The DOI matches its Crossref record; 2 of the 2 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory of Minimum Quality Standards
Abstract
I consider markets with asymmetric information. As suggested by Akerlof, quality deterioration in such markets may take place. I show that this is a general phenomenon. Minimum quality constraints (or "licensing requirements") are examined as a possible solution to the problem. Although not generally a first-best solution, such constraints will increase welfare in a number of cases. The types of markets that are likely to benefit from minimum quality standards are identified. It is then shown that, if quality standards are set by the profession (or industry) itself, it is likely that the standards will be too high.
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Citations
Cites
The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism
Akerlof, G. A. (1970) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1879431 · Cited by 23,016
Free competition and the optimal amount of fraud
Darby, M. R., & Karni, E. (1973) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466756 · Cited by 3,947
Cited by
Premiums for High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations
Shapiro, C. (1983) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/1881782 · Cited by 2,327
Quality Disclosure and Certification: Theory and Practice
Dranove, D., & Jin, G. Z. (2010) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.48.4.935 · Cited by 740
Einav, L., Farronato, C., & Levin, J. (2016) · Annual Review of Economics · doi:10.1146/annurev-economics-080315-015334 · Cited by 553
Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing
Shapiro, C. (1986) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297722 · Cited by 338
Regulating Service Quality: A Survey
Sappington, D. E. M. (2005) · Journal of Regulatory Economics · doi:10.1007/s11149-004-5341-9 · Cited by 191
Metadata
- Authors
- Leland, H. E.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1979-12
- Volume
- 87
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1328-1346
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2065390951
- Cited by
- 806
- References
- 2
- FWCI
- 10.47
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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