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Cited by 22Information and Cyber SecuritySmart Grid Security and ResilienceInfrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Integrating redundancy, diversity, and hardening to improve security of industrial internet of things

Laszka, Aron, Abbas, Waseem, Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy, Koutsoukos, Xenofon·2020·Cyber-Physical Systems
DOI 10.1080/23335777.2019.1624620
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Abstract

As the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) becomes more ubiquitous in critical application domains, such as smart water-distribution and transportation systems, providing security and resilience against cyber-attacks grows into an issue of utmost importance. Cyber-attacks against critical infrastructure pose significant threats to public health and safety. To alleviate the severity of these threats, various security techniques are available, including redundancy, diversity, and hardening. However, no single technique can address the whole spectrum of cyber-attacks that may be launched by a determined and resourceful attacker. In light of this, we consider a multi-pronged approach that integrates redundancy (deploying additional components and devices), diversity (using multiple implementation variants), and hardening (reinforcing individual components) techniques for designing secure and resilient IIoT systems. We introduce a framework for quantifying cyber-security risks and optimizing IIoT design. We show that finding optimal designs is an NP-hard problem, and then present an efficient meta-heuristic algorithm that finds near optimal designs in practice. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we present two case studies in water-distribution and transportation systems. Our numerical evaluation shows that integrating redundancy, diversity, and hardening can lead to reduced security risks at the same cost.

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Citations

Cites

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    “Securing large-scale IIoT systems against cyber- and cyber-physical attacks is a complicated task since these systems often face a variety of threats, have large attack surfaces, comprise heterogeneous components, may contain a number of undiscovered vulnerabilities, and have constrained resources [1,2,5,6].”
    Background

  • A review of cyber security risk assessment methods for SCADA systems

    Cherdantseva, Y., Burnap, P., Blyth, A., Eden, P., Jones, K., Soulsby, H., & Stoddart, K. (2016) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2015.09.009 · Cited by 606 · cited 2×

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    Background

  • Review of security issues in industrial networks

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    “Conventional cybersecurity mechanisms are inadequate and thus need to be expanded to incorporate the complexity and physical aspects of such systems [1,5,34].”
    Background

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Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Laszka, A., Abbas, W., Vorobeychik, Y., & Koutsoukos, X.
Affiliations
  • Department of Computer Science, University of Houston, Houston, TX, USA
  • Information Technology University (PK)
  • Washington University in St. Louis (US)
  • Vanderbilt University (US)
ORCID
Venue
Cyber-Physical Systems
Publisher
Informa UK Limited
Published
2019-06-10
Volume
6
Issue
1
Pages
1-32
ISSN
  • 2333-5777 (ISSN-L)
  • 2333-5785
DOI
10.1080/23335777.2019.1624620
OpenAlex
W2951840990
Cited by
22
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 4 · 2025: 8 · 2024: 2 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 4 · 2020: 1
FWCI
2.49
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Cyber-Physical Systems (publishedVersion)
Funders
  • Air Force Research Laboratory (FA-8750-14-2-0180)
  • National Institute of Standards and Technology (70NANB18H198)
  • National Science Foundation (IIS-1905558, CNS-1238959)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
Keywords
Industrial Internet of Things, cybersecurity, redundancy, diversity, hardening, critical infrastructure resilience, NP-hardness, metaheuristic optimization, water distribution systems, transport systems

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