‘Human oversight’ in the EU artificial intelligence act: what, when and by whom?

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The main wording of Article 14 has not been subject to propositions of major changes compared to the Commission's draft proposal.

“All in all, however, the main wording of Article 14 has not been subject to propositions of major changes as compared to the Commission's draft proposal.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

The Council draft version of Article 14 contains suggested amendments compared to the Commission's draft, most appearing to have a clarifying purpose.

“The Council draft version of Article 14 contains some suggested amendments as compared to the above proposals from the Commission's draft.Most of these appear to have a clarifying purpose.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Council draft removed the word 'fully' as a prefix in Article 14(4)(a) to the requirement that human overseers should be enabled to understand the capacities and limitations of the high-risk AI system.

“It can, however, be noted that the word 'fully' has been removed as a prefix in (4)(a) to the requirement that the human overseers should be enabled to understand the capacities and limitations of the high-risk AI system”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Commission's April 2021 draft AIA proposes requirements for high-risk AI systems to be designed and developed so they can be effectively overseen by natural persons during use (Article 14).

“The European Commission has, in its draft of a new EU Artificial Intelligence Act 2 from April 2021, the AIA, proposed to set requirements for so-called 'high-risk' AI systems, to be designed and developed in such a way that they can be effectively overseen by natural persons during their use.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

All obligations in Article 14 are linked to the relative criteria 'as appropriate to the circumstances'.

“And notably, all of these obligations are linked to the relative criteria 'as appropriate to the circumstances'.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

None of the Article 14 AIA provisions includes obligations that stretch beyond the provider.

“that none of them includes obligations that stretch beyond the provider”

May combine two claims.

Article 14(4) AIA obliges providers to ensure high-risk AI systems enable assigned human overseers to fully understand capacities and limitations and monitor operation, remain aware of automation bias, correctly interpret output, decide not to use or override output, and intervene or interrupt the system.

“It obliges the providers to ensure that the high-risk AI system will enable the individuals to whom human oversight is assigned to, as appropriate to the circumstances, to:”

• Also stated in: § 3. Short introduction to article 14key aspects · plain

  “(a) fully understand the capacities and limitations of the high-risk AI system and be able to duly monitor its operation, so that signs of anomalies, dysfunctions and unexpected performance can be detected and addressed as soon as possible;”

• Also stated in: § 3. Short introduction to article 14key aspects · plain

  “(e) be able to intervene on the operation of the high-risk AI system or interrupt the system through a 'stop' button or a similar procedure.37”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The European Parliament draft version proposes a new Article 4a containing a general principle of human oversight applicable to all AI systems.

“The European Parliament draft version of the AIA does propose the inclusion of a new Article 4 a, which would contain a general principle of human oversight applicable to all AI systems.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Neither the Commission nor the Council draft includes any definition or further specific recital guidance on how to relate 'appropriate' or 'proportionate' to 'circumstances'.

“Neither one of the drafts include any definition or further specific recital guidance on how to relate 'appropriate' or 'proportionate' to 'circumstances'.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Articles 12-13 AIA establish requirements of record-keeping and transparency through information to users.

“Turning to what type of information that, more specifically, should be available to the human overseers, Articles 12-13 AIA are of special interest as they establish requirements of record-keeping and transparency through information to users.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Article 13 AIA requires that high-risk AI systems should be designed and developed so that their operation is sufficiently transparent to enable users to interpret the system's output and use it appropriately.

“Turing to Article 13 AIA, it requires that high-risk AI systems should be designed and developed so that their operation is sufficiently transparent to enable users to interpret the system's output and use it appropriately.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Article 14 primarily emphasises the relational aspect of transparency between systems and humans.

“The Article primarily emphasises the relational aspect of transparency between systems and humans.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Providers should ensure that humans are able to intervene on the operation or interrupt the system through a 'stop' button or a similar procedure.

“They should also be able to intervene on the operation or interrupt the system through a 'stop' button or a similar procedure.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based).

