The DOI matches its Crossref record; 19 of the 19 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations
Abstract
Positive and negative selective incentives are shown analytically to have different structural implications when used to induce collective action. Positive selective incentives are effective for motivating small numbers of cooperators and generate pressures toward smaller, more "elite" actions, unless the incentives have jointness of supply. Negative selective incentives are effective for motivating unanimous cooperation, but their use is often uneven and cyclical and may generate hostilities which disrupt the cooperation they enforce. Examples of these dynamics are found in many arenas of collective action and social movements.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
The Logic of Collective Action.
Golembiewski, R. T., & Olson, M. (1966) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2091298 · Cited by 11,364
The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure
Samuelson, P. A. (1954) · The Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.2307/1925895 · Cited by 7,458
Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory
McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/226464 · Cited by 7,381
The Strategy of Social Protest.
Lewis, J. M., & Gamson, W. A. (1975) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2063633 · Cited by 2,111
Social Conflict and Social Movements.
Westby, D. L., & Oberschall, A. (1974) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2063450 · Cited by 1,370
Bator, F. M. (1958) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1882231 · Cited by 1,294
The Trend of Social Movements in America: Professionalization and Resource Mobilization
McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977) · Deep Blue (University of Michigan) · Cited by 1,049
Microeconomic Theory: A Mathematical Approach
Labarge, R. A., Henderson, J. M., & Quandt, R. E. (1959) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1055873 · Cited by 813
Marwell, G., & Ames, R. E. (1979) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/226937 · Cited by 742
Sociologists, Economists and Democracy
Curry, R. L., & Barry, B. M. (1972) · Southern Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/1056243 · Cited by 508
Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Daylight Saving: A Study of Binary Choices With Externalities
Schelling, T. C. (1973) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/002200277301700302 · Cited by 505
Provision of Collective Goods As a Function of Group Size
Chamberlin, J. R. (1974) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400117496 · Cited by 426
Principles of behavioral analysis
Millenson, J. R. (1967) · Medical Entomology and Zoology · Cited by 359
Utilitarian Logic in the Resource Mobilization Perspective
Fireman, B., & Gamson, W. A. (1977) · Deep Blue (University of Michigan) · Cited by 338
Introduction to Social Movements.
Hood, T. C., & Wilson, J. (1974) · Social Forces · doi:10.2307/2576871 · Cited by 280
I Get By With a Little Help From My Friends
Frohlich, N., & Oppenheimer, J. A. (1970) · World Politics · doi:10.2307/2009633 · Cited by 222
Cooperation and Group Size in the N-Person Prisoners' Dilemma
Bonacich, P., Shure, G. H., Kahan, J. P., & Meeker, R. J. (1976) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/002200277602000406 · Cited by 183
Public Goods and Public Welfare
Gillespie, W. I., & Head, J. G. (1977) · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · doi:10.2307/134454 · Cited by 148
Individual Contributions for Collective Goods: Alternative Models
Frohlich, N., Hunt, T. C., Oppenheimer, J., & Wagner, R. H. (1975) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/002200277501900206 · Cited by 50
Cited by
Frame Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation
Snow, D. A., Rochford, E. B., Worden, S. K., & Benford, R. D. (1986) · American Sociological Review · doi:10.2307/2095581 · Cited by 6,548
Collective action and the evolution of social norms.
Ostrom, E. (2000) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.14.3.137 · Cited by 4,195
Остром, Э. (2010) · Public Administration Issues · doi:10.17323/1999-5431-2010-0-1-5-52 · Cited by 2,850
Open source software and the “private-collective” innovation model: Issues for organization science
Hippel, E. V., & Krogh, G. V. (2003) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.14.2.209.14992 · Cited by 2,145
Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992) · Ethology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y · Cited by 1,482
Metadata
- Authors
- Oliver, P.
- Venue
- American Journal of Sociology
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1980-05
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1356-1375
- ISSN
- 0002-9602 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5390
- OpenAlex
- W2082097596
- Cited by
- 551
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 9.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.