The DOI matches its Crossref record; 30 of the 30 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Incentives for Helping on the Job: Theory and Evidence
Abstract
Recent advances in incentive theory stress the multidimensional nature of agent effort and specifically cases where workers affect one anothers' performance through “helping” efforts. This article models helping efforts as determined by the compensation package and task allocation. The model is tested with Australian evidence on reported helping efforts within work groups. The evidence consistently supports the hypothesis that helping efforts are reduced, while individual efforts are increased, when promotion incentives are strong. Piece rates and profit‐sharing appear to have little effect on helping efforts, while task variety and helping efforts are positively correlated.
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Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- Drago, R., & Garvey, G. T.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1998-01
- Volume
- 16
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 1-25
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2255601800
- Cited by
- 344
- References
- 30
- FWCI
- 23.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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