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Cited by 177Mental Health and PsychiatrySchizophrenia research and treatmentEpistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics

Abductive inference and delusional belief.

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Coltheart, Max, Menzies, Peter, Sutton, John·2010·Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
DOI 10.1080/13546800903439120
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Abstract

Delusional beliefs have sometimes been considered as rational inferences from abnormal experiences. We explore this idea in more detail, making the following points. First, the abnormalities of cognition that initially prompt the entertaining of a delusional belief are not always conscious and since we prefer to restrict the term "experience" to consciousness we refer to "abnormal data" rather than "abnormal experience". Second, we argue that in relation to many delusions (we consider seven) one can clearly identify what the abnormal cognitive data are which prompted the delusion and what the neuropsychological impairment is which is responsible for the occurrence of these data; but one can equally clearly point to cases where this impairment is present but delusion is not. So the impairment is not sufficient for delusion to occur: a second cognitive impairment, one that affects the ability to evaluate beliefs, must also be present. Third (and this is the main thrust of our paper), we consider in detail what the nature of the inference is that leads from the abnormal data to the belief. This is not deductive inference and it is not inference by enumerative induction; it is abductive inference. We offer a Bayesian account of abductive inference and apply it to the explanation of delusional belief.

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  • Depersonalization and the experiential component of DMS are reported in as-if vocabulary.

    “they are reported in “as if” vocabulary”

    From Pain Asymbolia as Depersonalization for Pain Experience. An Interoceptive Active Inference Account (2020) · cites this paper as Coltheart et al., 2010

    The Capgras Delusion section (p. 262) describes an autonomic response that is as it would be if the face belonged to a stranger, but that is the authors’ explanation, not a report of a patient using “as if” language. The Delusions and Experiences section discusses whether the Capgras abnormality is a conscious experience. Searches for “as if” and depersonalization found no passage addressing how depersonalization or the experiential component of DMS is reported. (LLM, conf=0.72)

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Cites

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2 of the 41 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Binkofski, F., Buccino, G., Dohle, C., Seitz, R. J., & Freund, H. J. (1999). Mirror agnosia and mirror ataxia constitute different parietal lobe disorders. Annals of Neurology, 47, 553Á554.
  2. James, W. (1950). Principles of psychology (Vol. 2). New York: Henry Holt & Co. (Original work published 1890).
  3. In M. L. Dalla Chiara, K. Doets, D. Mundici, & J. van Benthem (Eds.), Logic and scientific methods (pp. 413Á427). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Kluwer.

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Authors
Coltheart, M., Menzies, P., & Sutton, J.
Affiliations
Macquarie University (AU)
Corresponding author
Coltheart, Max
ORCID
Venue
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
2010-01
Volume
15
Issue
1-3
Pages
261-287
ISSN
  • 1354-6805 (ISSN-L)
  • 1464-0619
DOI
10.1080/13546800903439120
OpenAlex
W2126015061
Cited by
177
References
41
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 4 · 2024: 10 · 2023: 11 · 2022: 9 · 2021: 14 · 2020: 18 · 2019: 9 · 2018: 9 · 2017: 12 · 2016: 8 · 2015: 17 · 2014: 11 · 2013: 9 · 2012: 8
FWCI
55.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Cognitive Neuropsychiatry (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Mental Health and Psychiatry
  • Health Sciences › Medicine › Psychiatry and Mental health › Schizophrenia research and treatment
  • Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
Keywords
delusions, abductive reasoning, neuropsychological deficits, Bayesian inference, rational inference, belief evaluation, subjective experience
MeSH terms
Bayes Theorem, Brain, Capgras Syndrome, Cognition Disorders, Delusions, Humans, Models, Neurological, Models, Psychological, Nerve Net

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