Confabulation and delusion: A common monitoring framework
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 10 of the 10 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Confabulations and delusions both involve the production of false claims. Although they may have different types of content, they share several characteristics. For example, they are often held with considerable conviction and are resistant to counter evidence, they may be acted upon, and they may be accompanied by a lack of concern about the false claim or its implications. Confabulations and delusions may initially arise from failures in different systems (e.g., mnemonic vs. perceptual or affective). However, their shared characteristics raise the possibility that the monitoring deficits involved might be the same, resulting in failure to reject the confabulatory or delusional ideas. In this paper we will focus on the nature of these common monitoring deficits. Critically, we argue that monitoring in confabulation and delusion involves both unconscious and conscious processes. We propose that an unconscious process is responsible for tagging suspect content which needs to be checked for veracity by a separate set of conscious evaluative processes. Failure of these monitoring processes would allow ideas which ought to be checked and rejected to instead be uncritically accepted: This would result in the production of confabulations or delusions. Importantly, inclusion of both unconscious and conscious monitoring stages allows the model to account for both "endorsement" and "explanation" delusions, and both "primary" and "secondary" confabulations. Our hope is that this model may provide a theoretical framework to guide empirical investigation of the commonalities and differences between the conditions.
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Citations
Cites
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Cognitive approaches to delusions: a critical review of theories and evidence.
Garety, P. A., & Freeman, D. (1999) · British Journal of Clinical Psychology · doi:10.1348/014466599162700 · Cited by 794 · cited 1×
“Garety and Freeman (1999) have reported that delusional patients are more likely than controls to switch hypotheses when given potentially contradictory information.”
BackgroundDisrupted prediction-error signal in psychosis: Evidence for an associative account of delusions
Corlett, P. R., Murray, G. K., Honey, G. D., Aitken, M. R. F., Shanks, D. R., Robbins, T. W., Bullmore, E. T., Dickinson, A., & Fletcher, P. C. (2007) · Brain · doi:10.1093/brain/awm173 · Cited by 460
Top-down predictions in the cognitive brain
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Abductive inference and delusional belief.
Coltheart, M., Menzies, P., & Sutton, J. (2010) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800903439120 · Cited by 177 · cited 1×
“This view is also consistent with the account of delusional belief offered by Coltheart, Menzies, and Sutton ( 2010 this issue).”
ResultSelf-citationThe neuropsychology of delusions
Coltheart, M. (2010) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05496.x · Cited by 152 · cited 1×
“The anatomical basis of these disparate functions is likely to be complex, but previous evidence suggests that conscious monitoring and evaluation processes may be associated with the right lateral prefrontal cortex (Coltheart, 2009; Corlett et al., 2007; Shallice, 2001, 2006).”
BackgroundSelf-citationCorlett, P. R. (2009) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/neuro.09.012.2009 · Cited by 146
Cited by
Abductive inference and delusional belief.
Coltheart, M., Menzies, P., & Sutton, J. (2010) · Cognitive Neuropsychiatry · doi:10.1080/13546800903439120 · Cited by 177
Self-citationThe neuropsychology of delusions
Coltheart, M. (2010) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2010.05496.x · Cited by 152
Self-citationThe Epistemic Innocence of Irrational Beliefs
Bortolotti, L. (2020) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780198863984.001.0001 · Cited by 127
The Generative Adversarial Brain
Gershman, S. J. (2019) · Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.3389/frai.2019.00018 · Cited by 89
Gilboa, A., & Moscovitch, M. (2017) · Cortex · doi:10.1016/j.cortex.2016.10.008 · Cited by 82
Metadata
- Authors
- Turner, M., & Coltheart, M.
- Venue
- Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-01
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1-3
- Pages
- 346-376
- ISSN
- 1354-6805 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0619
- OpenAlex
- W2079181700
- Cited by
- 109
- References
- 10
- FWCI
- 66.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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