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The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement
Abstract
In this paper we formulate and test a model of collusive pricing in the presence of antitrust enforcement. We show that a cartel's optimal price is likely to be neither the competitive price nor the price that the cartel would set in the absence of antitrust enforcement but rather an intermediate price that depends on the levels of antitrust enforcement efforts and penalties. Our empirical results reveal that increasing antitrust enforcement in the presence of a credible threat of large damage awards has the deterrent effect of reducing mark-ups in the bread industry.
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Citations
Cited by
Deterrence or Escalation?: The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent
Lichbach, M. I. (1987) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002787031002003 · Cited by 815
The Legal Environments of Organizations
Edelman, L. B., & Suchman, M. C. (1997) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.23.1.479 · Cited by 730
Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses
Ehrlich, I. (1996) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.10.1.43 · Cited by 714
Sanction Threats and Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime
Paternoster, R., & Simpson, S. (1996) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3054128 · Cited by 670
Testing an Expected Utility Model of Corporate Deterrence
Braithwaite, J., & Makkai, T. (1991) · Law & Society Review · doi:10.2307/3053888 · Cited by 278
Metadata
- Authors
- Block, M. K., Nold, F. C., & Sidak, J. G.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1981-06
- Volume
- 89
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 429-445
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W3124468354
- Cited by
- 235
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 8.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/260979
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- Block, M. K., Nold, F. C., & Sidak, J. G. (1981). The Deterrent Effect of Antitrust Enforcement. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/260979
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.