The DOI matches its Crossref record; 39 of the 41 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abductive inference and delusional belief.
Open accessAbstract
Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. First, the abnormalities of cognition that initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term "experience" to consciousness we refer to "abnormal data" rather than "abnormal experience". Second, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider seven) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairment is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur: a second cognitive impairment, one that affects the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Third (and this is the main thrust of our paper), we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief.
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From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Coltheart et al., 2010
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McKay, R. T., & Dennett, D. C. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09990975 · Cited by 474
Sense of agency in health and disease: A review of cue integration approaches
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Toward a neurobiology of delusions
Corlett, P. R., Taylor, J. R., Wang, X.-J., Fletcher, P. C., & Krystal, J. H. (2010) · Progress in Neurobiology · doi:10.1016/j.pneurobio.2010.06.007 · Cited by 394
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Active Inference, Curiosity and Insight
Friston, K. J., Lin, M., Frith, C., Pezzulo, G., Hobson, J. A., & Ondobaka, S. (2017) · Neural Computation · doi:10.1162/neco_a_00999 · Cited by 372
Metadata
- Authors
- Coltheart, M., Menzies, P., & Sutton, J.
- Affiliations
- Macquarie University (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Coltheart, Max
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-01
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1-3
- Pages
- 261-287
- ISSN
- 1354-6805 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0619
- OpenAlex
- W2126015061
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 41
- Citations by year
- 2026: 16 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 8
- FWCI
- 55.91
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- philarchive.org
- Locations
- Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
- Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- delusions, abductive reasoning, neuropsychological deficits, Bayesian inference, rational inference, belief evaluation, subjective experience
- MeSH terms
- Bayes Theorem, Brain, Capgras Syndrome, Cognition Disorders, Delusions, Humans, Models, Neurological, Models, Psychological, Nerve Net
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