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Cited by 394Mental Health and PsychiatrySchizophrenia research and treatmentEmbodied and Extended Cognition

Toward a neurobiology of delusions

Open access
Corlett, P.R., Taylor, J.R., Wang, X.-J., Fletcher, P.C., Krystal, J.H.·2010·Progress in Neurobiology
DOI 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2010.06.007PMC PMC3676875
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Abstract

Delusions are the false and often incorrigible beliefs that can cause severe suffering in mental illness. We cannot yet explain them in terms of underlying neurobiological abnormalities. However, by drawing on recent advances in the biological, computational and psychological processes of reinforcement learning, memory, and perception it may be feasible to account for delusions in terms of cognition and brain function. The account focuses on a particular parameter, prediction error--the mismatch between expectation and experience--that provides a computational mechanism common to cortical hierarchies, fronto-striatal circuits and the amygdala as well as parietal cortices. We suggest that delusions result from aberrations in how brain circuits specify hierarchical predictions, and how they compute and respond to prediction errors. Defects in these fundamental brain mechanisms can vitiate perception, memory, bodily agency and social learning such that individuals with delusions experience an internal and external world that healthy individuals would find difficult to comprehend. The present model attempts to provide a framework through which we can build a mechanistic and translational understanding of these puzzling symptoms.

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Crossref · 10.1016/j.pneurobio.2010.06.007

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  • The learning function of dopamine may mediate the transition from disordered perception to delusion, with dopamine-modulated learning underlying the re-sculpting of generative models to accommodate persistently elevated prediction error signals.

    “the learning function of dopamine may nonetheless mediate the transition from disordered perception to delusion. In this view, dopamine-modulated learning underlies the re-sculpting of generative models to accommodate persistently elevated prediction error signals (Corlett et al., 2010).”

    From An Interoceptive Predictive Coding Model of Conscious Presence (2012) · cites this paper as Corlett et al., 2010

    Section 2.1 links dysregulated dopamine signaling to inappropriate prediction errors, altered learning, and ultimately delusion formation. It says persistent imprecision in estimating prediction errors may produce a new explanatory prior; it does not specifically say that the prediction error signals remain elevated. The Introduction also distinguishes prediction errors from their precision. (LLM, conf=0.85)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • NMDAR-dependent signaling is thought to be essential for updating and encoding representations of beliefs.

    “Importantly, NMDAR dependent signaling is thought to be essential for updating and encoding representations of beliefs (Corlett et al., 2010; Vinckier et al., 2016).”

    From Allostatic Self-efficacy: A Metacognitive Theory of Dyshomeostasis-Induced Fatigue and Depression (2016) · cites this paper as Corlett et al., 2010

    Section 2.1 says prior beliefs are updated by prediction errors and describes NMDA signaling as helping maintain neural representations of expected events. But it says NMDA receptors only possibly convey top-down expectancies, a role not yet established empirically; it does not establish that NMDAR signaling is essential for both updating and encoding beliefs. The cited claim overstates that proposed role. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Evidence from anatomical and physiological studies has established bridges between computational and physiological components of hierarchical precision-weighted message passing: prediction error signaling via forward connections likely rests on glutamatergic (AMPA and NMDA) receptors, prediction signaling via backward connections probably exclusively on NMDA receptors, while precision-weighting is

    “Evidence from anatomical and physiological studies has established bridges between the computational and physiological components of this hierarchical precision-weighted message passing: prediction error signaling via forward connections likely rests on glutamatergic (AMPA and NMDA) receptors, prediction signaling via backward connections probably exclusively on NMDA receptors, while precision”

    From Allostatic Self-efficacy: A Metacognitive Theory of Dyshomeostasis-Induced Fatigue and Depression (2016) · cites this paper as Corlett et al., 2010

    Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured

  • Predictive coding models explain psychotic experiences as attempts to account for and reduce uncertainty.

    “Predictive coding models explain these experiences as attempts to account for and minimise uncertainty.10”

    From Computational psychiatry: a Rosetta Stone linking the brain to mental illness (2014) · cites this paper as [10]

  • Anomalies in how prediction error arises, what it is like, and how it is responded to can explain the emergence of psychosis.

    “we propose that anomalies in the genesis of prediction error, its nature, and our responses to it can explain the emergence of psychosis.”

    From Computational psychiatry: a Rosetta Stone linking the brain to mental illness (2014) · cites this paper as [10]

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Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Capgras J Reboul-Lachaux J 1923 L’illusion des “soises” dans un delire systematise Bulletin de Society Clinique de Medicine Mentale 11 6 16
  2. Conrad K 1958b Die BeginnendeSchizophrenie G. Thieme Stuttgart
  3. Corlett PR Frith CD Fletcher PC 2009b From drugs to deprivation: a Bayesian framework for understanding models of psychosis Psychopharmacology (Berl) 206 515 530 19475401 PMC2755113
  4. Corlett PR Krystal JK Taylor JR Fletcher PC 2009 Why do delusions persist? Frontiers in Human Neuroscience In press PMC2713737 19636384
  5. Hemsley DR Garety PA 1986b The formation of maintenance of delusions: a Bayesian analysis Br J Psychiatry 149 51 56 3779313
  6. Kihlstrom JF Hoyt IP Oltmanns TF Maher BA 1988 Hypnosis and the Psychology of Delusions Delusional Beliefs Wiley New York
  7. Maher BA 1988 Delusions as normal theories Wiley New York
  8. Miller NE Kock S 1959 Liberalization of basic S-R concepts: Extensions to conflict behaviour, motivation and social learning Psychology: A study of a science 196 292 McGraw-Hill New York
  9. Schultz W Dickinson A 2000 Neural coding of prediction errors Annual Review of Neuroscience 473 500 10845072
  10. Sperry RW Trevarthen C 1990 Forebrain Commisurectomy and consciuos awareness Brain Circuits and the Mind Cambridge University Press New York
  11. Wegner DM 2004 Precis of the illusion of conscious will Behav Brain Sci 27 649 659 discussion 659–692 15895616

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Authors
Corlett, P. R., Taylor, J. R., Wang, X.-J., Fletcher, P. C., & Krystal, J. H.
Affiliations
  • Yale University (US)
  • University of Cambridge (GB)
Corresponding author
Corlett, P.R.
ORCID
Venue
Progress in Neurobiology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
2010-11
Volume
92
Issue
3
Pages
345-369
ISSN
0301-0082 (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.1016/j.pneurobio.2010.06.007
PMC
PMC3676875
OpenAlex
W2018699045
Cited by
394
References
439
Citations by year
2026: 31 · 2025: 16 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 20 · 2022: 29 · 2021: 30 · 2020: 33 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 20 · 2017: 35 · 2016: 27 · 2015: 32 · 2014: 25 · 2013: 22 · 2012: 21
FWCI
34.61
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
  • Progress in Neurobiology (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (acceptedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
  • Wellcome Trust (064351)
  • National Institute on Drug Abuse (R01DA011717, R01DA015222)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
delusions, prediction error, reinforcement learning, hierarchical prediction, frontostriatal circuits, amygdala, parietal cortex, memory, perception, bodily agency, social learning, computational psychiatry
MeSH terms
Brain, Cognition, Computer Simulation, Culture, Delusions, Humans, Learning, Memory, Models, Neurological, Nervous System Diseases, Neurobiology, Perception

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