CoChat

The risk of corruption in public pharmaceutical procurement: how anti-corruption, transparency and accountability measures may reduce this risk

Open access
Kohler, Jillian Clare, Dimancesco, Deirdre · 2020 · Global Health Action

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 3 of the 37 sources its claims cite were checked for support.

Abstract

Background: The goal of the public procurement of pharmaceuticals is to purchase sufficient quantities of high-quality pharmaceuticals at cost-effective prices for a given population. This goal can be undercut if corruption infiltrates the procurement process. Good procurement practices can help mitigate the risks of corruption and support equitable access to affordable and high-quality medicines.Objectives: This paper aims to 1) examine manifestations of corruption in the pharmaceutical procurement process and key factors behind them, and 2) identify how to design and implement effective anti-corruption, transparency and accountability mechanisms within this process.Methods: This paper was informed by a narrative literature review from 1996 to the present. The search focused on publications that addressed the issue of pharmaceutical procurement and governance and corruption issues. Our search included peer-reviewed literature, books, grey literature such as working papers, reports published by international organizations and donor agencies, and some media articles. Some documents used in this paper were already known to the authors.Results: Procurement is highly vulnerable to corruption particularly in the health sector. What is more, corruption in the procurement process does not appear to be limited to any one level of government or type of health system. The better integration of accountability, transparency and anti-corruption mechanisms in the procurement process is needed to reduce the risk of corruption.Conclusions: Lessons learned suggest that anti-corruption, transparency and accountability mechanisms in the pharmaceutical procurement process, such as open contracting and integrity pacts are helpful towards reducing the risk of corruption.

Overview

CoChat Summary

TL;DR

This narrative review argues that public pharmaceutical procurement is highly vulnerable to corruption and that stronger transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption (ACTA) measures can reduce that risk. It highlights examples such as open contracting, e-procurement, integrity pacts, and stronger audits/oversight as promising tools, but stresses that they are not sufficient on their own.

Key findings

  • The review concludes that procurement is “highly vulnerable to corruption,” especially in health, and that corruption can occur at national, state/provincial, and local levels in both centralized and decentralized systems.
  • Corruption can appear at every procurement stage: pre-bidding, bidding, and post-bidding; examples given include falsified needs, biased bids, bribery/extortion, false invoicing, and rewriting contract terms.
  • The paper gives concrete examples of scale and impact: in a World Bank review of five health projects in India (FY 2007–2008), evidence of fraud and corruption was found in all five; in a Latin America hospital study, high-to-low purchase price ratios ranged from 3:1 to 35:1; in one country report, prices for essential medicines were up to 41% higher than international averages.
  • The authors argue that transparency and accountability can help by exposing patterns/outliers, enabling price comparison, supporting sanctions, and improving monitoring; they cite open contracting and e-procurement as useful, but “necessary but insufficient” without additional governance measures.

Methods

  • Narrative literature review covering publications from 1996 to the present.
  • Search strategy used PubMed, PAIS, and Summon with corruption/procurement/pharmaceutical/governance keywords; included peer-reviewed articles, books, grey literature, reports, and some media articles.
  • Search yielded 2,038 results, reduced to 99 articles, and then to a final pool of 62 cited articles; the search was limited to English-language sources.

Limitations

  • The paper states that the search was limited to English sources and that the cited articles are “not exhaustive.”
  • It also notes that “some documents used in this paper were already known to the authors,” which makes the review partly reliant on prior familiarity rather than a fully systematic search.

Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.

Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.1080/16549716.2019.1694745

Cites

22 of 22 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

2 Valid · 2 Not valid · 31 Not checked · 20 Own results and interpretations

19 more claims

Create a free account to see all 55 claims and to verify the 1 reference still open.

See all claims — free account
  • It may state two separate claims as one. 27
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 13

Create a free account to see these claims.

Claims other papers make about this one

Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?

Citations

Cites

Show all 22 references

Research works printed but not linked: 12

  1. Strombom D., 1998, Econ Perspect, 3, 1
  2. Savedoff WD, Hussmann K Why are health systems prone to corruption? Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2006. London, UK: Pluto Press; 2006.
  3. Transparency International G20 Position Paper, 2016, Transparency in Health Sector Procurement
  4. World Bank, 2007, Corruption and technology in public procurement
  5. World Health Organization, 2009, Measuring transparency in the public pharmaceutical sector: assessment instrument
  6. Vian T, 2016, Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA): pathways to transparency, accountability and access
  7. Vian T, 2010, Anti-corruption in the health sector: strategies for transparency and accountability
  8. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Health and Public Procurement, 2009, OECD
  9. The Law of Ukraine. About Public Procurement, 2015, Document 922-VIII, current edition
  10. Cohen JC, 2001, Using technology to fight corruption in pharmaceutical purchasing: lessons learned from the chilean experience
  11. Navarrete E, 2014, CUENTA PÚBLICA 2013 [Public account 2013] Central de Abastecimiento S.N.S.S. Ministerio de Salud
  12. Engstrom A, 2009, Proc Int Multiconference Comput Sci Inf Technol, 4, 315

Cited by

See all 128

Metadata

Authors
Kohler, J. C., & Dimancesco, D.
Affiliations
  • Leslie Dan Faculty of Pharmacy, University of Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
  • World Health Organization (CH)
Venue
Global Health Action
Published
2020-02-03
Volume
13
Issue
sup1
Pages
1694745
ISSN
  • 1654-9716 (ISSN-L)
  • 1654-9880
OpenAlex
W3011937804
Cited by
128
References
21
Citations by year
2026: 14 · 2025: 21 · 2024: 24 · 2023: 33 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 6
FWCI
2.65
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Global Health Action (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
World Health Organization
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Business, Management and Accounting › Strategy and Management › Public Procurement and Policy
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Corruption and Economic Development
Keywords
corruption, anti-corruption mechanisms, transparency, accountability, integrity pact, health system governance, equitable access to medicines, procurement risk
MeSH terms
Pharmaceutical Preparations, Fraud, Government Programs, Humans, Social Responsibility

About these checks

Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

The claim verdicts this report counts are experimental: their accuracy is not yet measured.

A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-10, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).

A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-10 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).

Cited sources are checked with a language model’s help (gpt-6-sol).

Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.

Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.

What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›

Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review

How to cite

Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.

This page
CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The risk of corruption in public pharmaceutical procurement: how anti-corruption, transparency and accountability measures may reduce this risk. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/16549716.2019.1694745
The paper
Kohler, J. C., & Dimancesco, D. (2020). The risk of corruption in public pharmaceutical procurement: how anti-corruption, transparency and accountability measures may reduce this risk. Global Health Action. https://doi.org/10.1080/16549716.2019.1694745

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.