None of the Article 14 AIA provisions go beyond regulating what types of technical oversight capabilities should be in place before the system is placed on the market or put into service.

“and that none of them go beyond regulating what types of technical oversight capabilities should be in place before the system is placed on the market or put into service.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Article 3(1) AIA refers to system outputs by non-exhaustive exemplifications such as content, predictions, recommendations, or decisions.

“Article 3(1) AIA, for instance, refers to system outputs by non-exhaustive exemplifications such as content, predictions, recommendations, or decisions.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Council draft version's Article 29(4) contains a proposed amendment stating that users also shall implement human oversight on the basis of the instructions of use.

“Here, the Council draft version even further emphasises the link between the instructions of use and the Article 14 oversight requirement, as its Article 29(4) contains a proposed amendment stating that users also shall implement human oversight on the basis of the instructions of use.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Providers of AI systems should make sure that humans are able to decide, in any particular situation, not to use the high-risk AI system or otherwise disregard, override or reverse its output.

“Providers of AI systems should make sure that humans are able to decide, in any particular situation, not to use the high-risk AI system or otherwise disregard, override or reverse its output.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Article 13 provides some detail on the type of information that system users and human overseers should have access to and be able to evaluate when performing the oversight.

“On how this goal is to be realised, Article 13 also provides some detail on the type of information that system users and human overseers should have access to (and be able to evaluate) when performing the oversight.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Article 14 AIA does not provide direct answers to if and how the obligations to ensure technical oversight capabilities would relate to specific stages of a system process.

“Here again, Article 14 AIA does not provide direct answers to if and how the obligations to ensure technical oversight capabilities would relate to specific stages of a system process.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Article 14 AIA comprises obligations that more specifically address what type of powers human overseers must be allowed to exercise in relation to the system.

“In addition to the above-mentioned goal-oriented type provisions, Article 14 AIA would also comprise obligations that more specifically address what type of powers that human overseers must be allowed to exercise in relation to the system.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Article 13(2) AIA holds that providers must develop and supply the systems with accompanying instructions.

“Of importance to how the transparency goals of Article 13 AIA translate into the system user domain, Article 13(2) AIA holds that the providers must develop and supply the systems with accompanying instructions.”

May combine two claims.

Article 12 AIA requires the automatic recording of events (logs) while a high-risk AI system is in operation and obliges providers to ensure that the system offers a level of traceability of its functioning that is 'appropriate' to the intended purpose of the system.

“Firstly, Article 12 AIA would, by requiring the automatic recording of events (logs) while a high-risk AI system is in operation, oblige the providers to ensure that the system offers a level of traceability of its functioning that is 'appropriate' to the intended purpose of the system.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Article 14 AIA is addressed to system providers and does not, in itself, address whom in particular should perform oversight at the user's end.

“To sum up, as Article 14 AIA is addressed to the system providers it does not, in itself, address whom in particular should perform the oversight at the user's end.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The wording of Article 14 does not specify to any great extent when a system would be required to direct a case or process to human oversight.

“The wording of Article 14, however, does not specify to any great extent when a system would be required to direct a case or process to human oversight.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Article 12 logs should enable the monitoring of whether the system presents risks at national level or if it is being remodelled to an extent that would qualify as a substantial modification, and should facilitate the provider's post-market monitoring.

“The Article 12 logs should, in particular, enable the monitoring of whether the system presents risks at national level or if it is being remodelled to an extent that would qualify as a substantial modification.”

• Also stated in: § 4. 'what' are the aims and objects of the human oversight? · plain

  “The logs should also facilitate the provider's post-market monitoring of the system, where it is obliged to actively and systematically collect, document and analyse relevant data provided by users or others throughout its lifetime.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

These instructions should include information on the human oversight measures installed, as well as the technical measures in place to facilitate the interpretation of system outputs by the users.

