Cited by 887Action Observation and SynchronizationEmbodied and Extended CognitionChild and Animal Learning Development

Eight problems for the mirror neuron theory of action understanding in monkeys and humans

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Hickok, Gregory·2009·Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract

The discovery of mirror neurons in macaque frontal cortex has sparked a resurgence of interest in motor/embodied theories of cognition. This critical review examines the evidence in support of one of these theories, namely, that mirror neurons provide the basis of action understanding. It is argued that there is no evidence from monkey data that directly tests this theory, and evidence from humans makes a strong case against the position.

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Crossref · 10.1162/jocn.2009.21189

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  • The AIM model only works when one sensory input is associated with one cause.

    “The problem is that such a theory only works when one sensory input is associated with one cause (Hickok, 2009;Kilner et al., 2007).”

    From Connecting minds and sharing emotions through mimicry: A neurocognitive model of emotional contagion (2017) · cites this paper as Hickok, 2009

    The Conclusion (page unavailable) says a single observed action can have multiple meanings and that a motor representation cannot distinguish among them. This supports the concern about ambiguity, but the paper does not identify the AIM model or state that it works only when each sensory input has one cause. (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • Mirror neurons do not code for any particular meaning or goal-directed action; instead, their activity reflects associative learning via sensory-motor pairings.

    “Hickok (2009) argues that perhaps just like unconscious reflexes, mirror neurons do not code for any particular meaning or goal-directed action.Instead, similarly to Pavlovian associations, the activity of mirror neurons simply reflects on associative learning via sensory-motor pairings.”

    From Connecting minds and sharing emotions through mimicry: A neurocognitive model of emotional contagion (2017) · cites this paper as Hickok (2009)

    In “What role does the ‘mirror system’ play in action understanding?” (page unavailable), Hickok proposes that mirror-neuron activity may reflect Pavlovian-like sensory–motor pairings without coding meaning. But he presents this as one possibility, says both proposed explanations may apply, and does not establish the categorical claim that mirror neurons code no goal-directed action. (LLM, conf=0.88)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • This flexibility avoids the single input-output relationship criticized in mirror neuron theories.

    “This gives organisms greater flexibility and avoids single input-output relationship criticized in mirror neuron theories (Hickok, 2009;Kilner et al., 2007).”
  • To the degree that action understanding has been examined in patients, the evidence does not support a role for the putative mirror neuron mechanism.

    “to the degree that action understanding has been examined in patients, the evidence does not support a role for the putative mirror neuron mechanism”

    From Neuroscience Needs Behavior: Correcting a Reductionist Bias (2017) · cites this paper as Hickok, 2009

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Authors
Hickok, G.
Affiliations
University of California, Irvine (US)
Corresponding author
Hickok, Gregory
Venue
Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
Publisher
MIT Press
Published
2009-07-01
Volume
21
Issue
7
Pages
1229-1243
ISSN
  • 0898-929X (ISSN-L)
  • 1530-8898
OpenAlex
W2135099359
Cited by
887
References
137
Citations by year
2026: 16 · 2025: 15 · 2024: 19 · 2023: 56 · 2022: 22 · 2021: 43 · 2020: 107 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 44 · 2017: 66 · 2016: 55 · 2015: 71 · 2014: 57 · 2013: 75 · 2012: 78
FWCI
9.51
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
  • National Institutes of Health
  • University of California, Irvine
  • National Institute on Deafness and Other Communication Disorders (P01DC000361, R01DC009659, R01DC003681, DC0361)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
Keywords
mirror neurons, action understanding, embodied cognition, theory of mind, social cognition
MeSH terms
Animals, Haplorhini, Cerebral Cortex, Cognition, Humans, Imitative Behavior, Models, Neurological, Motor Skills, Neurons

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