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Cited by 497

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Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data

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Eriksson, Tor·1999·Journal of Labor Economics
DOI 10.1086/209920
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Abstract

This article adds to the empirical literature on tournament theory as a theory of executive compensation. I test several propositions of tournament models on a rich data set containing information about 2,600 executives in 210 Danish firms during a 4‐year period. I ask, Are pay differentials between job levels consistent with relative compensation? Is pay dispersion between levels higher in noisy environments? Is the dispersion affected by the number of tournament participants? Is average pay lower in firms with more compressed pay structures? Does wider pay dispersion enhance firm performance? Most of the predictions gain support in the data.

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Metadata

Authors
Eriksson, T.
Venue
Journal of Labor Economics
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
1999-04
Volume
17
Issue
2
Pages
262-280
ISSN
  • 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-5307
DOI
10.1086/209920
OpenAlex
W2096482578
Cited by
497
References
0
FWCI
69.66
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
gold

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/209920
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Eriksson, T. (1999). Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data. Journal of Labor Economics. https://doi.org/10.1086/209920

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.