrelevant for action choice, information about the source of an event may be useful in guiding decision-making when the event is later recalled – and importantly, it may be useful in ways that are not always predictable in advance: hence the importance of source memory for decision flexibility, in particular.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe abductive inference to the best explanation-the one that minimises prediction error at all levels of the hierarchy-entails not merely that the movement was caused by something other than myself, but also that it was caused by an agent.
“The abductive inference to the best explanation – that is, the one that minimises prediction error at all levels of the hierarchy – therefore entails not merely that the movement was caused by something other than myself, but also that it was caused by an agent”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningThe predictive processing framework provides a deeper understanding of source monitoring and offers a compelling account of how a hypothesised impairment in processing prediction errors could lead to agency disturbances and, via subtle changes in how sources of evidence are weighted, a profound change in how a person models and interprets their world.
“We suggest that the PP framework provides a deeper understanding of source monitoring and offers a compelling account of how the hypothesised impairment in the processing of prediction errors could lead to agency disturbances and, via subtle changes in how sources of evidence are weighted, a profound change in how a person models and interprets their world.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based). May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningSource monitoring itself has an extremely important and far-reaching role in allowing us to make sense of the world and to ensure that we update our model only when necessary.
“This arises, we argue, because source monitoring itself has an extremely important and far-reaching role to play in allowing us to make sense of the world and to ensure that we update our model only when necessary.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationReduced discriminability between social sources could account for the peculiar social content of delusions and for their social form.
“This could account not only for the peculiar social content of delusions - widespread conspiracies involving a growing list of suspicious people - but also for their social form: delusions involve a kind of ‘Global social estrangement…[and] a failure to treat others as reliable sources of information’ (Ratcliffe 2015).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ratcliffe 2015
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenReduced discriminability in prediction error signalling could lead to a consistent sense of unease or surprise.
“Just as reduced discriminability in PE signalling could lead to a consistent sense of unease or surprise, so too could reduced discriminability between social sources make everything (and everyone) seem uniformly unreliable - even suspicious.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.
Interpretationnone givenThe ability to identify the causal sources of current inputs is a key concern of predictive processing, and may be crucial for flexible learning and behaviour.
“The ability to identify the causal sources of current inputs is a key concern of PP, and may be crucial for flexible learning and behaviour.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenAn accurate representation of the source of some evidence will very often be an important clue to estimating its reliability.
“and because an accurate representation of the source of some evidence will very often be an important clue to estimating its reliability.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPrediction error is useful not only in updating one's prior belief about the reliability of the information itself but also in updating a meta-level prior as to the general reliability of its source.
“PE is useful not only in updating one’s prior belief about the reliability of the information itself (‘how reliably does this signal produce the outcome?’) but also in updating a meta-level prior as to the general reliability of its source (‘how reliable are signals from that source?).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisecitationA key point is not just what the evidence is, but the optimising meta-level judgments about how reliable that evidence is expected to be and, by extension, the degree to which it should be weighted.
“and a key point is not just what the evidence is, but the optimising meta-level judgments about how reliable that evidence is expected to be (Mathys 2011) and, by extension, the degree to which it should be weighted.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mathys 2011
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationRetrospectively inferring 'who said what' is likely to be a highly challenging task because a great deal of potentially-identifying perceptual information in the speech signal is filtered out during encoding and there may be a very long delay before a piece of information is re-evoked and updated.
“Retrospectively inferring ‘who said what’ is likely to be a highly challenging task: a great deal of potentially-identifying perceptual information in the speech signal is filtered out during encoding in order to prioritise semantic processing (Johnson 2005), and there may be a very long delay before a piece of information is re-evoked and updated.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Johnson 2005
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningPredictive processing offers a framework for understanding source monitoring capabilities and a parsimonious explanation for how specific perturbations generate characteristic oddities of both source and agency attribution.
“In short, PP offers a framework for understanding source monitoring capabilities as well as a parsimonious explanation for how specific perturbations might generate characteristic oddities of both source and agency attribution.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
PremisecitationElsabbagh and Johnson (2016) suggested that a 'domain general and diffuse' abnormality in synaptic connectivity and transmission has partial and mild effects on multiple systems but these effects are only clearly revealed when more complex multisensory integration and high temporal resolution processing becomes important in the increasingly complex social environment.
“Elsabbagh and Johnson (2016) suggested that a ‘domain general and diffuse’ abnormality in synaptic connectivity and transmission has ‘partial and mild effects on multiple systems…but [these] effects are only clearly revealed when more complex multisensory integration and high temporal resolution processing becomes important…[in] the increasingly complex social environment’.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Elsabbagh and Johnson (2016)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe predictive processing explanation of a reduction in associative memory could have further explanatory power, accounting for difficulty in using source and context information to allow flexibility of thinking and decision-making.
“Given the importance of associative memory (for source and spatiotemporal context) in facilitating flexible behaviour, we advance the possibility that the PP explanation of a reduction in this capacity could have further explanatory power, accounting for difficulty in using source and context information to allow flexibility of thinking and decision-making.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationMcKay (2012) takes this further in relation to a Bayesian account of Capgras delusion proposed by Coltheart et al (2010).
“McKay (2012) takes this further in relation to a Bayesian account of Capgras delusion (the belief that a loved one has been replaced by an imposter) proposed by Coltheart et al (2010).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 2 sources checked- cites McKay (2012)
Not checked in the free run.
- cites Coltheart et al (2010)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S1 (asserted).
PremisecitationFrom a Bayesian perspective, the imposter hypothesis has such a low prior probability that it is hard to understand how it could be selected as the most likely cause of the experience.
“From a Bayesian perspective, the imposter hypothesis has such a low prior probability that it is hard to understand how it could be selected as the most likely cause of the experience.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites McKay 2012
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMental images whose content is for some reason poorly predicted by the current cognitive context will be experienced as more vivid, and thus particularly vulnerable to external misattribution.
“Extending the analogy with the agency case, mentalmages whose content is for some reason poorly predicted by the current cognitive context will be experienced as more vivid, and thus particularly vulnerable to external misattribution.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationThe precision of self-generated images may be 'dampened down' because they contain nothing newsworthy, and their consequently reduced salience or vividness will be a powerful cue that they are indeed self-generated rather than externally caused.
“By analogy with self-generated movement, the precision of self-generated images may be ‘dampened down’ because they contain nothing newsworthy -their content is already highly predictable given the system’s antecedent state – and their consequently reduced salience or vividness will be a powerful cue that they are indeed self-generated rather than externally caused (Frith 2005).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Frith 2005
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningThe predictive processing account has the potential to offer a unified explanation for a remarkably wide array of the disorder's symptoms, features and risk factors.
“This is admittedly speculative, but it highlights the potential of the PP account to offer a unified explanation for a remarkably wide array of the disorder’s symptoms, features and risk factors.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe idea that hallucinations result from vivid mental imagery being misattributed to an external cause is a long-standing one.
“The idea that hallucinations result from vivid mental imagery being misattributed to an external cause is a long-standing one (Mintz & Alpert 1972), and indeed, increased vividness of imagery does seem to be a trait-like feature of schizophrenia (Sack et al 2005, Oertel et al 2009).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Mintz & Alpert 1972
Not checked in the free run.
May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationHighly schizotypal individuals are particularly prone to the self-reinforcing effect of high-level knowledge on perceptual processing, which perhaps contributes to their elevated risk of psychotic disorder.