“These should include information on the human oversight measures installed, as well as the technical measures in place to facilitate the interpretation of system outputs by the users.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Article 29(2) also states that the obligation to follow instructions is without prejudice to the user's discretion in organising its own resources and activities for the purpose of implementing the human oversight measures indicated by the provider.

“And perhaps even more importantly in the context of how the human oversight related responsibilities are distributed between providers and users, the paragraph also states that the obligation to follow instructions is without prejudice to the user's discretion in organising its own resources and activities for the purpose of implementing the human oversight measures indicated by the provider.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The analysis showed that neither Article 14 AIA nor other relevant related provisions of the draft provide much detail on what the human overseer is to consider or direct attention towards when performing oversight.

“The analysis showed that neither the Article 14 AIA, or the other relevant related provisions of the draft, provide much detail on what the human overseer is to consider or direct its attention towards when performing the oversight.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Similar conclusions were made on the issue of 'when' the oversight is to be exercised.

“Similar conclusions were made on the issue of 'when' the oversight is to be exercised.71”

• cites [71]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Providers are to ensure that users at all times may interrupt or override the system processes.

“The providers are to ensure that users at all times may interrupt or override the system processes.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The removal of 'fully' indicates a relaxed expectation or recognition that it may not always be feasible or necessary for users to have a complete understanding of an AI system.

“indicating a relaxed expectation, or recognition, that it may not always be feasible or necessary for users to have a complete understanding of an AI system.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The linkage to 'as appropriate to the circumstances' underscores that a type of proportionality requirement is intended, as made clearer in the Council draft which contains the additional 'and proportionate' to the circumstances.

“This underscores that a type of proportionality requirement is intended (as is made more clear in the Council draft version, which contains the additional 'and proportionate' to the circumstances).”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

It is not clear to what extent the 'appropriate' or 'proportionate' prerequisite could modify the obligation for providers to enable human oversight.

“It is thus not clear to what extent this prerequisite could modify the obligation for providers to enable human oversight.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The relative criteria indicate a discretionary space for the provider to determine and develop the specific technical configuration to put in place.

“This indicates a discretionary space for the provider to determine and develop the specific technical configuration to put in place.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

An obligation to ensure human oversight implies that humans are expected to counterbalance some of the associated risks with AI systems.

“While, indeed, an obligation to ensure human oversight implies that humans are expected to counterbalance some of the associated risks with AI systems, their capacity and aptness to do so will depend on the type of systems they are to oversee, the transparency of these systems, as well as their mandates and working conditionsincluding what training they have.4”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Article 14 AIA's risk assessments should have been made during the system design phase and observed via the installation of oversight capabilities, rather than oversight performance before the system is provided to users.

“The risk assessments should have been made during the system design phase and observed via the installation of oversight 'capabilities', rather than oversight performancebefore the system is provided to users.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Article 14 is drafted on the basis that technical capability obligations should be placed on the provider.

“As clear from the provider obligations in Article 14(a-e), as laid out above, the Article is thus drafted on the basis that technical capability obligations should be placed on the provider.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The AIA and its oversight requirement will be a novelty in European law.

“The AIA and its oversight requirement will therefore be a novelty in European law.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Human oversight should not be viewed as a specific and single type of safeguarding measure.

“Human oversight should in this regard not be viewed as a specific and single type of safeguarding measure.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The placement of Article 14 AIA obligations on providers highlights a predominately preventive nature of the Article.

“The fact that the obligations in Article 14 AIA are placed on the providers thus highlights a predominately preventive nature of the Article.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Commission's understanding of human oversight focuses on the human agent interpreting and following or modifying the output at the use stage and does not extend to concepts such as organisational oversight.

“As put by Lazcoz and De Hert, this also implies that the Commission's understanding of human oversight focuses on the human agent interpreting and following or modifying the output at the use stageand does not extend to concepts such as organisational oversight.”

• cites Lazcoz and De HertNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

'Human oversight' could have different functions depending on at what stage in the process it is being exercised.

“This also means that 'human oversight' could have different functions depending on at what stage in the process it is being exercised.”

May combine two claims.

