The DOI matches its Crossref record; 21 of the 21 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Share Tendering Strategies and the Success of Hostile Takeover Bids
Abstract
This paper presents a model of tender offers in which the bid perfectly reveals the bidder's private information about the size of the value improvement that can be generated by a takeover. We argue that bidders with greater improvements will offer higher premia to ensure that sufficient shares are tendered to obtain control. The model relates announcement date returns and takeover success or failure to the amount bid, the initial shareholdings of the bidder, the number of shares the bidder attempts to purchase, the dilution of minority shareholders, and managerial opposition. We show that managerial defensive measures will sometimes increase the probability of the offer's success, either by raising the incentive to bid high or by decreasing the asymmetry of information about the improvement.
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Citations
Cites
Large Shareholders and Corporate Control
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The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
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Takeover Bids, The Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation
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Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control
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Shark repellents and stock prices
Jarrell, G. A., & Poulsen, A. B. (1987) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(87)90032-8 · Cited by 407
Perfect sequential equilibrium
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A Theory of Preemptive Takeover Bidding
Fishman, M. J. (1988) · The RAND Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/2555399 · Cited by 367
Malatesta, P. H., & Walkling, R. A. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90050-5 · Cited by 366
The effect of poison pill securities on shareholder wealth
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The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer
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A Theory of Negotiated Equity Financing
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Repetition, Reputation, and Raiding
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Cited by
Corporate Governance and Control
Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A. (2003) · Handbook of the Economics of Finance · doi:10.1016/s1574-0102(03)01005-7 · Cited by 795
Block Investment and Partial Benefits of Corporate Control
Zwiebel, J. (1995) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.2307/2297801 · Cited by 416
Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in Takeovers
Betton, S., & Eckbo, B. E. (2000) · Review of Financial Studies · doi:10.1093/rfs/13.4.841 · Cited by 394
Coff, R. W. (1999) · Organization Science · doi:10.1287/orsc.10.2.144 · Cited by 356
Why Higher Takeover Premia Protect Minority Shareholders
Burkart, M., Gromb, D., & Panunzi, F. (1998) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/250006 · Cited by 354
Metadata
- Authors
- Hirshleifer, D., & Titman, S.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-04
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 295-324
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2048217327
- Cited by
- 263
- References
- 21
- FWCI
- 28.18
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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