Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence from Automobile Insurance
Open accessThe DOI matches its Crossref record; 27 of the 28 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Insurance fraud is now recognized as a significant resource-allocation problem in many markets. The object of this study is to verify how straight deductible contracts may affect the equilibrium level of falsification in automobile insurance. This type of contract is observed in many markets, even if it is not optimal under costly state falsification. A higher deductible may create incentives to fraud or cheat, particularly when the insured anticipates that the claim has a small probability of being audited. To verify this proposition, we estimate a loss equation for which one of the determinants is the amount of the deductible, using a data set of claims filed for damages following an automobile accident with twenty insurance companies in Quebec in 1992. Because we have access only to reported losses, a higher deductible also implies a lower probability of reporting small losses. To isolate the fraud effect related to the presence of a deductible in the contract, we jointly estimate a loss equation and a threshold equation. The threshold is the amount over which an insured decides to report a given loss. It can be interpreted as a personal deductible, and it is not observable. Our results indicate, among other things, that with an appropriate correction for selectivity the amount of the deductible is a significant determinant of the reported loss, at least when no other vehicle is involved in the accident; in other words, when the presence of witnesses is less likely.
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Cites
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Research works printed but not linked: 3
- Boyer M. Martin, 1997, HECMontréal working paper, 97
- Dionne Georges, 1996, Assurances, 65, 49
- Dionne Georges, 1997, CREST INSEE working paper, 9701
Cited by
Testing for Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets
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“See Dionne and Gagné (2001) for a careful investigation of these issues.”
BackgroundEconomic Analysis of Insurance Fraud
Picard, P. M. (2013) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-1-4614-0155-1_13 · Cited by 93
“For instance Dionne and Gagné (2001) have shown with data from Québec that the amount of the deductible in automobile insurance is a signi cant determinant of the reported loss, at least when no other vehicle is involved in the accident, and thus when the presence of witnesses is less likely.”
BackgroundFraud Detection Using a Multinomial Logit Model With Missing Information
Caudill, S. B., Ayuso, M., & Guillén, M. (2005) · Journal of Risk & Insurance · doi:10.1111/j.1539-6975.2005.00137.x · Cited by 102
Replacement Cost Endorsement and Opportunistic Fraud in Automobile Insurance
Dionne, G., & Gagné, R. (2002) · Journal of Risk and Uncertainty · doi:10.1023/a:1015683401986 · Cited by 81
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Dionne, G., & Gagné, R.
- Affiliations
- HEC Montréal (CA)
- ORCID
- Dionne, Georges
- Venue
- Review of Economics and Statistics
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Published
- 2001-05
- Volume
- 83
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 290-301
- ISSN
- 0034-6535 (ISSN-L)
- 1530-9142
- OpenAlex
- W2019034117
- Cited by
- 67
- References
- 28
- Citations by year
- 2026: 1 · 2025: 2 · 2024: 5 · 2023: 1 · 2022: 1 · 2021: 2 · 2020: 1 · 2018: 2 · 2017: 3 · 2016: 3 · 2015: 1 · 2014: 8 · 2013: 8 · 2012: 4
- FWCI
- 5.44
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- papers.ssrn.com
- Locations
- The Review of Economics and Statistics (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- SSRN Electronic Journal (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Insurance and Financial Risk Management
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Law, Economics, and Judicial Systems
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Healthcare Policy and Management
- Keywords
- insurance fraud, deductibles, automobile insurance, loss reporting, fraud detection, audit probability
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- Dionne, G., & Gagné, R. (2001). Deductible Contracts Against Fraudulent Claims: Evidence from Automobile Insurance. Review of Economics and Statistics. https://doi.org/10.1162/00346530151143824
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