The DOI matches its Crossref record; 16 of the 16 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?
Abstract
This paper empirically examines one motive for takeovers: to change control of firms that make acquisitions that diminish the value of their equity. Firms that subsequently become takeover targets make acquisitions that significantly reduce their equity value, and firms that do not become takeover targets make acquisitions that raise their equity value. Within the sample of acquisition by targets, the acquisitions that reduce equity value the most are those that are later divested either in bust-up takeovers or restructuring programs to thwart the takeover. This evidence is consistent with theories advanced by Marris, Manne, and Jensen concerning the disciplinary role played by takeovers.
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Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
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Self-citationAgency Problems and Residual Claims
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467038 · Cited by 4,827
The market for corporate control
Jensen, M. C., & Ruback, R. S. (1983) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(83)90004-1 · Cited by 4,141
The Hubris Hypothesis of Corporate Takeovers
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Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control
Manne, H. G. (1965) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/259000 · Cited by 2,364
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Demsetz, H. (1983) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/467041 · Cited by 2,342
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Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Ohio Antitakeover Law
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Cited by
FAMA, E. F. (1991) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1991.tb04636.x · Cited by 5,350
New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., & Stafford, E. (2001) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.15.2.103 · Cited by 2,798
Self-citationDo Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
MORCK, R., SHLEIFER, A., & VISHNY, R. W. (1990) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1990.tb05079.x · Cited by 1,887
Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns
MASULIS, R. W., WANG, C., & XIE, F. (2007) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x · Cited by 1,772
The impact of industry shocks on takeover and restructuring activity
Mitchell, M. L., & Mulherin, J. H. (1996) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(95)00860-h · Cited by 1,511
Self-citation
Metadata
- Authors
- Mitchell, M. L., & Lehn, K.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-04
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 372-398
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1997433126
- Cited by
- 417
- References
- 16
- FWCI
- 50.72
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.