Connectionism and the Learning of Probabilistic Concepts
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Three experiments examine the claim of Gluck and Bower (1986, 1988a, 1988b) that the learning of medical concepts can be simulated by a connectionist network in which the symptoms are the input and the diagnosis is the output. The first experiment replicates the main finding of Gluck and Bower. In this experiment, subjects were required to estimate the probability of each of two diseases, given a particular target symptom. In fact these two probabilities were identical, but because one illness was more common than the other, the target symptom was a better predictor of the rare disease than of the common disease. Contrary to a normative probability judgement account, subjects were biased in that they judged the probability of the rare disease given the target symptom to be greater than the probability of the common disease given the target symptom. Gluck and Bower argued that such a result was predicted by a connectionist network using the Rescorla-Wagner learning rule, but it is argued that Gluck and Bower's network simulation was not appropriate for the experiment they had performed. In fact, it appeared that the connectionist network failed to predict the bias in the subjects’ probability estimates. However, this conclusion rests on an assumption that Gluck and Bower implicitly made. They arranged for P(rare disease/target symptom) and P(com-mon disease/target symptom) to be identical across all trials on which the target symptom occurred, both on its own and with other symptoms present. Gluck and Bower assumed that the subjects were estimating these probabilities. But the results of the second experiment showed instead that the subjects were estimating the probability of each disease given only the target symptom. In the final experiment the design was changed so that this problem might be circumvented. In this experiment, again, the subjects were biased in their probability judgements exactly as the connectionist network predicted. Thus, finally, evidence was found which was compatible with the network model but not with a normative account, but this was true only if the network did not include a layer of hidden units.
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Citations
Cites
Connectionism and cognitive architecture: A critical analysis
Fodor, J. A., & Pylyshyn, Z. W. (1988) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/0010-0277(88)90031-5 · Cited by 4,022
WIDROW, B., & HOFF, M. E. (1960) · doi:10.21236/ad0241531 · Cited by 4,009
On the proper treatment of connectionism
Smolensky, P. (1988) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00052432 · Cited by 2,441
Evidential impact of base rates
Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1982) · Judgment under Uncertainty · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511809477.011 · Cited by 591 · cited 1×
“For example, the bias the subjects showed in the final experiment seems very similar to the base-rate fallacies widely documented by Tversky and Kahneman (e.g. Tversky 8z Kahneman, 1982), and which they have attributed to the operation of the representativeness heuristic.”
Result
Cited by
ALCOVE: An exemplar-based connectionist model of category learning.
Kruschke, J. K. (1992) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.99.1.22 · Cited by 1,582
The Structure and Organization of Memory
Squire, L. R., Knowlton, B., & Musen, G. (1993) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.ps.44.020193.002321 · Cited by 1,123
The propositional nature of human associative learning
Mitchell, C. J., De Houwer, J., & Lovibond, P. F. (2009) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09000855 · Cited by 753
Recent views of conceptual structure.
Komatsu, L. K. (1992) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.112.3.500 · Cited by 435
An Economist’s Perspective on Probability Matching
Vulkan, N. (2000) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/1467-6419.00106 · Cited by 403
Metadata
- Authors
- Shanks, D. R.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1990-05
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 209-237
- ISSN
- 0272-4987 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0740
- OpenAlex
- W2027590587
- Cited by
- 74
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 8.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Shanks, D. R. (1990). Connectionism and the Learning of Probabilistic Concepts. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A. https://doi.org/10.1080/14640749008401219
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