The DOI matches its Crossref record; 20 of the 20 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm
Open accessAbstract
This paper provides a framework for addressing the question of when transactions should be carried out within a firm and when through the market. Following Grossman and Hart, we identify a firm with the assets that its owners control. We argue that the crucial difference for party 1 between owning a firm (integration) and contracting for a service from another party 2 who owns this firm (nonintegration) is that, under integration, party 1 can selectively fire the workers of the firm (including party 2), whereas under nonintegration he can "fire" (i.e., stop dealing with) only the entire firm: the combination of party 2, the workers, and the firm's assets. We use this idea to study how changes in ownership affect the incentives of employees as well as those of owner-managers. Our framework is broad enough to encompass more general control structures than simple ownership: for example, partnerships and worker and consumer cooperatives all emerge as speical cases.
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Cites
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Self-citationVertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process
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An economist's perspective on the theory of the firm
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Cited by
A Survey of Corporate Governance
Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x · Cited by 16,243
Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure
Hart, O. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0198288816.001.0001 · Cited by 4,672
Self-citationTowards a theory of ecosystems
Jacobides, M. G., Cennamo, C., & Gawer, A. (2018) · Strategic Management Journal · doi:10.1002/smj.2904 · Cited by 3,724
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Formal and Real Authority in Organizations
Aghion, P., & Tirole, J. (1997) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262063 · Cited by 3,046
Metadata
- Authors
- Hart, O., & Moore, J.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1990-12
- Volume
- 98
- Issue
- 6
- Pages
- 1119-1158
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2070639717
- Cited by
- 5,364
- References
- 20
- FWCI
- 44.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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