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Deduction from Uncertain Premises
Abstract
We investigate how the perceived uncertainty of a conditional affects a person's choice of conclusion. We use a novel procedure to introduce uncertainty by manipulating the conditional probability of the consequent given the antecedent. In Experiment 1, we show first that subjects reduce their choice of valid conclusions when a conditional is followed by an additional premise that makes the major premise uncertain. In this we replicate Byrne (1989). These subjects choose, instead, a qualified conclusion expressing uncertainty. If subjects are given a third statement that qualifies the likelihood of the additional premise, then the uncertainty of the conclusions they choose is systematically related to the suggested uncertainty. Experiment 2 confirms these observations in problems that omit the additional premise and qualify the first premise directly. Experiment 3 shows that the qualifying statement also affects the perceived probability of the consequent given the antecedent of the conditional. Experiment 4 investigates the effect of suggested uncertainty on the fallacies and shows that increases in uncertainty reduce the number of certain conclusions that are chosen while affirming the consequent but have no effect on denying the antecedent. We discuss our results in terms of rule theories and mental models and conclude that the latter give the most natural account of our results.
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Cites
Grice, H. P. (1975) · Speech Acts · doi:10.1163/9789004368811_003 · Cited by 23,221
Confirmation, disconfirmation, and information in hypothesis testing
Klayman, J., & Ha, Y.-W. (1987) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.94.2.211 · Cited by 2,094
Cited by
Dual-Processing Accounts of Reasoning, Judgment, and Social Cognition
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2008) · Annual Review of Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.59.103006.093629 · Cited by 5,137
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Conditionals: A theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference.
Johnson-Laird, P. N., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2002) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037//0033-295x.109.4.646 · Cited by 861
Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm.
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2002) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037//0033-2909.128.6.978 · Cited by 431
On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning
Evans, J. S. B. T. (2007) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780601008825 · Cited by 396
Metadata
- Authors
- Stevenson, R. J., & Over, D. E.
- Venue
- The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 1995-08
- Volume
- 48
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 613-643
- ISSN
- 0272-4987 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0740
- OpenAlex
- W2090260807
- Cited by
- 226
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 5.75
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Stevenson, R. J., & Over, D. E. (1995). Deduction from Uncertain Premises. The Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology Section A. https://doi.org/10.1080/14640749508401408
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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