The DOI matches its Crossref record; 15 of the 15 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Corporate tax evasion with agency costs
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Citations
Cites
Moral Hazard and Observability
Holmstrom, B. (1979) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003320 · Cited by 8,311
Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis
Allingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(72)90010-2 · Cited by 4,970
Mussa, M., & Rosen, S. (1978) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(78)90085-6 · Cited by 3,306
Optimal contracts and competitive markets with costly state verification
Townsend, R. M. (1979) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90031-0 · Cited by 3,204
Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
Myerson, R. B. (1979) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1912346 · Cited by 1,983
Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis
Yitzhaki, S. (1974) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(74)90037-1 · Cited by 944
Guesnerie, R., & Laffont, J.-J. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90060-4 · Cited by 648
Internal Control vs External Manipulation: A Model of Corporate Income Tax EvasionPreprint
Kong-Pin, & Chu, C. Y. C. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.353860 · Cited by 321
Optimal Contracts under Costly State Falsification
Lacker, J. M., & Weinberg, J. A. (1989) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261657 · Cited by 266
A General Model of the Behavioral Response to Taxation
Slemrod, J. (2001) · International Tax and Public Finance · doi:10.1023/a:1011204301325 · Cited by 250
Self-citation
Cited by
Corporate Tax Avoidance and Firm Value
Desai, M. A., & Dharmapala, D. (2009) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest.91.3.537 · Cited by 1,118
The incentives for tax planning
Armstrong, C. S., Blouin, J. L., & Larcker, D. F. (2012) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2011.04.001 · Cited by 851
Competition and Corporate Tax Avoidance: Evidence from Chinese Industrial Firms
Cai, H., & Liu, Q. (2009) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2009.02217.x · Cited by 835
The Effect of Tax Authority Monitoring and Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality
Hanlon, M., Hoopes, J. L., & Shroff, N. (2014) · The Journal of the American Taxation Association · doi:10.2308/atax-50820 · Cited by 246
Why Can Modern Governments Tax So Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal Intermediaries
Kleven, H. J., Kreiner, C. T., & Saez, E. (2009) · doi:10.3386/w15218 · Cited by 88
Metadata
- Authors
- Crocker, K. J., & Slemrod, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Public Economics
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2005-09
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 9-10
- Pages
- 1593-1610
- ISSN
- 0047-2727 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2148090769
- Cited by
- 490
- References
- 15
- FWCI
- 21.34
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Corporate tax evasion with agency costs. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.003
- The paper
- Crocker, K. J., & Slemrod, J. (2005). Corporate tax evasion with agency costs. Journal of Public Economics. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.08.003
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