“Indeed, Schmack and colleagues (2013) demonstrated that the effect of high-level knowledge on perceptual processing, in healthy subjects, increases with their tendency towards delusional ideation – suggesting that highly schizotypal individuals are particularly prone to this self-reinforcing effect, which perhaps contributes to their elevated risk of psychotic disorder.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimClassified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationFonagy and Allison (2014) have offered a mechanistic account for how childhood trauma could lead to an inability to appropriately assign epistemic trust.
“Moreover, in relation to the discussion above about the social nature of delusions, Fonagy and Allison (2014) have offered a mechanistic account for how childhood trauma could lead to an inability to appropriately assign epistemic trust.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fonagy and Allison (2014)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationThe idea that an altered physiological response to a familiar person confers a strange sense of unfamiliarity, in the context of preserved conscious recognition of the person, has been argued to provide the germ of the ultimate belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor.
“The idea that an altered physiological response to a familiar person confers a strange sense of unfamiliarity, in the context of preserved conscious recognition of the person, has been argued to provide the germ of the ultimate belief that the person has been replaced by an impostor (Ellis et al 1997).”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Ellis et al 1997
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.
InterpretationcitationPeople who suffered neglect and abuse may have formed a persisting meta-level prior that 'who said it' makes little difference: social source is simply not a very useful guide to epistemic reliability, and therefore not worth carefully monitoring.
“Since neglect and abuse prevent the formation of specific attachment relations that differentially pick out particular adults who can be relied upon as sources of valuable, generalizable information, people who suffered neglect and abuse may have thereby formed a persisting meta-level prior that ‘who said it’ makes little difference: in other words, that social source is simply not a very useful”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fonagy and Allison (2014)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
PremisecitationColtheart (2007) makes a powerful case that a separate factor, in addition to that which generates the strange experiences, must be invoked to account for why such an unlikely belief is not rejected.
“This objection has been eloquently outlined by Coltheart (2007) who make a powerful case that a separate factor, in addition to that which generates the strange experiences,must be invoked to account for why such an unlikely belief is not rejected.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Coltheart (2007)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningIt would be misguided to compare directly the predictive processing and source monitoring accounts, because they are pitched at different levels.
“As above, it would be misguided to compare directly the predictive processing and source monitoring accounts, because they are pitched at different levels.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
PremisereasoningAlthough there are reports of "autochthonous" delusions which appear to arise suddenly and fully-formed, the more characteristic pattern is that delusion formation is preceded by a prodromal period of 'delusional mood', involving a vague sense that the world has subtly changed somehow to become more sinister or foreboding.
“Consistent with this overall picture, although there are reports of “autochthonous” delusions which appear to arise suddenly and fully-formed, the more characteristic pattern is that delusion formation is preceded by a prodromal period of ‘delusional mood’, involving a vague sense that the world has subtly changed somehow to become more sinister or foreboding.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThe temporally extended predictive processing account relates to a cognitive model proposed by Fleminger (1992), who refers to 'a morbid cycle of misperception and delusion reinforcing one another' occurring iteratively across time.
“Note that the temporally extended PP account we have adumbrated in this section relates to a cognitive model proposed by Fleminger (1992), who refers to ‘a morbid cycle of misperception and delusion reinforcing one another’ occurring iteratively across time.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Fleminger (1992)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningDifferent theoretical accounts of psychosis can often seem to be in competition or conflict, when in fact they may show themselves to be complementary when we identify the particular level(s) at which their claims are intended to apply, and the particular characteristic(s) of symptoms with which they concern themselves.
“Different accounts can often seem to be in competition or conflict, when in fact they may show themselves to be complementary when we identify the particular level(s) at which their claims are intended to apply, and the particular characteristic(s) of symptoms with which they concern themselves.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
Interpretationnone givenWithout intervening levels of understanding, correlative links between brain activity and source monitoring capacities will remain frustratingly vague.
“The brain basis of source monitoring has been explored (Mitchell & Johnson 2009) but, without intervening levels of understanding, correlative links between brain activity and source monitoring capacities will remain frustratingly vague.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenThe key components of a hierarchical and dynamic predictive processing framework - prediction error, reliability, uncertainty, adaptivity - readily translate to the subjective experiences that are key to source monitoring ideas: self versus other; real versus imagined; agentic versus non-agentic.
“Moreover, the key components that are the concern of a hierarchical and dynamic PP framework – prediction error, reliability, uncertainty, adaptivity – readily translate to the subjective experiences that are key to source monitoring ideas: self versus other; real versus imagined; agentic versus non-agentic.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningSource information is valuable in optimally modelling the world.
“Moreover, by scrutinising source monitoring afresh within the PP context, we are encouraged to appreciate more fully the value of source information in optimally modelling the world”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationreasoningThe computational parameters invoked by predictive processing models appear, prima facie at least, to lend themselves readily to formulations in terms of brain processes.
“The computational parameters invoked by predictive processing models appear, prima facie at least, to lend themselves readily to formulations in terms of brain processes.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationcitationThe predictive processing framework offers opportunities for bridging levels of understanding that extend beyond merely tabulating the neural correlates of a capacity or behaviour.
“Third, it offers opportunities for bridging levels of understanding that extend beyond merely tabulating the neural correlates of a capacity or behaviour.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Teufel and Fletcher 2016
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationCurrie (2000) has already proposed a 'metarepresentational' account of delusions as being due to the individual imagining some state of affairs and misidentifying this imaging as a belief.
“Indeed, Currie (2000) has already proposed a ‘metarepresentational’ account of delusions as being due to the individual imagining some state of affairs (e.g., that his wife has been replaced by an imposter) and misidentifying this imaging as a belief.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Currie (2000)
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
PremisecitationThere are internal inconsistencies with respect to neurobiological implementations of predictive processing that demand careful scrutiny.
“Moreover, as has been discussed elsewhere (Teufel and Fletcher, 2016), there are internal inconsistencies with respect to neurobiological implementations of PP that demand careful scrutiny.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Teufel and Fletcher, 2016
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationThe question of which aspects of reality a model should represent, and which it should leave out, is unanswerable without a consideration of the model's purpose and intended level of explanation or description.
“The question of which aspects of reality a model should represent, and which it should it leave out, is unanswerable without a consideration of the model’s purpose and intended level of explanation or description (see Teufel and Fletcher, Brain 2016 for full discussion).”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Teufel and Fletcher, Brain 2016
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).
InterpretationreasoningPredictive processing provides a starting point for a computational understanding of the links between brain activity and source monitoring capacities, and of how they may be changed in psychosis.
“Predictive processing, we suggest, provides a starting point for a computational understanding of these links, and of how they may be changed in psychosis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimMay combine two claims.
InterpretationreasoningMisattributions of imaginings as beliefs could have severe consequences since imaginings could become able to influence perception which would in turn support developing beliefs, via the process of gradual self-reinforcement proposed.
“Misattributions of this nature could have severe consequences since imaginings could become able to influence perception which would in turn support developing beliefs, via the process of gradual self-reinforcement that we have proposed.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
Interpretationnone givenOne ultimate consequence of a failure to create, judge, compare and develop models of external reality and be clear about their aims and scope is psychosis.
