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Cited by 235

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The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement

Block, Michael Kent, Nold, Frederick Carl, Sidak, Joseph Gregory·1981·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

In this paper we formulate and test a model of collusive pricing in the presence of antitrust enforcement. We show that a cartel's optimal price is likely to be neither the competitive price nor the price that the cartel would set in the absence of antitrust enforcement but rather an intermediate price that depends on the levels of antitrust enforcement efforts and penalties. Our empirical results reveal that increasing antitrust enforcement in the presence of a credible threat of large damage awards has the deterrent effect of reducing mark-ups in the bread industry.

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Metadata

Authors
Block, M. K., Nold, F. C., & Sidak, J. G.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
1981-06
Volume
89
Issue
3
Pages
429-445
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W3124468354
Cited by
235
References
0
FWCI
8.98
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/260979
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Block, M. K., Nold, F. C., & Sidak, J. G. (1981). The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/260979

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.