The DOI matches its Crossref record; 18 of the 18 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory: Empirical Tests on Danish Data
Open accessAbstract
This article adds to the empirical literature on tournament theory as a theory of executive compensation. I test several propositions of tournament models on a rich data set containing information about 2,600 executives in 210 Danish firms during a 4‐year period. I ask, Are pay differentials between job levels consistent with relative compensation? Is pay dispersion between levels higher in noisy environments? Is the dispersion affected by the number of tournament participants? Is average pay lower in firms with more compressed pay structures? Does wider pay dispersion enhance firm performance? Most of the predictions gain support in the data.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
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Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Eriksson, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Labor Economics
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1999-04
- Volume
- 17
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 262-280
- ISSN
- 0734-306X (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5307
- OpenAlex
- W2096482578
- Cited by
- 497
- References
- 18
- FWCI
- 69.66
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- gold
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.