“One ultimate consequence of a failure to do this is psychosis.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim- Rests on an assumption: The brain must create, judge, compare and develop models of external reality and must be clear about the aims and scope of each model.
May combine two claims.
PremisecitationBelief is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but varies along a continuum from more to less; if we implicitly interpret our thoughts as evidence indicative of the presence in the world of that to which the thought corresponds, then the stronger the presence of some information in our minds, the more likely we are to accept the validity of the situation posited by the thought.
“Schwartz (1998) frames these overall ideas eloquently: ”belief is not an all-or-nothing phenomenon, but, rather, varies along a continuum from more to less…If we implicitly interpret our thoughts as evidence indicative of the presence in the world of that to which the thought corresponds, then it seems reasonable to assume that the stronger the presence of some information in our minds, i.e., the”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Schwartz (1998)
Not checked in the free run.
Classified as probably not a substantial claim.
InterpretationcitationThe predictive processing framework demands an explicitness and precision that conceptual/descriptive models do not, by translating conceptualisations to a mathematical framework.
“First, in translating conceptualisations to a mathematical framework, it demands an explicitness and precision that conceptual/descriptive models do not.”
Quote in the paperSubstantial claim0 of 1 sources checked- cites Teufel and Fletcher 2016
Not checked in the free run.
Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).
InterpretationreasoningA source monitoring impairment profoundly and pervasively affects the modelling process itself, leading to models that are suboptimal and harmful in very specific ways.
“and the implications of a source monitoring impairment in profoundly and pervasively affecting the modelling process itself, leading to models that are suboptimal and harmful in very specific ways.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claimProbably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).
InterpretationcitationThe greater imagination inflation for emotional interpersonal events may contribute to the tendency for delusions to have a negative emotional tone.
“Interestingly, the ‘imagination inflation’ effect is greater for emotional interpersonal events than it is for neutral ones (Szpunar & Schachter 2013), perhaps contributing to the tendency for delusions to have a negative emotional tone.”
Quote in the paperNot a substantial claim
The paper relies on this without support.
The social world is highly volatile, and our access to it is extremely noisy.
“The social world is highly volatile, and our access to it extremely noisy.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Inferences about other people’s intentions are inferences about deeply hidden states.
“Inferences about other people’s intentions are inferences about deeply hidden states.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The more characteristic pattern is that delusion formation is preceded by a prodromal period of ‘delusional mood’, involving a vague sense that the world has subtly changed somehow to become more sinister or foreboding.
“the more characteristic pattern is that delusion formation is preceded by a prodromal period of ‘delusional mood’, involving a vague sense that the world has subtly changed somehow to become more sinister or foreboding.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Psychotic experiences are often negative, frightening, unpleasant and depressing.
“people often suffer from these experiences. They are negative, frightening, unpleasant and depressing.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Delusions tend to have a negative emotional colouring.
“Third, we ask why delusions tend to have a negative emotional colouring.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The application of predictive processing models has been largely descriptive.
“As yet, the application of PP models has been largely descriptive.”
The paper relies on this without support.
Predictive processing has yet to be fully and formally tested by examining novel predictions that it may make.
“While this research has established, as we hope has been shown here, an impressive degree of explanatory power, PP has yet to be fully and formally tested by examining novel predictions that it may make.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The brain must create, judge, compare and develop models of external reality and must be clear about the aims and scope of each model.
“The brain is no different. It must create, judge, compare and develop models of external reality and must be clear too about the aims and, importantly, the scope of each model.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
Recent evidence relates delusion-proneness to reduced usage of prior beliefs in perceptual but not cognitive decision making.
“Differential roles of priors at low and high levels of the hierarchy are also suggested by recent evidence relating delusion-proneness to reduced usage of prior beliefs in perceptual but not cognitive decision making (109).”
From The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis (2018) · cites this paper as [109]
In “Why are Delusions Bizarre?” (page unavailable), the review reports the opposite perceptual association: the effect of high-level knowledge on perception increased with delusional ideation in healthy subjects. The cited passage does not make the claimed perceptual-versus-cognitive decision-making comparison. (LLM, conf=0.86)
Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Premack citation year differs from reference
MinorThe in-text citation says 1999; the listed Premack reference says 1990.
“(Biro et al 2007, Premack 1999)”
“116. Premack D The infant's theory of self-propelled objects Cognition 1990 36 1 16 2383967”
Cicchino citation year differs from reference
MinorThe text cites Cicchino et al. as 2011, whereas the corresponding reference gives 2005.
“(Cicchino et al 2011)”
“22. Cicchino JB Aslin RN Rakison DH Correspondences between what infants see and know about causal and self-propelled motion Cognition 2005 118 2 171 92 PMC3038602 21122832”
LeDoux citation year differs from reference
MinorThe text cites LeDoux et al. as 1988, while the corresponding reference prints 1998.
“(LeDoux et al 1988)”
“87. LeDoux JE Iwata J Cicchetti P Reis DJ Different projections of the central amygdaloid nucleus mediate autonomic and behavioural correlates of conditioned fear J Neurosci 1998 8 2517 29 PMC6569498 2854842”
Behrens citation year differs from reference
MinorThe text cites Behrens et al. as 2008, but the corresponding Behrens-led reference is dated 2007.
“(Rushworth & Behrens 2007, Behrens et al 2008)”
“9. Behrens TE Woolrich MW Walton ME Rushworth MFS Learning the value of information in an uncertain world Nat Neurosci 2007 10 9 1214 21 17676057”
Moore citation year differs from reference
MinorThe text cites Moore as 2004 for auditory cues, while the listed Moore hearing reference is dated 2012.
“(Moore 2004)”
“98. Moore BCJ An Introduction to the Psychology of Hearing Sixth Edition Bingley, England Emerald Group Publishing Ltd 2012”
Schlagenhauf citation year differs from reference
MinorThe text cites the Schlagenhauf study as 2010, while the listed study is dated 2014.
“Schlagenhauf et al (2010) demonstrated an increased tendency to update in response to prediction error in unmedicated people in their very first episode of psychosis.”
“127. Schlagenhauf F Huys QJM Deserno L Rapp MA Beck A Striatal dysfunction during reversal learning in unmedicated schizophrenia patients Neuroimage 2014 89 171 80 24291614 PMC3991847”
Roediger and McDermott citation year differs from reference
MinorThe in-text citation gives 1978; the listed Roediger and McDermott reference gives 1995.
“(Arkes 1991, Garry et al 1996, Roediger & McDermott 1978)”
“122. Roediger HL McDermott KB Creating false memories: remembering words not presented in lists J Exp Psychol: Learn Mem Cogn 1995 21 803 14”
Pezzulo citation year differs from reference
MinorThe text cites Pezzulo as 2014, but the listed Pezzulo reference is dated 2013.
“Pezzulo provides an elegant and comprehensive discussion of these ideas (Pezzulo 2014).”
“115. Pezzulo G Why do you fear the Bogeyman? An embodied predictive coding model of perceptual inference Cogn Affect Behav Neurosci 2013 14 3 902 11 24307092”
Haug citation year differs from reference
MinorThe text cites Haug et al. as 2013, but the listed Haug paper on social dysfunction is dated 2014.
“(Haug et al 2012b, Parnas et al 2013, Haug et al 2013).”
