Similarity of Political Behavior Among Large American Corporations

Abstract

Political sociologists have debated for decades, without resolution, whether elites in advanced capitalists societies are integrated. Rather than ask whether elites are integrated, this study examines the conditions under which convergence of political behavior occurs, focusing on campaign contributions of political action committees in the American business community. A model of similarity in corporate political behavior is proposed that draws on principles developed by resource-dependence and social class theorists of intercorporate relations. The model was supported by an examination of the 1,596 dyads created by relations among 57 large U.S. manufacturing firms in 1980. Membership in the same primary industry or several similar industries, geographical proximity of headquarters locations (but not plant locations), market constraint, and common relations with financial institutions (through either stock ownership or directorate ties) were positively associated with the similarity of political behavior between firms. Market constraint affected the similarity of political behavior primarily because it increased the likelihood that firms would produce in the same industries. The effect of indirect board interlocking throung financial institutions was a stronger predictor of similarity of political behavior than was direct interlocking between manufacturing firms. The findings suggest the simultaneous importance of organizational and social network factors in understanding common political behavior between firms.