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Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts

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Young, Liane, Scholz, Jonathan, Saxe, Rebecca · 2011 · Social Neuroscience
Cited by 71

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 40 of the 40 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Moral judgment depends critically on theory of mind (ToM), reasoning about mental states such as beliefs and intentions. People assign blame for failed attempts to harm and offer forgiveness in the case of accidents. Here we use fMRI to investigate the role of ToM in moral judgment of harmful vs. helpful actions. Is ToM deployed differently for judgments of blame vs. praise? Participants evaluated agents who produced a harmful, helpful, or neutral outcome, based on a harmful, helpful, or neutral intention; participants made blame and praise judgments. In the right temporo-parietal junction (right TPJ), and, to a lesser extent, the left TPJ and medial prefrontal cortex, the neural response reflected an interaction between belief and outcome factors, for both blame and praise judgments: The response in these regions was highest when participants delivered a negative moral judgment, i.e., assigned blame or withheld praise, based solely on the agent's intent (attempted harm, accidental help). These results show enhanced attention to mental states for negative moral verdicts based exclusively on mental state information.

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Crossref · 10.1080/17470919.2010.529712

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Metadata

Authors
Young, L., Scholz, J., & Saxe, R.
Venue
Social Neuroscience
Published
2011-06
Volume
6
Issue
3
Pages
302-315
ISSN
  • 1747-0919 (ISSN-L)
  • 1747-0927
OpenAlex
W2164239761
Cited by
71
References
40
FWCI
2.86
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
green

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1080/17470919.2010.529712
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Young, L., Scholz, J., & Saxe, R. (2011). Neural evidence for “intuitive prosecution”: The use of mental state information for negative moral verdicts. Social Neuroscience. https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2010.529712

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