The DOI matches its Crossref record; 99 of the 99 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 17 of the 54 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards
Open accessAbstract
This paper examines the applicability of the ISA/IEC 62443 series of standards, traditionally used for securing industrial automation and control systems, to the IIoT environment. For each requirement described in the ISA/IEC 62443 standards, relevant research on that subject is reviewed and presented in a table-like manner. Based on this table, areas for future research are identified, including system hardening, asset inventory, safety instrumented system isolation, risk assessment methodologies, change management systems, data storage security, and incident response procedures.
Overview
CoChat Summary
## TL;DR
This paper maps IEC/ISA 62443 requirements onto the Industrial IoT (IIoT), reviewing research for each requirement and judging whether it applies to IIoT. It concludes that most requirements do apply, but important gaps remain, especially for hardening.
## Key findings
- The paper found that 83 papers were relevant after screening 107 documents; 89 met the initial criteria, and those 83 were analyzed in detail.
- It concludes that most IEC 62443 requirements are applicable to IIoT, but there are still significant gaps because IIoT has low-power devices, many more devices than standard IACS environments, and common use of cloud/edge/AI technologies.
- The paper identifies future research needs in system hardening, asset inventory, safety instrumented system isolation, risk assessment methodologies, change management systems, data storage security, and incident response procedures.
- The authors state that hardening is one of the most critical areas needing further research and that there is no comprehensive guide or framework found for fully hardening an IIoT environment.
## Methods
- The study performs a requirement-by-requirement mapping of the ISA/IEC 62443 series onto IIoT, using the IEC 62443 requirements as the basis and expanding across the available parts of the series.
- The literature search used Google Scholar, IEEE Xplore, ScienceDirect, SpringerLink, ResearchGate, and MDPI; search terms combined IIoT synonyms with each requirement area.
- For each requirement, the authors reviewed relevant research and presented it in a table-like manner to assess both research coverage and applicability to IIoT.
## Limitations
- The paper states that no specific standard for IIoT exists to date, so the mapping is done against an OT-focused standard rather than an IIoT-native one.
- It also notes that many IEC 62443 requirements are broad or only partially adaptable to IIoT, and some areas remain insufficiently researched; these are stated in the paper.
- Evident from the text: the review is based on a literature-based mapping, not an experimental validation or deployment study; this is not explicitly framed as a limitation by the authors, but it follows from the method used.
Model-written summary. Check it against the paper before relying on it.
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Claims the paper makes
17 Valid · 10 Not valid · 32 Not checked · 63 Own results and interpretations
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Several risk analysis methods commonly used in regular IT systems have proven to be insufficient for IIoT environments.”
§ Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards > 5. Mapping IEC 62443 Requirements onto IIoT > 5.3. Risk Assessment
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [38] Hassani, 2021, Vulnerability and security risk assessment in a IIoT environment in compliance with standard IEC 62443, Procedia Comput. Sci. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction identifies EBIOS and MEHARI as risk-analysis methods designed for information systems and describes IEC 62443 as specific to industrial cybersecurity. It does not say that those methods have proven insufficient for IIoT environments; the Proposed Evaluation Model (§3.1) even adopts steps described as common to information-system risk methods. No page numbers are available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.82)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Traditional asset management methods for conventional IT systems are difficult to implement for IIoT systems due to the variety of network protocols, devices, and technologies involved.”
§ Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards > 5. Mapping IEC 62443 Requirements onto IIoT > 5.1. Asset Inventory
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [43] Matsumoto, N., Fujita, J., Endoh, H., Yamada, T., Sawada, K., and Kaneko, O. (2021). Asset Management Method of Industrial IoT Systems for Cyber-Security Countermeasures. Information, 12. source
The Abstract directly says that asset management methods used for conventional IT systems are difficult to implement for IIoT systems because IIoT systems comprise various network protocols, devices, and open technologies. The claim accurately paraphrases that statement. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plainstates a cause- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“One of the biggest identified risks for this type of environment is the fact that IoT devices have no or limited authentication capability.”
§ Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards > 5. Mapping IEC 62443 Requirements onto IIoT > 5.3. Risk Assessment
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [38] Hassani, 2021, Vulnerability and security risk assessment in a IIoT environment in compliance with standard IEC 62443, Procedia Comput. Sci. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 3.2 (Testbed; page unavailable) reports absent or weak authentication in several zones, and Table 5 rates unauthorized access as a very important risk in Zone 1. But these are findings about authentication implemented in this testbed, not evidence that IoT devices generally lack authentication capability; the same section describes hardened authentication in Zone 4. (LLM, conf=0.86)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Hassani et al. [38] only focus on two parts of the IEC 62443 series, namely IEC 62443-3-2 and IEC 62443-4-2.”
§ Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards > 4. Related Work
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [38] Hassani, 2021, Vulnerability and security risk assessment in a IIoT environment in compliance with standard IEC 62443, Procedia Comput. Sci. source
The Abstract (page unavailable) says the authors’ proposed approach is based on IEC 62443-3-2 and IEC 62443-4-2. The mention of IEC 62443-3-3 in Related works describes another paper, not an additional basis for Hassani et al.’s approach. (LLM, conf=0.91)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“However, complete separation in a modern IIoT environment is not possible [76].”
§ Mapping of Industrial IoT to IEC 62443 Standards > 5. Mapping IEC 62443 Requirements onto IIoT > 5.9. Safety Instrumented Systems
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [76] Onshus, 2022, Security and Independence of Process Safety and Control Systems in the Petroleum Industry, J. Cybersecur. Priv. source
Section 6.2, “New Dependencies and Links,” says that even a dedicated safety network has connection points and cannot fully protect safety-related information because communication over shared networks is needed. It also says that network segmentation does not guarantee full independence, while IIoT solutions add links across zones. This supports the claim as a paraphrase about connected modern systems. (LLM, conf=0.88)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Supported
15 more claims
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- Probably not a substantial claim. 88
Citations
Cites
The industrial internet of things (IIoT): An analysis framework
Boyes, H., Hallaq, B., Cunningham, J., & Watson, T. (2018) · Computers in Industry · doi:10.1016/j.compind.2018.04.015 · Cited by 1,486 · cited 1×
“Boyes et al. [70] use the Purdue model to divide the IIoT into logical zones through the use of firewalls and conduits based on factors such as device location, connectivity, and functionality.”
Guide to Industrial Control Systems (ICS) Security
Stouffer, K., Pillitteri, V., Lightman, S., Abrams, M., & Hahn, A. (2015) · doi:10.6028/nist.sp.800-82r2 · Cited by 1,377 · cited 6×
“High availability is a critical requirement that requires, among other things, thorough pre-deployment testing as well as planned testing [20].”
InfluentialA survey of intrusion detection in Internet of Things
Zarpelão, B. B., Miani, R. S., Kawakani, C. T., & de Alvarenga, S. C. (2017) · Journal of Network and Computer Applications · doi:10.1016/j.jnca.2017.02.009 · Cited by 1,022
Blockchain-Assisted Secure Device Authentication for Cross-Domain Industrial IoT
Shen, M., Liu, H., Zhu, L., Xu, K., Yu, H., Du, X., & Guizani, M. (2020) · IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications · doi:10.1109/jsac.2020.2980916 · Cited by 411 · cited 1×
“To avoid having to rely on a third-party certificate authority, Shen et al. [98] use a blockchain-based authentication and key agreement mechanism called BASA (Blockchain-Assisted Secure Authentication).”
Cybersecurity for industrial control systems: A survey
Bhamare, D., Zolanvari, M., Erbad, A., Jain, R., Khan, K., & Meskin, N. (2020) · Computers & Security · doi:10.1016/j.cose.2019.101677 · Cited by 394 · cited 1×
“However, it is considered the least important of the three, especially when the data in question are only sensor data that are processed by the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system [19].”
A survey on internet of things security: Requirements, challenges, and solutions
HaddadPajouh, H., Dehghantanha, A., M. Parizi, R., Aledhari, M., & Karimipour, H. (2021) · Internet of Things · doi:10.1016/j.iot.2019.100129 · Cited by 368 · cited 4×
“Availability deficiencies may often be tolerated, depending on the specific use of the system [16].”