“62. Haug E Oie M Andreassen OA Bratlien U Rabalo A Anomalous self-experiences contribute independently to social dysfunction in the early phases of schizophrenia and psychotic bipolar disorder Compr Psychiatry 2014 55 3 475 82 24378241”
Friston and Stephan citation year differs from reference
MinorThe text cites Friston and Stephan as 2007, but the corresponding reference lists 2009.
“Friston & Stephan 2007”
“50. Friston KJ Stephan KE Free-energy and the brain Synthese 2009 159 3 417 58 PMC2660582 19325932”
Cites
A neural substrate of prediction and reward
Schultz, W., Dayan, P., & Montague, P. R. (1997) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.275.5306.1593 · Cited by 9,388 · see citing works
The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory?
Friston, K. (2010) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2787 · Cited by 8,120 · cited 2× · see citing works
“…approaches have been applied to perception, belief, attention, and action, and they have even been put forward (notably in the context of the “free energy principle”; see Friston 2005, 2009, 2010; Friston & Stephan 2009; Friston et al. 2006) as the basis for a unified theory of brain function.”
BackgroundWhatever next? Predictive brains, situated agents, and the future of cognitive science
Clark, A. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12000477 · Cited by 5,924 · cited 2× · see citing works
“Moreover, we propose that ideas of the brain as a predictive device making inferences about its environment allow us to link cognitive processes not only to brain processes, but also to higher-level subjective and social phenomena (Clark 2013, Hohwy 2013).”
BackgroundA theory of cortical responses.
Friston, K. (2005) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2005.1622 · Cited by 4,578 · see citing works
An Introduction to the Psychology of Hearing
Moore, B. (1997) · BRILL eBooks · doi:10.1163/9789004658820 · Cited by 3,961 · see citing works
Johnson, M. K., Hashtroudi, S., & Lindsay, D. S. (1993) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/0033-2909.114.1.3 · Cited by 3,392 · see citing works
Kapur, S. (2003) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.160.1.13 · Cited by 2,813 · see citing works
The Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation
Knill, D. C., & Pouget, A. (2004) · Trends in Neurosciences · doi:10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007 · Cited by 2,588 · see citing works
The variable nature of cognitive control: a dual mechanisms framework
Braver, T. S. (2012) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.12.010 · Cited by 2,482 · see citing works
Varese, F., Smeets, F., Drukker, M., Lieverse, R., Lataster, T., Viechtbauer, W., Read, J., van Os, J., & Bentall, R. P. (2012) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbs050 · Cited by 2,436 · see citing works
Discrete coding of reward probability and uncertainty by dopamine neurons
Fiorillo, C. D., Tobler, P. N., & Schultz, W. (2003) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1077349 · Cited by 2,085 · see citing works
Learning the value of information in an uncertain world
Behrens, T. E. J., Woolrich, M. W., Walton, M. E., & Rushworth, M. F. S. (2007) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn1954 · Cited by 2,053 · see citing works
The evolution of foresight: What is mental time travel, and is it unique to humans?
Suddendorf, T., & Corballis, M. C. (2007) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x07001975 · Cited by 2,031 · see citing works
Hohwy, J. (2013) · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199682737.001.0001 · Cited by 1,914 · see citing works
The free-energy principle: a rough guide to the brain?
Friston, K. (2009) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.04.005 · Cited by 1,831 · see citing works
Insel, T. R. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature09552 · Cited by 1,783 · see citing works
LeDoux, J., Iwata, J., Cicchetti, P., & Reis, D. (1988) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.08-07-02517.1988 · Cited by 1,580 · see citing works
Perceiving is believing: a Bayesian approach to explaining the positive symptoms of schizophrenia
Fletcher, P. C., & Frith, C. D. (2009) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nrn2536 · Cited by 1,462 · see citing works
Self-citationA free energy principle for the brain
Friston, K., Kilner, J., & Harrison, L. (2006) · Journal of Physiology-Paris · doi:10.1016/j.jphysparis.2006.10.001 · Cited by 1,369 · see citing works
The neuropsychology of schizophrenia
Gray, J. A., Feldon, J., Rawlins, J. N. P., Hemsley, D. R., & Smith, A. D. (1991) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00065055 · Cited by 1,350 · see citing works
Wolpert, D. M., & Flanagan, J. R. (2001) · Current Biology · doi:10.1016/s0960-9822(01)00432-8 · Cited by 1,257 · see citing works
Abnormalities in the awareness and control of action
Frith, C., Blakemore, S., & Wolpert, D. M. (2000) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2000.0734 · Cited by 1,201 · see citing works
Proceedings of the 35th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society
Culbertson, J., & Wilson, C. (2013) · Cited by 1,125 · see citing works
Conflict monitoring and decision making: Reconciling two perspectives on anterior cingulate function
BOTVINICK, M. M. (2007) · Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3758/cabn.7.4.356 · Cited by 1,117 · see citing works
The cognitive control network: Integrated cortical regions with dissociable functions
Cole, M. W., & Schneider, W. (2007) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.03.071 · Cited by 1,091 · see citing works
Mental Imagery: Functional Mechanisms and Clinical Applications
Pearson, J., Naselaris, T., Holmes, E. A., & Kosslyn, S. M. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.003 · Cited by 1,087 · see citing works
Every good regulator of a system must be a model of that system †
CONANT, R. C., & ROSS ASHBY, W. (1970) · International Journal of Systems Science · doi:10.1080/00207727008920220 · Cited by 1,063 · see citing works
Computational psychiatry as a bridge from neuroscience to clinical applications
Huys, Q. J. M., Maia, T. V., & Frank, M. J. (2016) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn.4238 · Cited by 1,002 · see citing works
The role of mentalizing and epistemic trust in the therapeutic relationship.
Fonagy, P., & Allison, E. (2014) · Psychotherapy · doi:10.1037/a0036505 · Cited by 997 · see citing works
Abnormalities in the awareness of action.
Blakemore, S.-J., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2002) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(02)01907-1 · Cited by 947 · see citing works
Learned predictions of error likelihood in the anterior cingulate cortex
Brown, J. W., & Braver, T. S. (2005) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1105783 · Cited by 928 · see citing works
Choice, uncertainty and value in prefrontal and cingulate cortex
Rushworth, M. F. S., & Behrens, T. E. J. (2008) · Nature Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/nn2066 · Cited by 866 · see citing works
The Computational Anatomy of Psychosis
Adams, R. A., Stephan, K. E., Brown, H. R., Frith, C. D., & Friston, K. J. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychiatry · doi:10.3389/fpsyt.2013.00047 · Cited by 850 · see citing works
Cognition in schizophrenia: core psychological and neural mechanisms
Barch, D. M., & Ceaser, A. E. (2011) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2011.11.015 · Cited by 752 · see citing works
Andreasen, N. C. (1979) · Archives of General Psychiatry · doi:10.1001/archpsyc.1979.01780120045006 · Cited by 746 · cited 1× · see citing works
“This could affect domains of belief (So et al. 2012, Woodward et al. 2008), cognition (Waltz 2016), thought (Lysaker & Lysaker 2002), speech (Andreasen 1979, Barr et al. 1989), mood (Lincoln et al. 2015), and behavior (Kraepelin 1976, Ridley 1994).”
