Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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In the citing paper
“Instead, the use of direct and third-party punishment against norm violators has been proposed as a key factor in the emergence of large-scale non-kin cooperation observed within human societies [13, 15, 27, 31, 32].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [15]
In the citing paper
“Therefore, reputation alone is not a strong factor in the emergence of cooperation within populations. Instead, it acts in collaboration with other mechanisms such as punishment [13, 15, 20, 21, 60].”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [15]
In the citing paper
“Although reputation and partner selection can facilitate the emergence of cooperation within small groups, they have a negligible impact on larger populations.”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [15]
In the citing paper
“the decision to apply punishment is heavily related”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [15]
In the citing paper
“The results show that populations using third-party punishment consistently achieve higher levels of cooperation at convergence compared to populations using direct punishment.”
From Investigating the impact of direct punishment on the emergence of cooperation in multi-agent reinforcement learning systems (2025) · cites this paper as [15]
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Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
Culture and the Evolutionary Process
Griesemer, J. R., Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1986) · The Condor · doi:10.2307/1367778 · Cited by 7,034
Self-citationSociobiology: The New Synthesis.
Lenski, G., & Wilson, E. O. (1976) · Social Forces · doi:10.2307/2576242 · Cited by 6,271
Connolly, T., & Axelrod, R. (1984) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2392957 · Cited by 3,890
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis.
van den Berghe, P. L., & Wilson, E. C. (1976) · Contemporary Sociology · doi:10.2307/2063069 · Cited by 2,850
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
Axelrod, R. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400185016 · Cited by 2,205
Alexander, R. D. (2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203700976 · Cited by 1,692
The provision of a sanctioning system as a public good.
Yamagishi, T. (1986) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/0022-3514.51.1.110 · Cited by 1,359 · cited 1×
“This problem is sometimes referred to as the problem of "second order" cooperation (Oliver 1980; Yamagishi 1986).”
BackgroundHardin, R. (1982) · doi:10.56021/9780801828188 · Cited by 1,230
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Axelrod, 1986, The evolution of norms, American Political Science Review, 80, 1095, 10.2307/1960858 · doi:10.2307/1960858 · Paper page
Cited by
Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S. (2000) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.90.4.980 · Cited by 4,547
Остром, Э. (2010) · Public Administration Issues · doi:10.17323/1999-5431-2010-0-1-5-52 · Cited by 2,850
Henrich, J., & Gil-White, F. J. (2001) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/s1090-5138(00)00071-4 · Cited by 2,500
Ostrom, E. (1998) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/2585925 · Cited by 3,583
“Economic man” in cross-cultural perspective: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale societies
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., Alvard, M., Barr, A., Ensminger, J., et al. (2005) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x05000142 · Cited by 1,898
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J.
- Affiliations
- Bielefeld University (DE)
- Corresponding author
- Boyd, Robert
- Venue
- Ethology and Sociobiology
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 1992-05
- Volume
- 13
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 171-195
- ISSN
- 0162-3095 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2147570389
- Cited by
- 1,482
- References
- 35
- Citations by year
- 2026: 34 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 74 · 2023: 45 · 2022: 59 · 2021: 94 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 48 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 43 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 71 · 2013: 45 · 2012: 60
- FWCI
- 98.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
- Locations
- Ethology and Sociobiology (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- evolution of cooperation, punishment, retribution, reciprocity, large groups, evolutionary stability, costly cooperation, coexistence of strategies, public goods
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y
- The paper
- Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992). Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology. https://doi.org/10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.