The DOI matches its Crossref record; 77 of the 78 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
What's domain-specific about theory of mind?
Abstract
Twenty years ago, Baron-Cohen and colleagues argued that autistic performance on false belief tests was explained by a deficit in metarepresentation. Subsequent research moved from the view that the mind has a domain-general capacity for metarepresentation to the view that the mind has a domain-specific mechanism for metarepresentation of mental states per se, i.e., the theory of mind mechanism (ToMM). We argue that 20 years of data collection in lesion patients and children with autism supports a more parsimonious view closer to that of the 1985 paper. Lower-level domain-specific mechanisms--e.g., tracking gaze, joint attention--interacting with higher-level domain-general mechanisms for metarepresentation, recursion, and executive function can account for observed patterns of deficits in both autism and neurological patients. The performance of children with autism or orbitofrontal patients on ToM tests can be explained more parsimoniously by their deficits in lower-level domain-specific mechanisms for processing social information. Without proper inputs, the intact capacity for metarepresentation by itself cannot make correct ToM inferences. Children with autism have no impairment in false photograph tests because their metarepresentational capacity is intact and they have no impairment in inputs required for such tests. TPJ patients have equivalent deficits on ToM and non-ToM metarepresentational tasks, consistent with a failure in domain-general processing. If deficits on ToM tasks can result from deficits in low-level input systems or in higher-level domain-general capacities, postulating a separate ToM mechanism may have been an unnecessary theoretical move.
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“A thorough review of cognitive mechanisms underlying ASD suggested that non-social cognitive mechanisms, including reward, executive function, attention, visual and auditory processing, may affect the presentation of social behavior regardless of specific impairment or the existence of domain-specific social cognitive mechanisms7.”
From Subtyping cognitive profiles in Autism Spectrum Disorder using a Functional Random Forest algorithm (2018) · cites this paper as [7]
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Cites
Does the autistic child have a “theory of mind” ?
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“The original paper by Baron-Cohen et al. (1985) suggested that passing the false belief test engaged some or all of these metacognitive mechanisms.”
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Do 15-month-old infants understand false beliefs?
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People thinking about thinking peopleThe role of the temporo-parietal junction in “theory of mind”
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“Apperly et al. (2005, in press) have used nonverbal false belief and false photograph tasks closely equated for 3 Figure 4 of Saxe and Kanwisher (2003) compares how certain voxels respond to particular types of stimulus stories: false belief, false photograph, physical descriptions of people,…”
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Cited by
Sorted by citations
Decety, J., & Lamm, C. (2007) · The Neuroscientist · doi:10.1177/1073858407304654 · Cited by 1,044
Neuroanatomical and neurochemical bases of theory of mind
Abu-Akel, A. M., & Shamay‐Tsoory, S. (2011) · Neuropsychologia · doi:10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.07.012 · Cited by 659
Putting together phylogenetic and ontogenetic perspectives on empathy
Decety, J., & Svetlova, M. (2012) · Developmental Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1016/j.dcn.2011.05.003 · Cited by 508
Handbook of Imagination and Mental Simulation
Markman, K. D., Suhr, J., & Klein, W. (2012) · Psychology Press eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203809846 · Cited by 390
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Metadata
- Authors
- Stone, V. E., & Gerrans, P.
- Affiliations
- The University of Queensland (AU)
- The University of Adelaide (AU)
- Corresponding author
- Stone, Valerie E.
- ORCID
- Gerrans, Philip
- Venue
- Social Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2006-09
- Volume
- 1
- Issue
- 3-4
- Pages
- 309-319
- ISSN
- 1747-0919 (ISSN-L)
- 1747-0927
- OpenAlex
- W2057687803
- Cited by
- 138
- References
- 78
- Citations by year
- 2026: 2 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 7 · 2022: 5 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 4 · 2018: 7 · 2017: 10 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 7 · 2014: 9 · 2013: 12 · 2012: 11
- FWCI
- 2.69
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Social Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Adelaide Research & Scholarship (AR&S) (University of Adelaide) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Autism Spectrum Disorder Research
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
- Keywords
- theory of mind, metarepresentation, autism spectrum disorder, false belief test, domain-general mechanisms, temporoparietal junction, joint attention, gaze tracking, executive function, recursion, social cognition
- MeSH terms
- Autistic Disorder, Brain Mapping, Humans, Mental Processes, Psychological Theory
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