BackgroundFriston, K. J., & Stephan, K. E. (2007) · Synthese · doi:10.1007/s11229-007-9237-y · Cited by 673 · see citing works
The infant's theory of self-propelled objects
Premack, D. (1990) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(90)90051-k · Cited by 658 · see citing works
Mitchell, K., & Johnson, M. K. (2009) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0015849 · Cited by 656 · see citing works
A Bayesian foundation for individual learning under uncertainty
Mathys, C. (2011) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00039 · Cited by 655 · see citing works
Imagination inflation: Imagining a childhood event inflates confidence that it occurred
Garry, M., Manning, C. G., Loftus, E. F., & Sherman, S. J. (1996) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03212420 · Cited by 648 · see citing works
DEMENTIA PRAECOX AND PARAPHRENIA
Kraepelin, E. (1921) · The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease · doi:10.1097/00005053-192110000-00104 · Cited by 605 · see citing works
Payne, J. P. (1969) · British Journal of Anaesthesia · doi:10.1093/bja/41.4.356 · Cited by 603 · see citing works
The Left Striato-pallidal Hyperactivity Model of Schizophrenia
Early, T. S., Haller, J., Posner, M. I., & Raichle, M. (2019) · Psychology Press eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315785004-2 · Cited by 598 · see citing works
A cognitive neuroscience account of posttraumatic stress disorder and its treatment
Brewin, C. R. (2001) · Behaviour Research and Therapy · doi:10.1016/s0005-7967(00)00087-5 · Cited by 588 · see citing works
Nassar, M. R., Wilson, R. C., Heasly, B. S., & Gold, J. I. (2010) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.0822-10.2010 · Cited by 564 · see citing works
Experiences of alien control in schizophrenia reflect a disorder in the central monitoring of action
Frith, C. D., & Done, D. J. (1989) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s003329170001240x · Cited by 551 · see citing works
Computational psychiatry: the brain as a phantastic organ
Friston, K. J., Stephan, K. E., Montague, R., & Dolan, R. J. (2014) · The Lancet Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/s2215-0366(14)70275-5 · Cited by 531 · see citing works
Delusional thinking and perceptual disorder.
Maher, B. A. (1974) · PubMed · Cited by 515 · see citing works
Disrupted prediction-error signal in psychosis: Evidence for an associative account of delusions
Corlett, P. R., Murray, G. K., Honey, G. D., Aitken, M. R. F., Shanks, D. R., Robbins, T. W., Bullmore, E. T., Dickinson, A., & Fletcher, P. C. (2007) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awm173 · Cited by 460 · see citing works
Self-citationSense of agency in health and disease: A review of cue integration approaches
Moore, J., & Fletcher, P. (2012) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2011.08.010 · Cited by 444 · see citing works
Self-citationEvidence for sensory prediction deficits in schizophrenia
Shergill, S. S., Samson, G., Bays, P. M., Frith, C. D., & Wolpert, D. M. (2005) · American Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1176/appi.ajp.162.12.2384 · Cited by 432 · see citing works
Frontal-striatal cognitive deficits in patients with chronic schizophrenia
Pantelis, C. (1997) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/120.10.1823 · Cited by 430 · see citing works
Dopaminergic dysfunction in schizophrenia: Salience attribution revisited
Heinz, A., & Schlagenhauf, F. (2010) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbq031 · Cited by 412 · see citing works
How should DSM-V criteria for schizophrenia include cognitive impairment?
Keefe, R. S. E., & Fenton, W. S. (2007) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbm046 · Cited by 394 · see citing works
Imagining Can Heighten or Lower the Perceived Likelihood of Contracting a Disease
Sherman, S. J., Cialdini, R. B., Schwartzman, D. F., & Reynolds, K. D. (1985) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167285111011 · Cited by 384 · see citing works
From drugs to deprivation: A Bayesian framework for understanding models of psychosis
Corlett, P. R., Frith, C. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2009) · Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1007/s00213-009-1561-0 · Cited by 367 · cited 1× · see citing works
“…lay in the simple perspective that the early emergence of delusions and hallucinations could be conceptualized in terms of associative learning models and, more particularly, in terms of a disruption to prediction error–dependent updating (Corlett et al. 2006, 2007, 2009; Fletcher & Frith 2009).”
BackgroundAltered awareness of action in schizophrenia: a specific deficit in predicting action consequences
Voss, M., Moore, J., Hauser, M., Gallinat, J., Heinz, A., & Haggard, P. (2010) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awq152 · Cited by 366 · see citing works
Imagination inflation for action events: Repeated imaginings lead to illusory recollections
Goff, L. M., & Roediger, H. L., III (1998) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03211367 · Cited by 363 · see citing works
Johnson, M. K. (2006) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/0003-066x.61.8.760 · Cited by 340 · see citing works
Cognitive Operations and Decision Bias in Reality Monitoring
Johnson, M. K., Raye, C. L., Foley, H. J., & Foley, M. A. (1981) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1422342 · Cited by 330 · see citing works
Synofzik, M., Thier, P., Leube, D. T., Schlotterbeck, P., & Lindner, A. (2010) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awp291 · Cited by 321 · see citing works
The self in action: lessons from delusions of control
Frith, C. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.002 · Cited by 315 · see citing works
Teufel, C., Subramaniam, N., Dobler, V., Perez, J., Finnemann, J., Mehta, P. R., Goodyer, I. M., & Fletcher, P. C. (2015) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1503916112 · Cited by 308 · see citing works
Self-citationReduced autonomic responses to faces in Capgras delusion
Ellis, H. D., Young, A. W., Quayle, A. H., & de Pauw, K. W. (1997) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.1997.0150 · Cited by 298 · see citing works
The psychology of perseverative and stereotyped behaviour
Ridley, R. M. (1994) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/0301-0082(94)90039-6 · Cited by 287 · see citing works
Computational psychiatry: towards a mathematically informed understanding of mental illness
Adams, R. A., Huys, Q. J. M., & Roiser, J. P. (2015) · Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery & Psychiatry · doi:10.1136/jnnp-2015-310737 · Cited by 285 · see citing works
Nelson, B., Thompson, A. D., & Yung, A. R. (2012) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbs007 · Cited by 283 · see citing works
The 33rd Sir Frederick Bartlett Lecture Cognitive neuropsychiatry and delusional belief
Coltheart, M. (2007) · Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology · doi:10.1080/17470210701338071 · Cited by 280 · see citing works
Neuropsychological evidence for frontostriatal dysfunction in schizophrenia
Elliott, R., McKenna, P. J., Robbins, T. W., & Sahakian, B. J. (1995) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291700033523 · Cited by 267 · see citing works
Striatal dysfunction during reversal learning in unmedicated schizophrenia patients
Schlagenhauf, F., Huys, Q. J. M., Deserno, L., Rapp, M. A., Beck, A., Heinze, H.-J., Dolan, R., & Heinz, A. (2014) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2013.11.034 · Cited by 253 · see citing works
Imagery vividness, reality testing, and schizophrenic hallucinations.
Mintz, S., & Alpert, M. (1972) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/h0033209 · Cited by 244 · see citing works
Trauma and Hallucinatory Experience in Psychosis
Hardy, A., Fowler, D. G., Freeman, D. H., Smith, B., Steel, C., Evans, J., Garety, P. A., Kuipers, E., Bebbington, P., & Dunn, G. (2005) · The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease · doi:10.1097/01.nmd.0000172480.56308.21 · Cited by 239 · see citing works
Narrative Structure in Psychosis
Lysaker, P. H., & Lysaker, J. T. (2002) · Theory & Psychology · doi:10.1177/0959354302012002630 · Cited by 235 · see citing works
How Schizophrenia Develops: Cognitive and Brain Mechanisms Underlying Onset of Psychosis
Cannon, T. D. (2015) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2015.09.009 · Cited by 228 · see citing works
Cognitive impairments associated with formal thought disorder in people with schizophrenia.
