The DOI matches its Crossref record; 11 of the 11 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance
Abstract
Tender offers provide an ideal setting for the analysis of agency relationships since the best interests of the principal (target firm shareholders) and agent (target firm managers) are often in conflict. Moreover, the actions and stated rationale of target managers in resisting or not resisting tender offers are readily observable, and the size of the possible agency costs is great. This research provides direct empirical evidence on the relationship between managerial welfare and takeover bid resistance. Tests on a sample of cash tender offers provide support for the managerial welfare hypothesis. The existence or absence of bid resistance is found to be directly related to the personal wealth changes of the target firm's managers. The relationships between managerial actions and bid premium size, bidder nationality, conglomerate offers, and "ex post settling up" are also examined.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(76)90026-x · Cited by 71,491
The pricing of options and corporate liabilities
Black, F., & Scholes, M. (1973) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260062 · Cited by 29,074
Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm
Fama, E. F. (1980) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/260866 · Cited by 10,466
The Modern Corporation and Private Property
Kline, J. V., Berle, A. A., & Means, G. C. (1933) · Columbia Law Review · doi:10.2307/1115736 · Cited by 7,361
Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers
Amihud, Y., & Lev, B. (1981) · The Bell Journal of Economics · doi:10.2307/3003575 · Cited by 2,772
Business Behavior, Value and Growth.
Fisher, M. R., & Baumol, W. J. (1962) · The Economic Journal · doi:10.2307/2228457 · Cited by 888
Merger proposals, management discretion and stockholder wealth
Dodd, P. (1980) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(80)90014-8 · Cited by 638
Managerial Pay and Corporate Performance
Lewellen, W. G., & Huntsman, B. (1970) · American Economic Review · Cited by 307
Tender Offers and Management Resistance
Baron, D. P. (1983) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1983.tb02237.x · Cited by 112
Taxes and executive stock options
Hite, G. L., & Long, M. S. (1982) · Journal of Accounting and Economics · doi:10.1016/0165-4101(82)90003-9 · Cited by 89
Self-citation
Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1989) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1989.4279003 · Cited by 13,338
Managerial control of voting rights
Stulz, R. (1988) · Journal of Financial Economics · doi:10.1016/0304-405x(88)90039-6 · Cited by 2,429
Agents without Principles? The Spread of the Poison Pill through the Intercorporate Network
Davis, G. F. (1991) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2393275 · Cited by 1,377
On the Efficiency of Internal and External Corporate Control Mechanisms
Walsh, J. P., & Seward, J. K. (1990) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.1990.4308826 · Cited by 1,017
Metadata
- Authors
- Walkling, R. A., & Long, M. S.
- Venue
- The RAND Journal of Economics
- Publisher
- Wiley
- Published
- 1984
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 1
- Pages
- 54
- ISSN
- 0741-6261 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3121572167
- Cited by
- 325
- References
- 11
- FWCI
- 45.24
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.2307/3003669
- The paper
- Walkling, R. A., & Long, M. S. (1984). Agency Theory, Managerial Welfare, and Takeover Bid Resistance. The RAND Journal of Economics. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003669
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