Similar obligations would make the AIA more obtrusive on users compared to the Commission's draft proposal, and would likely decrease the risk of users not utilising the oversight capabilities technically enabled by the provider.

“And while similar obligations indeed would make the AIA more obtrusive on the users as compared to in the Commission's draft proposal, they would likely also decrease the risk of users not utilising the potential of those oversight capabilities which have been technically enabled by the provider.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

This vagueness is particularly the case for the type of impulses that would trigger the need for oversight.

“This is particularly the case for the type of impulses that would trigger the need for oversight.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The provider obligations to enable human overseers to understand capacities and limitations, monitor operation, remain aware of automation bias, and correctly interpret output signal the central aspect of human oversight's target.

“While not providing detail on how, for example, a system's output should be presented to ensure that humans will be able to interpret it correctly, these formulations point out the central aspect of the human oversight's target.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

If variants of the Council and European Parliament obligations were reflected in the final AIA, they would further reinforce the link between provider obligations in Article 14 and user obligations in Article 29.

“If some variants of these obligations were to be reflected in the final form of the AIA, they would further reinforce the link between the provider obligations in Article 14 and the user obligations in Article 29 of the AIA.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Transparency in Article 14 is construed not only as a form of openness but also as a quality of being identifiable and understandable.

“Transparency is thus not only construed as a form of 'openness', but also as a quality of being identifiable and understandable.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable). May combine two claims.

While the provider's and user's respective obligations to make versus follow the system instructions would enable more specific and circumstanced guidance on the objects of the oversight, this would not counterbalance the fact that the edge of the Regulation is primarily directed towards the providers and their preventive installation of various system capacities for oversight.

“But, while the provider's and user's respective obligations to make versus follow the system instructions would enable more specific and circumstanced guidance on the objects of the oversight, this would not counterbalance the fact that the edge of the Regulation is primarily directed towards the providers and their preventive installation of various system capacities for oversight.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The AIA or Article 14 does not lack bearing on users' exercise of human oversight over high-risk AI systems as they are deployed and in operation.

“As we will see, this, however, does not mean that the AIA or the specific content of Article 14 lacks any bearing on the users' exercise of human oversight over high-risk AI systems as they are deployed and in operation.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

From the perspective of legal certainty, this makes the potential efficiency of 'human oversight', either as a procedural or substantive safeguard of health safety and fundamental rights, hard to evaluate.

“From the perspective of legal certainty, this makes the potential efficiency of 'human oversight', either as a procedural or substantive safeguard of health safety and fundamental rights, hard to evaluate.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The Council draft version includes a new express obligation for users to 'assign human oversight to natural persons who have the necessary competence, training and authority'.

“It should, however, be added here that the Council draft version includes a new express obligation for users to 'assign human oversight to natural persons who have the necessary competence, training and authority'.64”

• cites [64]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The focus on the user's capability to actively intervene does not fully capture the fact that the particular human overseer may have difficulties identifying those stages of the process that would benefit from human input without help from the system itself.

“At the same time, the focus on the user's capability to actively intervene does not fully capture the fact that the particular human overseer may have difficulties identifying those stages of the process that would benefit from human inputwithout help from the system itself.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Article 14 AIA in conjunction with other main safeguarding obligations placed on the provider indirectly emphasises the importance of system transparency as a necessitator and enabler of oversight.

“As already introduced, Article 14 AIA in conjunction with other main safeguarding obligations placed on the provider indirectly emphasises the importance of system transparencyas a necessitator as well as an enabler of oversight.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

This lack of detail is somewhat understandable considering the omnibus-character of the AIA, an overarching Regulation that will apply across very different specific sectors and contexts of society as well as of law.

“This lack is somewhat understandable considering the omnibus-character of the AIAan overarching Regulation that will apply across very different specific sectors and contexts of society as well as of law.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

This legal arrangement again reflects the AIA's focus and rather large portion of trust vested in the providers to secure the sufficient human oversight infrastructure all the way to the user's end.