Kerns, J. G., & Berenbaum, H. (2002) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/0021-843x.111.2.211 · Cited by 221 · see citing works
Imagination, Delusion and Hallucinations
Currie, G. (2000) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/1468-0017.00128 · Cited by 208 · see citing works
Circular inferences in schizophrenia
Jardri, R., & Denève, S. (2013) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awt257 · Cited by 201 · see citing works
Delusions and the role of beliefs in perceptual inference
Schmack, K., Gòmez-Carrillo de Castro, A., Rothkirch, M., Sekutowicz, M., Rössler, H., Haynes, J.-D., Heinz, A., Petrovic, P., & Sterzer, P. (2013) · The Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1778-13.2013 · Cited by 198 · see citing works
Szpunar, K. K., & Schacter, D. L. (2012) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/a0028877 · Cited by 195 · see citing works
Anomalies of subjective experience in schizophrenia and psychotic bipolar illness
Parnas, J., Handest, P., Sæbye, D., & Jansson, L. (2003) · Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica · doi:10.1034/j.1600-0447.2003.00105.x · Cited by 193 · see citing works
Source monitoring deficits in patients with schizophrenia; a multinomial modelling analysis
Keefe, R. S. E., ARNOLD, M. C., Bayen, U. J., & Harvey, P. D. (1999) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291799008673 · Cited by 191 · see citing works
Disturbance of Minimal Self (Ipseity) in Schizophrenia: Clarification and Current Status
Nelson, B., Parnas, J., & Sass, L. A. (2014) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbu034 · Cited by 191 · see citing works
Johnson, M. K., Raye, C. L., Wang, A. Y., & Taylor, T. H. (1979) · Journal of Experimental Psychology Human Learning & Memory · doi:10.1037/0278-7393.5.3.229 · Cited by 183 · see citing works
Corlett, P. R., Honey, G. D., Aitken, M. R. F., Dickinson, A., Shanks, D. R., Absalom, A. R., Lee, M., Pomarol-Clotet, E., Murray, G. K., McKenna, P. J., et al. (2006) · Archives of General Psychiatry · doi:10.1001/archpsyc.63.6.611 · Cited by 182 · see citing works
Self-citationSelf-disorders and the Schizophrenia Spectrum: A Study of 100 First Hospital Admissions
Nordgaard, J., & Parnas, J. (2014) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbt239 · Cited by 182 · see citing works
Creating bizarre false memories through imagination
Thomas, A. K., & Loftus, E. F. (2002) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03194942 · Cited by 181 · see citing works
Parnas, J., Raballo, A., Handest, P., Jansson, L., Vollmer-Larsen, A., & Sæbye, D. (2011) · World Psychiatry · doi:10.1002/j.2051-5545.2011.tb00057.x · Cited by 177 · see citing works
Abductive inference and delusional belief.
Coltheart, M., Menzies, P., & Sutton, J. (2010) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800903439120 · Cited by 177 · see citing works
Childhood trauma and psychosis-what is the evidence?
Schäfer, I., & Fisher, H. L. (2011) · Dialogues in Clinical Neuroscience · doi:10.31887/dcns.2011.13.2/ischaefer · Cited by 173 · see citing works
Nelson, B., Whitford, T. J., Lavoie, S., & Sass, L. A. (2013) · Schizophrenia Research · doi:10.1016/j.schres.2013.06.022 · Cited by 171 · see citing works
Treating Negative Symptoms in Schizophrenia: an Update
Remington, G. J., Foussias, G., Fervaha, G., Agid, O., Takeuchi, H., Lee, J., & Hahn, M. (2016) · Current Treatment Options in Psychiatry · doi:10.1007/s40501-016-0075-8 · Cited by 167 · see citing works
Functional magnetic resonance imaging of impaired sensory prediction in schizophrenia
Shergill, S. S., White, T. P., Joyce, D. W., Bays, P. M., Wolpert, D. M., & Frith, C. D. (2014) · JAMA Psychiatry · doi:10.1001/jamapsychiatry.2013.2974 · Cited by 163 · see citing works
Determinants of judged validity
Arkes, H. R., Boehm, L. E., & Xu, G. (1991) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/0022-1031(91)90026-3 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
Speaker Normalization in Speech Perception
Johnson, K. A. (2008) · Blackwell Publishing Ltd eBooks · doi:10.1002/9780470757024.ch15 · Cited by 161 · see citing works
The Schizophrenic Experience: Taken Out of Context?
Hemsley, D. (2005) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbi003 · Cited by 154 · see citing works
The neuropsychology of delusions
Coltheart, M. (2010) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05496.x · Cited by 152 · see citing works
Paranoia and social reasoning: An attribution theory analysis
Bentall, R. P., Kaney, S., & Dewey, M. E. (1991) · British Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8260.1991.tb00915.x · Cited by 148 · see citing works
Exploring the role of repetition and sensory elaboration in the imagination inflation effect
Thomas, A. K., Bulevich, J. B., & Loftus, E. F. (2003) · Memory & Cognition · doi:10.3758/bf03196103 · Cited by 148 · see citing works
Trauma-Related Intrusions and Psychosis: An Information Processing Account
Steel, C., Fowler, D. G., & Holmes, E. A. (2004) · Behavioural and Cognitive Psychotherapy · doi:10.1017/s1352465804001924 · Cited by 145 · see citing works
So, S. H., Freeman, D. H., Dunn, G., Kapur, S., Kuipers, E., Bebbington, P., Fowler, D. G., & Garety, P. A. (2011) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0025297 · Cited by 143 · see citing works
Prediction error, ketamine and psychosis: An updated model
Corlett, P. R., Honey, G. D., & Fletcher, P. C. (2016) · Journal of Psychopharmacology · doi:10.1177/0269881116650087 · Cited by 142 · see citing works
Self-citationThe development of a cognitive model of schizophrenia: Placing it in context
Hemsley, D. R. (2005) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2004.12.008 · Cited by 141 · see citing works
Brébion, G., Gorman, J. M., AMADOR, X. F., Malaspina, D., & Sharif, Z. A. (2002) · Psychiatry Research · doi:10.1016/s0165-1781(02)00187-7 · Cited by 139 · see citing works
Autism and the Social Brain: The First-Year Puzzle
Elsabbagh, M., & Johnson, M. H. (2016) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2016.02.019 · Cited by 136 · see citing works
Adding prediction risk to the theory of reward learning
PREUSCHOFF, K., & BOSSAERTS, P. (2007) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1196/annals.1390.005 · Cited by 133 · see citing works
Why do you fear the bogeyman? An embodied predictive coding model of perceptual inference
Pezzulo, G. (2014) · Cognitive, Affective, & Behavioral Neuroscience · doi:10.3758/s13415-013-0227-x · Cited by 128 · see citing works
Waltz, J. A., Kasanova, Z., Ross, T. J., Salmeron, B. J., McMahon, R. P., Gold, J. M., & Stein, E. A. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0057257 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
The neural underpinnings of cognitive flexibility and their disruption in psychotic illness
Waltz, J. A. (2017) · Neuroscience · doi:10.1016/j.neuroscience.2016.06.005 · Cited by 122 · see citing works
Belief inflexibility in schizophrenia
Woodward, T. S., Moritz, S., Menon, M., & Klinge, R. (2008) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800802099033 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
Enhanced vividness of mental imagery as a trait marker of schizophrenia?