InfluentialChallenges and Opportunities in Securing the Industrial Internet of Things
Serror, M., Hack, S., Henze, M., Schuba, M., & Wehrle, K. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2020.3023507 · Cited by 362 · cited 1×
“Serror et al. [91] warn that there may be many long-lived legacy components and an increasing number of devices.”
Iqbal, W., Abbas, H., Daneshmand, M., Rauf, B., & Bangash, Y. A. (2020) · IEEE Internet of Things Journal · doi:10.1109/jiot.2020.2997651 · Cited by 356 · cited 5×
“Downtime can lead to interruptions and operational inefficiencies [17].”
InfluentialInternet of Things intrusion detection systems: a comprehensive review and future directions
Heidari, A., & Jabraeil Jamali, M. A. (2023) · Cluster Computing · doi:10.1007/s10586-022-03776-z · Cited by 340 · cited 1×
“Analyzing encryption without breaking the encryption is important in a network with a large number of edge devices, such as an IIoT network [110,111].”
Trustworthiness in Industrial IoT Systems Based on Artificial Intelligence
Lv, Z., Han, Y., Singh, A. K., Manogaran, G., & Lv, H. (2021) · IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics · doi:10.1109/tii.2020.2994747 · Cited by 320 · cited 1×
“Cyber-physical systems are becoming increasingly connected through the integration of more and more IIoT devices, and, therefore, the physical world can be affected by digital problems, as Lyu et al. [56] state.”
Research works printed but not linked: 4
- Bajramovic, E., Gupta, D., Guo, Y., Waedt, K., and Bajramovic, A. (2019, January 23–26). Security Challenges and Best Practices for IIoT. Proceedings of the INFORMATIK 2019: 50 Jahre Gesellschaft für Informatik–Informatik für Gesellschaft (Workshop-Beiträge), Kassel, Germany.
- Idris Khan, F., and Hameed, S. (2018). Understanding Security Requirements and Challenges in Internet of Things (IoTs): A Review. arXiv.
- Farina, 2021, Managing change towards Industry 4.0: How organizations design and implement Industry 4.0 projects, Int. J. Syst. Innov., 6, 18
- Fitsilis, 2018, Industry 4.0: Required personnel competences, Industry 4.0, 3, 130
Cited by
Leveraging Digital Twins and AI for Enhanced Gearbox Condition Monitoring in Wind Turbines: A Review
Habbouche, H., Amirat, Y., & Benbouzid, M. (2025) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app15105725 · Cited by 14
Nazir, I., Mushtaq, N., & Amin, W. (2025) · Energies · doi:10.3390/en18195076 · Cited by 18
Itu, A. (2025) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app151910823 · Cited by 20
Manufacturing Management Processes Integration Framework
Pereira, M. Â., Vieira, G., Varela, L., et al. (2025) · Applied Sciences · doi:10.3390/app15169165 · Cited by 6
Satpathy, P. R., & Ramachandaramurthy, V. K. (2026) · Applied Energy · doi:10.1016/j.apenergy.2026.128129 · Cited by 10
Metadata
- Authors
- Cindrić, I., Jurčević, M., & Hadjina, T.
- Affiliations
- University of Zagreb (HR)
- Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture in Zagreb (HR)
- Corresponding author
- Jurčević, Marko
- Venue
- Sensors
- Publisher
- MDPI AG
- Published
- 2025-01-25
- Volume
- 25
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 728
- ISSN
- 1424-8220 (ISSN-L)
- PMC
- PMC11820253
- OpenAlex
- W4406920088
- Cited by
- 29
- References
- 98
- Citations by year
- 2026: 20 · 2025: 9
- FWCI
- 4.45
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
- doi.org
- Licence
- Locations
- Sensors (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Information Systems › Information and Cyber Security
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Industrial and Manufacturing Engineering › Digital Transformation in Industry
- Physical Sciences › Engineering › Control and Systems Engineering › Industrial Automation and Control Systems
- Keywords
- Industrial Internet of Things, IEC 62443, industrial cybersecurity, industrial automation and control systems, system hardening, asset inventory, risk assessment, change management, secure data storage, incident response, standards mapping
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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