“This legal arrangement again reflects the AIA's focus and rather large portion of trust vested in the providers to secure the sufficient human oversight infrastructure all the way to the user's end.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Neither the Council nor the European Parliament draft versions establishes a specific minimum standard for the education or training level required to assign humans to oversee high-risk AI systems, but their references to criteria such as 'properly' and 'necessary' express a requirement on users to shape human overseers into a more specific 'whom'.

“Although neither one of the Council and European Parliament's draft versions establishes a specific minimum standard for the education or training level required to assign humans with the task of overseeing high-risk AI systems, their references to criteria such as 'properly' and 'necessary' express a requirement on system users to shape their human overseers into a more specific 'whom'.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

'Outputs' should not be narrowly construed as only relating to final decisions or recommendations by the system.

“'Outputs', in this respect, should not be narrowly construed as only relating to final decisions or recommendations by the system.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

As stressed by Lazcoz and de Hert, users (controllers in the GDPR) would be obliged to utilise provider information and instructions to enable the individuals assigned human oversight under Article 22 GDPR to understand the capacities and limitations of the system.

“As stressed by Lazcoz and de Hert, this would mean that users (controllers in the GDPR) would be obliged to utilise provider information and instructions to enable the individuals (in the controller's organisation) to whom human oversight is assigned under Article 22 GDPR, to understand the capacities and limitations of the system.”

• cites Lazcoz and de HertNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The lack of specific guidance on the provider's obligations regarding who performs oversight makes it hard to assess the sharpness of the provision.

“The lack of specific guidance on the provider's obligations in this respect makes it hard to assess the sharpness of the provision.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The European Parliament draft version includes a new Article 29(1a)(ii) provision that would oblige users (deployers) to ensure that natural persons assigned to ensure human oversight are competent, properly qualified and trained, and have the necessary resources for effective supervision in accordance with Article 14.

“Similarly, in the European Parliament draft version a new Article 29 (1a)(ii) provision would oblige the users (in the draft called deployers) to ensure 'that the natural persons assigned to ensure human oversight of the high-risk AI systems are competent, properly qualified and trained', and additionally also that the overseers have 'the necessary resources in order to ensure the effective super”

• cites Article 29(1a)(ii)Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

This could involve fixed design decisions manifested through specific instructions to automatically interrupt the process and redirect the case or issue to human oversight at certain instances or as a response to certain impulses.

“This could involve fixed design decisions manifested through specific instructions to automatically interrupt the process and redirect the case or issue to human oversightat certain instances or as a response to certain impulses.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

It is typically beyond providers' control how users choose to organise their work.

“It would typically be beyond their control how the users choose to organise their work.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Where the provider and user of a system are one and the same, more detailed knowledge on the specific training and education of those humans tasked with overseeing the systems should be retrievable.

“In those cases where the provider and user of a system is one and the same, more detailed knowledge on the specific training and education of those humans tasked with overseeing the systems should be retrievable.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

What qualifies as outputs would depend on the provider's design choices regarding what data the system will collect, log, assess and produce, as well as make readily available to the human overseers.

“What qualifies as outputs would thus depend on the provider's design choices regarding what data the system will collect, log, assess and produce, as well as make readily available to the human overseers.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Article 14's general aim to prevent or minimise risks to health, safety or fundamental rights indicates that oversight should aim towards identifying certain adverse effects of high-risk AI systems to important public interests and values.

“However, the Article's general aim to prevent or minimise the risks to health, safety or fundamental rights also indicates that the oversight should aim towards identifying certain adverse effects of high-risk AIsystems to important public interests and values.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Article 14 AIA clarifies that users at every given instance should have the technical capacity to interrupt the process, and that they should be able to disregard the system's output, which is an important component in ensuring human review of substantive character.

“That Article 14 AIA clarifies that users at every given instance should have the technical capacity to interrupt the process, and that they should be able to disregard the system's output, is thus an important component in ensuring human review of substantive character.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The AIA is not very detailed on the specific content of logs, which limits the extent to which the Regulation in itself provides some detail on the specific objects of the human oversight.

