The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 66 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
On the resolution of conflict in dual process theories of reasoning
Abstract
In this paper, I show that the question of how dual process theories of reasoning and judgement account for conflict between System 1 (heuristic) and System 2 (analytic) processes needs to be explicated and addressed in future research work. I demonstrate that a simple additive probability model that describes such conflict can be mapped on to three different cognitive models. The pre-emptive conflict resolution model assumes that a decision is made at the outset as to whether a heuristic or analytic process will control the response. The parallel-competitive model assumes that each system operates in parallel to deliver a putative response, resulting sometimes in conflict that then needs to be resolved. Finally, the default-interventionist model involves the cueing of default responses by the heuristic system that may or may not be altered by subsequent intervention of the analytic system. A second, independent issue also emerges from this discussion. The superior performance of higher-ability participants on reasoning tasks may be due to the fact that they engage in more analytic reasoning (quantity hypothesis) or alternatively to the fact that the analytic reasoning they apply is more effective (quality hypothesis).
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Cites
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“Are there parallel dual process models to be found in the literature? There are certainly dual process accounts, especially in social psychology, that propose two parallel modes of processing, as in the rational-experiential theory (Epstein, 1994 ; Epstein & Pacini, 1999 ) and the heuristic-systematic model (Chaiken,…”
BackgroundIndividual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2000) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00003435 · Cited by 2,762
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In two minds: dual-process accounts of reasoning
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Self-citation
Cited by
Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E. (2013) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691612460685 · Cited by 4,271
Self-citationOn the relative independence of thinking biases and cognitive ability
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F. (2008) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.94.4.672 · Cited by 840
Intuition, reason, and metacognition
Thompson, V. A., Prowse Turner, J. A., & Pennycook, G. (2011) · Cognitive Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.cogpsych.2011.06.001 · Cited by 703
Incubation, insight, and creative problem solving: A unified theory and a connectionist model.
Hélie, S., & Sun, R. (2010) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/a0019532 · Cited by 428
Glöckner, A., & Witteman, C. (2010) · Thinking & Reasoning · doi:10.1080/13546780903395748 · Cited by 397
Metadata
- Authors
- Evans, J. S. B. T.
- Venue
- Thinking & Reasoning
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2007-10
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 321-339
- ISSN
- 1354-6783 (ISSN-L)
- 1464-0708
- OpenAlex
- W2028992008
- Cited by
- 396
- References
- 66
- FWCI
- 10.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.