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Cited by 175Water Systems and OptimizationSmart Grid Security and ResilienceInfrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Characterizing Cyber-Physical Attacks on Water Distribution Systems

Taormina, Riccardo, Galelli, Stefano, Tippenhauer, Nils Ole, Salomons, Elad, Ostfeld, Avi·2017·Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management
DOI 10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0000749
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Abstract

This work contributes a modeling framework to characterize the effect of cyber-physical attacks (CPAs) on the hydraulic behavior of water distribution systems. The framework consists of an attack model and a MATLAB toolbox named epanetCPA. The former identifies the components of the cyber infrastructure (e.g., sensors or programmable logic controllers) that are potentially vulnerable to attacks, whereas the latter allows determining the exact specifications of an attack (e.g., timing or duration) and simulating it with EPANET. The framework is applied to C-Town network for a broad range of illustrative attack scenarios. Results show that the hydraulic response of the network to a cyber-physical attack depends not only on the attack specifications, but also on the system initial conditions and demand at the junctions. It is also found that the same hydraulic response can be obtained by implementing completely different attacks. This has some important implications on the design of attack detection mechanisms, which should identify anomalous behaviors in a water network as well as the cyber components being hacked. Finally, the manuscript presents some ideas regarding the next steps needed to thoroughly assess the risk of cyber attacks on water distribution systems.

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Crossref · 10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0000749

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Citations

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Research works printed but not linked: 33

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Metadata

Authors
Taormina, R., Galelli, S., Tippenhauer, N. O., Salomons, E., & Ostfeld, A.
Affiliations
  • Singapore University of Technology and Design (SG)
  • Consultant, OptiWater, 6 Amikam Israel St., Haifa 3438561, Israel.
  • Technion – Israel Institute of Technology (IL)
Corresponding author
Taormina, Riccardo
ORCID
Venue
Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management
Publisher
American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
Published
2017-05
Volume
143
Issue
5
ISSN
  • 0733-9496 (ISSN-L)
  • 1943-5452
DOI
10.1061/(asce)wr.1943-5452.0000749
OpenAlex
W2587918681
Cited by
175
References
3
Citations by year
2026: 11 · 2025: 14 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 16 · 2022: 20 · 2021: 24 · 2020: 25 · 2019: 22 · 2018: 17 · 2017: 6
FWCI
20.03
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Water Systems and Optimization
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Smart Grid Security and Resilience
  • Physical Sciences › Engineering › Civil and Structural Engineering › Infrastructure Resilience and Vulnerability Analysis
Keywords
cyber-physical attacks, water distribution systems, hydraulic behavior, attack modeling, EPANET, programmable logic controller, sensors, attack detection, cyberattack risk

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