“The AIA is, however, not very detailed on the specific content of these logs, which limits the extent to which the Regulation in itself provides some detail on the specific objects of the human oversight.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Providers could condition the use of their systems with the need for human input at certain stages of the system process.

“They could do this by technically conditioning the use of their systems with the need for human input at certain stages of the system process.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

This circumstance risks reducing the Regulation's impact on the prevalence and extent to which human oversight is actually being performed.

“This circumstance risks reducing the Regulation's impact on the prevalence and extent to which human oversight is actually being performed.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

Recital 48 points towards obligations under the responsible user's authority, making it hard to see how providers could make such guarantees.

“As this, notably, points towards obligations under the responsible user's authority, it is hard to see how the providers would be able to make such guarantees.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Article 14 AIA, as well as the requirements in Article 13 AIA on the specific content that the provider must include in their instructions to the user, provides rather vague guidance on 'when' human oversight over high-risk AI systems is to be performed.

“In sum, Article 14 AIA, as well as the requirements in Article 13 AIA on the specific content that the provider must include in their instructions to the user, provides rather vague guidance on 'when' human oversight over highrisk AI systems is to be performed.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

It is inevitable that the specific configuration of AI systems or their particular uses may require different types of data access and focuses of the human overseers.

“It is inevitable that the specific configuration of AI systems or their particular uses may require different types of data access and focuses of the human overseers.”

May combine two claims.

The Article 14 obligations are of technical type and providers must ensure that their high-risk AI systems are equipped to allow for human interference.

“This means that the obligations are of technical type and that providers thus must ensure that their high-risk AI systems are equipped to allow for human interference.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Recital 48 states that human oversight measures should guarantee that the system is subject to in-built operational constraints that cannot be overridden by the system itself and is responsive to the human operator, and that the natural persons assigned to human oversight have the necessary competence, training and authority.

“For example, Recital 48 states that human oversight measures, where appropriate, should guarantee that the system is subject to in-built operational constraints that cannot be overridden by the system itself and is responsive to the human operator, and that the natural persons to whom human oversight has been assigned have the necessary competence, training and authority to carry out that role.”

• cites Recital 48Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing). May combine two claims.

Article 13, like Article 14, emphasises the relational aspect of transparency, though setting the goals for the knowledge-transfer to human overseers.

“Just as with Article 14, it thus emphasis the relational aspect of transparency, though setting the goals for the knowledge-transfer to human overseers.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Recital 48 is an example of where the Recitals indicate further obligations than are backed up by the binding provisions of the Regulation.

“This is, however, an example of where the Recitals indicate further obligations than are backed up by the binding provisions of the Regulation.”

May combine two claims.

The provider's considerations and expectations of the user's knowledge, experience, education and training would not be binding on the user, especially because Article 29(2) AIA obligations to follow instructions are without prejudice to the user's discretion in organising its own resources and activities.

“Nonetheless, the provider's considerations and expectations of the user´s knowledge, experience, education and training would not be binding on the userespecially considering that the obligations to follow instructions in Article 29(2) AIA are without prejudice to the user's discretion in organising its own resources and activities.”

• cites Article 29(2) AIANot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

To ensure that human oversight is actually performed by the user, providers of high-risk systems could design the system processes to be hybrid, or semi-automated.

“To ensure that human oversight is actually performed by the user, providers of high-risk systems could design the system processes to be hybrid, or semi-automated.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

Article 14 AIA does not, and is not really aimed at, providing much detail on what the human overseer is to consider or direct its attention towards when performing the oversight.

“To sum up, Article 14 AIA does not, and is not really aimed at, providing much detail on what the human overseer is to consider or direct its attention towards when performing the oversight.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Article 14 AIA stresses the relational aspects of knowledge transfer between systems and humans to emphasise substantive and qualitative oversight, as opposed to symbolic or token gesture management.

