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Cited by 263

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids

Hirshleifer, David, Titman, Sheridan·1990·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

This paper presents a model of tender offers in which the bid perfectly reveals the bidder's private information about the size of the value improvement that can be generated by a takeover. We argue that bidders with greater improvements will offer higher premia to ensure that sufficient shares are tendered to obtain control. The model relates announcement date returns and takeover success or failure to the amount bid, the initial shareholdings of the bidder, the number of shares the bidder attempts to purchase, the dilution of minority shareholders, and managerial opposition. We show that managerial defensive measures will sometimes increase the probability of the offer's success, either by raising the incentive to bid high or by decreasing the asymmetry of information about the improvement.

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Metadata

Authors
Hirshleifer, D., & Titman, S.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
1990-04
Volume
98
Issue
2
Pages
295-324
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W2048217327
Cited by
263
References
1
FWCI
28.18
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/261679
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Hirshleifer, D., & Titman, S. (1990). Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261679

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.