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Rewards and Punishments as Selective Incentives for Collective Action: Theoretical Investigations
Abstract
Positive and negative selective incentives are shown analytically to have different structural implications when used to induce collective action. Positive selective incentives are effective for motivating small numbers of cooperators and generate pressures toward smaller, more "elite" actions, unless the incentives have jointness of supply. Negative selective incentives are effective for motivating unanimous cooperation, but their use is often uneven and cyclical and may generate hostilities which disrupt the cooperation they enforce. Examples of these dynamics are found in many arenas of collective action and social movements.
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Metadata
- Authors
- Oliver, P.
- Venue
- American Journal of Sociology
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1980-05
- Volume
- 85
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1356-1375
- ISSN
- 0002-9602 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-5390
- OpenAlex
- W2082097596
- Cited by
- 551
- References
- 19
- FWCI
- 9.48
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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