Sack, A. T. (2005) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbi011 · Cited by 121 · see citing works
Moseley, P., Fernyhough, C., & Ellison, A. (2013) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.10.001 · Cited by 113 · see citing works
Selective Aggregation of Self-Disorders in First-Treatment DSM-IV Schizophrenia Spectrum Disorders
Haug, E., Lien, L., Raballo, A., Bratlien, U., Øie, M. G., Andreassen, O. A., Melle, I. S., & Møller, P. (2012) · The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease · doi:10.1097/nmd.0b013e31825bfd6f · Cited by 108 · see citing works
Computational psychiatry: a Rosetta Stone linking the brain to mental illness
Corlett, P. R., & Fletcher, P. C. (2014) · The Lancet Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/s2215-0366(14)70298-6 · Cited by 105 · see citing works
Self-citationDiederen, K. M. J., Spencer, T., Vestergaard, M. D., Fletcher, P. C., & Schultz, W. (2016) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2016.04.019 · Cited by 102 · see citing works
Self-citationFleminger, S. (1992) · The British Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1192/bjp.160.3.293 · Cited by 101 · see citing works
Phenomenology and delusions: Who put the ‘alien’ in alien control?
Pacherie, É., Green, M. J., & Bayne, T. (2006) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.11.008 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
Metacognitive Deficits in Schizophrenia: Presence and Associations With Psychosocial Outcomes
Lysaker, P. H., Vohs, J., Minor, K. S., Irarrázaval, L., Leonhardt, B., Hamm, J. A., Kukla, M., Popolo, R., Luther, L., Buck, K. D., et al. (2015) · Journal of Nervous & Mental Disease · doi:10.1097/nmd.0000000000000323 · Cited by 94 · see citing works
Impaired Activation in Cognitive Control Regions Predicts Reversal Learning in Schizophrenia
Culbreth, A. J., Gold, J. M., Cools, R., & Barch, D. M. (2015) · Schizophrenia Bulletin · doi:10.1093/schbul/sbv075 · Cited by 92 · see citing works
False memories and the source monitoring framework
Lindsay, D. S., & Johnson, M. K. (2000) · Learning and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/s1041-6080(01)00035-8 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
Mental imagery vividness as a trait marker across the schizophrenia spectrum
Oertel, V., Rotarska-Jagiela, A., van de Ven, V. G., Haenschel, C., Grube, M., Stangier, U., Maurer, K., & Linden, D. E. J. (2009) · Psychiatry Research · doi:10.1016/j.psychres.2007.12.008 · Cited by 91 · see citing works
How to (and how not to) think about top-down influences on visual perception
Teufel, C., & Nánay, B. (2016) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2016.05.008 · Cited by 88 · see citing works
Vinckier, F., Gaillard, R., Palminteri, S., Rigoux, L., Salvador, A., Fornito, A., Adapa, R., Krebs, M. O., Pessiglione, M., & Fletcher, P. C. (2016) · Molecular Psychiatry · doi:10.1038/mp.2015.73 · Cited by 87 · see citing works
Self-citationSchizotypy: A Vulnerability Factor for Traumatic Intrusions
Holmes, E. A., & Steel, C. (2003) · The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease · doi:10.1097/01.nmd.0000105997.28152.4b · Cited by 85 · see citing works
Neural signals encoding shifts in beliefs
Schwartenbeck, P., FitzGerald, T. H. B., & Dolan, R. J. (2015) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2015.10.067 · Cited by 82 · see citing works
Episodic Memory in Schizophrenia
Leavitt, V. M., & Goldberg, T. E. (2009) · Neuropsychology Review · doi:10.1007/s11065-009-9107-0 · Cited by 76 · see citing works
Do People With Psychosis Have Specific Difficulties Regulating Emotions?
Lincoln, T. M., Hartmann, M. M., Köther, U., & Moritz, S. (2014) · Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy · doi:10.1002/cpp.1923 · Cited by 74 · see citing works
McKay, R. (2012) · Mind & Language · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0017.2012.01447.x · Cited by 72 · see citing works
The neuropsychology of schizophrenic speech
Barr, W., Bilder, R. M., Goldberg, E., Kaplan, E., & Mukherjee, S. (1989) · Journal of Communication Disorders · doi:10.1016/0021-9924(89)90009-9 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
The Neuroscience of Hallucinations
Jardri, R., Cachia, A., Thomas, P., & Pins, D. (2012) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-4121-2 · Cited by 71 · see citing works
Hallucinations as a trauma-based memory: implications for psychological interventions
Steel, C. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01262 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
Do you remember proposing marriage to the Pepsi machine? False recollections from a campus walk
Seamon, J. G., Philbin, M. M., & Harrison, L. G. (2006) · Psychonomic Bulletin & Review · doi:10.3758/bf03193992 · Cited by 70 · see citing works
Scaling prediction errors to reward variability benefits error-driven learning in humans
Diederen, K. M. J., & Schultz, W. (2015) · Journal of Neurophysiology · doi:10.1152/jn.00483.2015 · Cited by 69 · see citing works
Schizophrenic psychology, associative learning and the role of forebrain dopamine
Miller, R. (1976) · Medical Hypotheses · doi:10.1016/0306-9877(76)90040-2 · Cited by 67 · see citing works
The role of behavioral cues in understanding goal-directed actions in infancy
Bı́ró, S., Csibra, G., & Gergely, G. (2007) · Progress in brain research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(07)64017-5 · Cited by 66 · see citing works
Circular inference: mistaken belief, misplaced trust
Denève, S., & Jardri, R. (2016) · Current Opinion in Behavioral Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.cobeha.2016.04.001 · Cited by 65 · see citing works
The promises and pitfalls of applying computational models to neurological and psychiatric disorders
Teufel, C., & Fletcher, P. C. (2016) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/aww209 · Cited by 64 · see citing works
Self-citationDelusions and prediction error: clarifying the roles of behavioural and brain responses
Corlett, P. R., & Fletcher, P. C. (2015) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546805.2014.990625 · Cited by 63 · see citing works
Self-citationHaug, E., Øie, M. G., Andreassen, O. A., Bratlien, U., Raballo, A., Nelson, B., Møller, P., & Melle, I. S. (2013) · Comprehensive Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2013.11.010 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
Correspondences between what infants see and know about causal and self-propelled motion
Cicchino, J. B., Aslin, R. Ν., & Rakison, D. H. (2010) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2010.11.005 · Cited by 60 · see citing works
The relation between source memory and episodic memory: Comment on Siedlecki et al. (2005).
