Cited by 146Mental Health and PsychiatrySchizophrenia research and treatmentEmbodied and Extended Cognition

Why do delusions persist?

Open access
Corlett, Philip R.·2009·Frontiers in Human Neuroscience

Abstract

Delusions are bizarre and distressing beliefs that characterize certain mental illnesses. They arise without clear reasons and are remarkably persistent. Recent models of delusions, drawing on a neuroscientific understanding of learning, focus on how delusions might emerge from abnormal experience. We believe that these models can be extended to help us understand why delusions persist. We consider prediction error, the mismatch between expectancy and experience, to be central. Surprising events demand a change in our expectancies. This involves making what we have learned labile, updating and binding the memory anew: a process of memory reconsolidation. We argue that, under the influence of excessive prediction error, delusional beliefs are repeatedly reconsolidated, strengthening them so that they persist, apparently impervious to contradiction.

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Crossref · 10.3389/neuro.09.012.2009

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  • Evidence from experiments using the NMDA receptor antagonist ketamine suggests a link between prediction error signaling and memory reconsolidation, which could strengthen delusional beliefs and foster their persistence.

    “Evidence from experiments using the NMDA receptor antagonist ketamine, which has been previously shown to induce aberrant PE, suggests a link between PE signaling and memory reconsolidation, which could strengthen delusional beliefs and foster their persistence (103, 104).”

    From The Predictive Coding Account of Psychosis (2018) · cites this paper as [103]

    The Conclusion argues that aberrant prediction-error signals drive retrieval and reconsolidation-based strengthening of delusional beliefs, helping them persist. However, our copy does not present ketamine experiments as evidence for that reconsolidation link; ketamine appears in the titles of cited works in the References, while Box 1 discusses other NMDA-receptor manipulations. (LLM, conf=0.86)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Within predictive coding, prediction error may lead to an updated belief or may be suppressed.

    “This characteristic can be considered within the predictive coding framework, where prediction error might lead to an updated belief or might be suppressed.22”
  • The balance between extinction and reconsolidation of memories may be disrupted in people with psychosis, with less extinction learning and possible strengthening of beliefs during extinction trials.

    “This balance between extinction and reconsolidation of memories might be disrupted in people with psychosis, such that there is reduced extinction learning and possibly even belief-strengthening on extinction trials.22”

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Bartlett F. C. (1932). Remembering. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press
  2. Jaspers K. (1963). General Psychopathology. Manchester, Manchester University Press

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Authors
Corlett, P. R.
Affiliations
University of Cambridge (GB)
Corresponding author
Corlett, Philip R.
Venue
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
Published
2009
Volume
3
Pages
12-12
ISSN
1662-5161 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2061637033
Cited by
146
References
88
Citations by year
2026: 5 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 11 · 2023: 6 · 2022: 12 · 2021: 12 · 2020: 9 · 2019: 3 · 2018: 6 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 15 · 2015: 8 · 2014: 10 · 2013: 10 · 2012: 10
FWCI
70.62
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Human Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Bristol-Myers Squibb
  • AstraZeneca
  • National Alliance for Research on Schizophrenia and Depression
  • Wellcome Trust (064351)
  • University of Cambridge
  • Shire
  • National Institute on Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism
  • National Institute of Mental Health
  • National Institute on Drug Abuse
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
Keywords
delusions, prediction error, memory reconsolidation, learning, belief updating

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