“It has already been discussed that Article 14 AIA stresses the relational aspects of the knowledge transfer between the systems and humans, as a way to emphasise substantive and qualitative oversight, as opposed to more symbolic and 'token gesture' management.61”

• cites [61]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

The AIA addresses human agency primarily through technical architecture requirements and thus provides an oversight regime that substantiates a basic infrastructure for oversight.

“The AIA addresses the question of human agency primarily through technical architecture requirements, and thus provides an oversight regime that substantiates a basic infrastructure for the oversight.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The legal design of the AIA is not the end point of the legal discussion concerning what human oversight does or should entail.

“Irrespective of whether the EU will, or could have, detailed the Regulation more substantively, or included a broader set of responsibilities that more clearly followed through to the applicational phase, the legal design of the AIA is not the end point of the legal discussion concerning what human oversight does or should entail.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing), S4 (based).

The GDPR would definitely provide some guidance on the links between the draft AIA and the GDPR.

“This contribution has not, for example, expounded on the links between the draft AIA and the GDPRbut the latter Regulation would definitely provide some guidance in this respect.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Too detailed obligations on users could risk coming into conflict with the principle of procedural autonomy by limiting the state's discretion in how to organise efforts to realise the legislation.

“Too detailed obligations on the users could also, for example, risk coming into conflict with the principle of procedural autonomy (through limiting the state's discretion in how to organise their efforts to realise the legislation).74”

• cites [74]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

The European Data Protection Board and the UK Information Commissioner's Office have stressed that training of staff performing human oversight over automated systems is pivotal to ensuring the system is considered partly automated and thus not subject to the specific requirements for solely automated decision-making under Article 22 GDPR.

“In relation to the GDPR, the European Data Protection Board and the United Kingdom's Information Commissioner's Office, has stressed that the training of staff that are to perform human oversight over automated systems is pivotal to ensuring that the system is considered partly automated (and thus not subject to the specific requirements set up for solely automated decision-making processes in Art”

• cites [66]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The more specific answers to these questions move the configuration of the compliance systematicity that the AIA sets up more clearly into relief.

“And, thus, the configuration of the compliance systematicity that the AIA sets up, moves more clearly into relief.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

This legal arrangement signals a prioritisation of system level safeguarding.

“This legal arrangement thus signals a prioritisation of system level safeguarding.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

The function and effectiveness of human oversight is a complex matter with many dimensions stretching beyond the legal domain.

“As indicated through previous research in various fields, but not further explored within this contribution, the function and effectiveness of human oversight is a complex matter with many dimensions stretching beyond the legal domain.69”

• cites [69]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S4 (based). May combine two claims.

Although providers should adopt the technical design and instructions to intended system users, the latter enjoy a fair amount of organisational discretion in how to perform oversight.

“All in all, however, although providers should adopt the technical design as well as instructions to the intended system users, the latter enjoy a fair amount of organisational discretion in how to perform the oversight.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

More detail on the 'what', 'when' and 'by whom' would help improve the accountability of system providers, users, and individual human overseers employed by users.

“Ultimately, more detail on the 'what', 'when' and 'by whom' would thus help improve the accountability of, not only system providers, but also of users as well as the individual human overseers employed by the users.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

The focus on system level preparedness for AI systems to be placed on the market or put into service is unsurprising.

“This makes the focus on system level preparedness for AI systems to be placed on the market or put into service unsurprising.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim.

The AIA's emphasis on goal-oriented provider obligations clearly indicates that human oversight in the AIA is not meant to be understood as a one size fits all formula.

“The AIA's emphasis on provider obligations that are goal-oriented clearly indicates that human oversight in the AIA is not meant to be understood as a one size fits all formula.75”

• cites [75]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

The quality of oversight relates to the essential question of whether any human input has been made at all.

“Ultimately, the quality of the oversight relates to the essential question of whether any human input has been made at all.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

More contextualised legal analysis may help elucidate what duty of care principles should apply for each type of system use.