Johnson, M. K. (2005) · Psychology and Aging · doi:10.1037/0882-7974.20.3.529 · Cited by 55 · see citing works
Haug, E., Melle, I. S., Andreassen, O. A., Raballo, A., Bratlien, U., Øie, M. G., Lien, L., & Møller, P. (2011) · Comprehensive Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.comppsych.2011.07.005 · Cited by 54 · see citing works
Cognitive Remediation in Schizophrenia
Kaneko, Y., & Keshavan, M. (2012) · Clinical Psychopharmacology and Neuroscience · doi:10.9758/cpn.2012.10.3.125 · Cited by 51 · see citing works
Internal Source Monitoring and Thought Disorder in Schizophrenia
Nienow, T. M., & Docherty, N. M. (2004) · The Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease · doi:10.1097/01.nmd.0000142018.73263.15 · Cited by 50 · see citing works
A cognitive model for schizophrenia and its possible neural basis
Hemsley, D. R. (1994) · Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica · doi:10.1111/j.1600-0447.1994.tb05895.x · Cited by 50 · see citing works
Deficits in context-dependent adaptive coding of reward in schizophrenia
Kirschner, M., Hager, O. M., Bischof, M., Hartmann-Riemer, M. N., Kluge, A., Seifritz, E., Tobler, P. N., & Kaiser, S. (2016) · npj Schizophrenia · doi:10.1038/npjschz.2016.20 · Cited by 43 · see citing works
Learning and Generalization in Schizophrenia: Effects of Disease and Antipsychotic Drug Treatment
Daphna Shohamy, A., Mihalakos, P., Chin, R., Thomas, B. P., Wagner, A. D., & Tamminga, C. A. (2009) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2009.10.025 · Cited by 37 · see citing works
Ceaser, A. E., & Barch, D. M. (2016) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2015.00687 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Brébion, G., Gorman, J. M., Malaspina, D., & AMADOR, X. F. (2004) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291704002879 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Levels and kinds of explanation: lessons from neuropsychiatry
Wilkinson, S. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00373 · Cited by 30 · see citing works
Subjectivity and Schizophrenia: Another Look at Incomprehensibility and Treatment Nonadherence
Parnas, J., & Henriksen, M. G. (2013) · Psychopathology · doi:10.1159/000351837 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Source monitoring and olfactory hallucinations in schizophrenia.
Arguedas, D., Stevenson, R. J., & Langdon, R. A. (2012) · Journal of Abnormal Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0027174 · Cited by 22 · see citing works
Introduction to mathematical modelling
Barnes, B., & Fulford, G. R. (2014) · Chapman & Hall/CRC eBooks · doi:10.1201/b17896-5 · Cited by 20 · see citing works
Positive schizotypy and trait dissociation as vulnerability factors for post‐traumatic distress
Steel, C., Mahmood, M., & Holmes, E. A. (2008) · British Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1348/014466507x255276 · Cited by 17 · see citing works
The interpersonal world of psychosis
Ratcliffe, M. (2015) · World Psychiatry · doi:10.1002/wps.20208 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Achim, A. M., & Weiss, A. P. (2008) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800802299476 · Cited by 16 · see citing works
Internal source monitoring and communication disturbance in patients with schizophrenia
Nienow, T. M., & Docherty, N. M. (2005) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291705005660 · Cited by 13 · see citing works
Editorial: In praise of cognitive neuropsychiatry
Frith, C. (2007) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800701804442 · Cited by 6 · see citing works
Flagged first, then by citations
Research works printed but not linked: 10
- Adams RA, 2015, J. Neurol. Neurosurg. Psychiatry, 87, 53
- Adams RA, 2013, Front. Psychiatry, 4
- Ceaser AE, 2015, Front. Hum. Neurosci., 9, 687
- Johnson MK, 1993, Theories of Memory, 241
- Maher BA, 1974, J. Indiv. Psychol., 30, 98
- Mathys C, 2011, Front. Hum. Neurosci., 5
- Parnas J, 2003, Acta Psychiatr. Scand., 137, 434
- Rescorla RA, 1972, Classical Conditioning II, 64
- Roessler J, 2013, Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Psychiatry, 658
- Vinckier F, 2015, Mol. Psychiatry, 21, 945
Cited by
Sorted by citations
The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis
Sterzer, P., Adams, R. A., Fletcher, P., Frith, C., Lawrie, S. M., Muckli, L., Petrovic, P., Uhlhaas, P., Voss, M., & Corlett, P. R. (2018) · Biological Psychiatry · doi:10.1016/j.biopsych.2018.05.015 · Cited by 941 · see citing works
“We focu psychotic symptoms such as thought disorder and passivity phenomena fr (109) and Sterzer et al.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationHallucinations and strong priors
Corlett, P. R., Horga, G., Fletcher, P. C., Alderson-Day, B., Schmack, K., & Powers, A. R. (2019) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2018.12.001 · Cited by 534 · see citing works
Self-citationForms of prediction in the nervous system
Teufel, C., & Fletcher, P. C. (2020) · Nature Reviews Neuroscience · doi:10.1038/s41583-020-0275-5 · Cited by 155 · see citing works
Self-citationDamiani, S., Donadeo, A., Bassetti, N., Salazar‐de‐Pablo, G., Guiot, C., Politi, P., & Fusar‐Poli, P. (2022) · Psychiatry and Clinical Neurosciences · doi:10.1111/pcn.13338 · Cited by 31 · see citing works
Modality-general and modality-specific processes in hallucinations
Fernyhough, C. (2019) · Psychological Medicine · doi:10.1017/s0033291719002496 · Cited by 27 · see citing works
Neural and neuronal discoordination in schizophrenia: from ensembles through networks to symptoms
Krajcovic, B., Fajnerova, I., Horacek, J., Kelemen, E., Kubik, S., Svoboda, J., & Stuchlik, A. (2019) · Acta Physiologica · doi:10.1111/apha.13282 · Cited by 29 · see citing works
Standke, I., Trempler, I., Dannlowski, U., Schubotz, R. I., & Lencer, R. (2021) · NeuroImage: Clinical · doi:10.1016/j.nicl.2021.102855 · Cited by 11 · see citing works
Damiani, S., Cavicchioli, M., Guiot, C., Donadeo, A., Scalabrini, A., Grecuzzo, V., Bergamaschini, I., Provenzani, U., Politi, P., & Fusar-Poli, P. (2024) · Journal of Psychiatric Research · doi:10.1016/j.jpsychires.2023.11.036 · Cited by 9 · see citing works
- Authors
- Griffin, J. D., & Fletcher, P. C.
- Affiliations
- University of Cambridge (GB)
- Venue
- Annual Review of Clinical Psychology
- Publisher
- Annual Reviews
- Published
- 2017-05-08
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 265-289
- ISSN
- 1548-5943 (ISSN-L)
- 1548-5951
- PMC
- PMC5424073
- OpenAlex
- W2396823339
- Cited by
- 133
- References
- 157
- Citations by year
- 2026: 23 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 26 · 2023: 14 · 2022: 15 · 2021: 15 · 2020: 8 · 2019: 10 · 2018: 12 · 2017: 2
- FWCI
- 1.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Annual Review of Clinical Psychology (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
- Funders
- Wellcome Trust (095844/Z/11/Z, 095844, 095692)
- Topics
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- predictive processing, predictive coding, source monitoring, psychosis, delusions, hallucinations, hierarchical models, trauma, social adversity, explanatory gap
- MeSH terms
- Delusions, Hallucinations, Humans, Psychotic Disorders, Schizophrenia, Cognitive Dysfunction
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Claims read by deepseek-v4.1-flash under definition version 3 (extract-v3) on 2026-10-10.
Classified by jev-1.13-20260917 (gold-guideline-v0.2) on 2026-10-10.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review