The DOI matches its Crossref record; 3 of the 3 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Is Honesty the Best Policy? Curtailing Insurance Fraud through Optimal Incentive Contracts
Abstract
An incentive contracting approach is used to characterize optimal contracts when insured individuals possess private information about their losses and are able to misrepresent permanently their loss magnitudes by engaging in the falsification of claims. We demonstrate that efficient agreements necessarily induce some falsification but that the extent of such claims inflation is mitigated partially by an indemnification schedule that overcompensates small losses while overpaying larger ones. The differential costs of generating insurance claims through falsification provide an avenue by which the heterogencous insureds can credibly signal their underlying losses and are exploited in an optimal contract to implement loss‐contingent insurance payments.
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Cites
An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2296779 · Cited by 4,510
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 · Cited by 3,306
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Cited by
Corporate tax evasion with agency costs
Crocker, K. J., & Slemrod, J. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.003 · Cited by 490
Self-citationGlauber, J. W. (2004) · American Journal of Agricultural Economics · doi:10.1111/j.0002-9092.2004.00663.x · Cited by 293
Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence from Automobile Insurance
Dionne, G., & Gagné, R. (2001) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/00346530151143824 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Crocker, K. J., & Morgan, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1998-04
- Volume
- 106
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 355-375
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2087119732
- Cited by
- 196
- References
- 3
- FWCI
- 11.43
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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