Spontaneous and intentional trait inferences recruit a common mentalizing network to a different degree: Spontaneous inferences activate only its core areas
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 28 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
This fMRI study analyzes inferences on other persons' traits, whereby half of the participants were given spontaneous ("read") instructions while the other half were given intentional ("infer the person's trait") instructions. Several sentences described the behavior of a target person from which a strong trait could be inferred (trait diagnostic) or not (trait nondiagnostic). A direct contrast between spontaneous and intentional instructions revealed no significant differences, indicating that the same social mentalizing network was recruited. There was, however, a difference with respect to different brain areas that passed the significance threshold, suggesting that this common network was recruited to a different degree. Specifically, spontaneous inferences significantly recruited only core mentalizing areas, including the temporo-parietal junction and medial prefrontal cortex, whereas intentional inferences additionally recruited other brain areas, including the (pre)cuneus, superior temporal sulcus, temporal poles, and parts of the premotor and parietal cortex. These results suggest that intentional instructions invite observers to think more about the material they read, and consider it in many ways besides its social impact. Future research on the neurological underpinnings of trait inference might profit from the use of spontaneous instructions to get purer results that involve only the core brain areas in social judgment.
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Citations
Cites
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“To cite this Article Ma, Ning , Vandekerckhove, Marie , Van Overwalle, Frank , Seurinck, Ruth and Fias, Wim(2010) 'Spontaneous and intentional trait inferences recruit a common mentalizing network to a different degree: Spontaneous inferences activate only its core areas', Social Neuroscience,, First published on: 21…”
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“, 2005), another interpretation is that the TP utilizes personal memories to comprehend the state of mind of others (Olson et al., 2007).”
Background
Cited by
Fractionating theory of mind: a meta-analysis of functional brain imaging studies
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Aichhorn, M., Richlan, F., & Perner, J. (2014) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2014.01.009 · Cited by 1,656
Eight problems for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding in monkeys and humans
Hickok, G. (2009) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21189 · Cited by 887
Schurz, M., Radua, J., Tholen, M. G., Maliske, L., Margulies, D. S., Mars, R. B., Sallet, J., & Kanske, P. (2021) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/bul0000303 · Cited by 619
Shared Neural Circuits for Mentalizing about the Self and Others
Lombardo, M. V., Chakrabarti, B., Bullmore, E. T., Wheelwright, S. J., Sadek, S. A., Suckling, J., MRC AIMS Consortium, & Baron-Cohen, S. (2010) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21287 · Cited by 358
Neural evidence that utterance-processing entails mentalizing: The case of irony
Spotorno, N., Koun, E., Prado, J., Van Der Henst, J.-B., & Noveck, I. A. (2012) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2012.06.046 · Cited by 254
Metadata
- Authors
- Ma, N., Vandekerckhove, M., Van Overwalle, F., Seurinck, R., & Fias, W.
- Venue
- Social Neuroscience
- Publisher
- Informa UK Limited
- Published
- 2010-07-21
- Volume
- 6
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 123-138
- ISSN
- 1747-0919 (ISSN-L)
- 1747-0927
- OpenAlex
- W1971031033
- Cited by
- 120
- References
- 28
- FWCI
- 12.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- Ma, N., Vandekerckhove, M., Van Overwalle, F., Seurinck, R., & Fias, W. (2011). Spontaneous and intentional trait inferences recruit a common mentalizing network to a different degree: Spontaneous inferences activate only its core areas. Social Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2010.485884
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