Credible commitment in carbon policy
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 4 of the 4 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
In this article the problem of credible commitment in carbon policy is discussed. Investors favour long-term predictability of the policy, but without any external enforcement mechanisms a commitment made by a government can be withdrawn, leading to scepticism and lack of credibility. This results in increased market risks and investment hold-up. Regulatory uncertainty stems from (i) strategic interactions between government and firms, (ii) potential learning about climate damage and abatement cost and (iii) political volatility. Although commitment to future policy encourages private investment, it also imposes costs in the form of reduced flexibility to accommodate new information or preferences. The article reviews devices that may help policy makers raise the level of commitment while also leaving some room for flexible adjustments. In particular, legislation of a long-term governance framework, delegation to an independent carbon agency and securitization of investors' stakes in emission markets offer palliative approaches.
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Cites
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BackgroundCongressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms
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Cited by
Koch, N., Fuss, S., Grosjean, G., & Edenhofer, O. (2014) · Energy Policy · doi:10.1016/j.enpol.2014.06.024 · Cited by 448
Negative emissions—Part 3: Innovation and upscaling
Nemet, G. F., Callaghan, M. W., Creutzig, F., Fuss, S., Hartmann, J., Hilaire, J., Lamb, W. F., Minx, J. C., Rogers, S., & Smith, P. (2018) · Environmental Research Letters · doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aabff4 · Cited by 343
Sequencing to ratchet up climate policy stringency
Pahle, M., Burtraw, D., Flachsland, C., Kelsey, N., Biber, E., Meckling, J., Edenhofer, O., & Zysman, J. (2018) · Nature Climate Change · doi:10.1038/s41558-018-0287-6 · Cited by 271
Self-citationPolitics matters: Regulatory events as catalysts for price formation under cap-and-trade
Koch, N., Grosjean, G., Fuss, S., & Edenhofer, O. (2016) · Journal of Environmental Economics and Management · doi:10.1016/j.jeem.2016.03.004 · Cited by 135
Addressing policy credibility problems for low-carbon investment
Nemet, G. F., Jakob, M., Steckel, J. C., & Edenhofer, O. (2017) · Global Environmental Change · doi:10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2016.12.004 · Cited by 106
“Climate policy design thus needs to navigate a tradeoff between making commitments that are sufficiently credible to stimulate transformation and retaining flexibility to adjust (Brunner et al., 2012; Jakob and Brunner, 2014; Whitesell, 2011).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Brunner, S., Flachsland, C., & Marschinski, R.
- Venue
- Climate Policy
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2012-03
- Volume
- 12
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 255-271
- ISSN
- 1469-3062 (ISSN-L)
- 1752-7457
- OpenAlex
- W1985391633
- Cited by
- 177
- References
- 4
- FWCI
- 27.37
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Brunner, S., Flachsland, C., & Marschinski, R. (2012). Credible commitment in carbon policy. Climate Policy. https://doi.org/10.1080/14693062.2011.582327
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.