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Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups

Boyd, Robert, Richerson, Peter J. · 1992 · Ethology and Sociobiology

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 33 of the 35 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y

Cites

33 of 33 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

Cites

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Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Axelrod, 1986, The evolution of norms, American Political Science Review, 80, 1095, 10.2307/1960858 · doi:10.2307/1960858 · Paper page

Cited by

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Metadata

Authors
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J.
Affiliations
Bielefeld University (DE)
Corresponding author
Boyd, Robert
Venue
Ethology and Sociobiology
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Published
1992-05
Volume
13
Issue
3
Pages
171-195
ISSN
0162-3095 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2147570389
Cited by
1,482
References
35
Citations by year
2026: 34 · 2025: 37 · 2024: 74 · 2023: 45 · 2022: 59 · 2021: 94 · 2020: 63 · 2019: 63 · 2018: 48 · 2017: 45 · 2016: 43 · 2015: 55 · 2014: 71 · 2013: 45 · 2012: 60
FWCI
98.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/ (tdm)
Locations
Ethology and Sociobiology (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
evolution of cooperation, punishment, retribution, reciprocity, large groups, evolutionary stability, costly cooperation, coexistence of strategies, public goods

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y
The paper
Boyd, R., & Richerson, P. J. (1992). Punishment allows the evolution of cooperation (or anything else) in sizable groups. Ethology and Sociobiology. https://doi.org/10.1016/0162-3095(92)90032-y

Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.