“More contextualised legal analysis may also help elucidate what duty of care principles should apply for each type of system use.78”

• cites [78]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

May combine two claims.

The main legal basis of the AIA is Article 114 TFEU, and the Regulation's corresponding primary aim is to ensure a free internal market for AI systems while also ensuring protection of health and safety and fundamental rights.

“The main legal basis of the AIA is, however, Article 114 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union 73and the Regulation's corresponding primary aim is to ensure a free internal market for AI systems (while at the same time ensure a protection of health and safety, and fundamental rights).”

• cites Article 114 TFEUNot matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

• cites [73]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

These aspects are important for preventing the AIA from inadvertently legitimising or even incentivising a human oversight infrastructure that chiefly allows for mere superficial human involvement.

“These are important aspects of preventing the AIA inadvertently legitimisingor even incentivisinga human oversight infrastructure that chiefly allows for mere superficial human involvement.79”

• cites [79]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Further legal analysis may help identify particularly intricate and sensitive components of a decision or recommendation in need of more elaborate contextual assessments, which may place legal constraints on the possible level of automation without human oversight.

“Such legal analysis may help the identification of those particularly intricate and sensitive components of a decision or recommendation in need of more elaborate contextual assessments, which thus may place legal constraints on the possible level of automation without human oversight.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable).

Vague criteria on the components of lawfully compliant oversight regimes by providers or users challenges and impairs the outlook for providing clear answers on legality issues.

“Vague criteria on the components of lawfully compliant oversight regimes by either providers or users of AI systems challenges and impairs the outlook for providing clear answers on legality issues.”

May combine two claims.

These circumstances limit the permeation of the AIA's oversight obligations into everyday use of these systems and will affect the scale at which human overseers can discover or mitigate risks of errors in single cases.

“These circumstances thus limit the permeation of the AIA's oversight obligations into the everyday use of these systems, and will affect the scale at which human overseers will be able to discover or mitigate risks of errors in single cases.”

May combine two claims.

The AIA is predominately directed at providers, with no or indirect links between provider and user responsibilities.

“Overall, the recurring theme here is that the AIA is predominately directed at the providers, with no or indirect links between provider and user responsibilities.”

Classified as probably not a substantial claim. May combine two claims.

These requirements would only apply to high-risk AI systems, although there will surely be other AI systems associated with risks of adverse impacts that are also in need of efficient oversight.

“Obviously, these requirements would only apply to high-risk AI systems, although there will surely be other AI systems associated with risks of adverse impacts that are also in need of efficient oversight.76”

• cites [76]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S3 (load-bearing).

Such obligations would help counterbalance the risk of mere superficial engagement of humans, or a 'too human veneer' of the system.

“It would thus also help counterbalance the risk of mere superficial engagement of humans, or a 'too human veneer' of the system, as eloquently put by Brennan-Marquez, Levy and Susser.65”

• cites [65]Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

Such research could help address fundamental questions, such as in what cases shortfalls to either technical oversight capabilities or oversight performance would call the legality of the systems into question.

“Furthermore, such research could help address very fundamental questions, such as in what cases shortfalls to either the technical oversight capabilities or the oversight performance would call the legality of the systems into question.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S3 (load-bearing).

Every AI system will, depending on its configuration and use, be subject to other general or sector specific regulations that may, at least indirectly, provide more detail on the components of what human oversight should involve for a particular AI system use.

“Furthermore, every AI system will, of course, depending on its configuration and use, be subject to other general or sector specific regulations that may, at least indirectly, provide more detail on the components of what human oversight should involve for a particular AI system use.”

Probably not a substantial claim: may not pass S2 (checkable), S4 (based).

The more specific answers to the questions 'what', 'when' and 'by whom' that can be found, the more concretely the tasks of individual overseers when exercising oversight could be identified and defined.

“The more specific answers to these questions that can be found, the more concretely the tasks of the individual overseers when exercising 'oversight' could be identified and defined.”