The DOI matches its Crossref record; 17 of the 17 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Mobility and Redistribution
Abstract
The ability of individuals to move freely from one jurisdiction to another is generally seen as a constraint on the amount of redistribution that each jurisdiction within a system of governments can undertake. In this paper, we look at this proposition by developing a positive analysis of income redistribution by local governments in a federal system. We ask how much redistribution occurs when only local governments can have tax/transfer instruments, individuals can move freely among jurisdictions, and voters in each jurisdiction are fully aware of the migration effects of redistributive policies. Local redistribution is shown to induce sorting of the population, with the poorest households located in the communities that provide the most redistribution. While the threat of out-migration affects the potential for redistribution, our results suggest that significant local redistribution is nonetheless feasible. Numerical computations indicate that the proportion of residents who are renters is a major factor affecting the local choice of level of redistribution.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
A Rational Theory of the Size of Government
Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261013 · Cited by 5,485
Individual welfare, majority voting, and the properties of a linear income tax
Romer, T. (1975) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(75)90016-x · Cited by 922
Self-citationVoting over income tax schedules
Roberts, K. W. S. (1977) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(77)90005-6 · Cited by 794
The Implications of Competition Among Jurisdictions: Does Tiebout Need Politics?
Epple, D., & Zelenitz, A. (1981) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261029 · Cited by 340
Self-citationEpple, D. N., Filimon, R., & Romer, T. (1984) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(84)90012-4 · Cited by 299
Self-citationAssistance to the poor in a federal system
Brown, C. C., & Oates, W. E. (1987) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(87)90035-1 · Cited by 279
Existence of equilibria in economies with a local public good
Westhoff, F. (1977) · Journal of Economic Theory · doi:10.1016/0022-0531(77)90086-2 · Cited by 276
Capitalization and the Theory of Local Public Finance
Yinger, J. (1982) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261101 · Cited by 231
Jurisdictional Fragmentation and Residential Choice
Ellickson, B. (1971) · American Economic Review · Cited by 223
Matthews, S., & Moore, J. (1987) · Econometrica · doi:10.2307/1913245 · Cited by 218
Income Transfers as a Public Good: An Application to AFDC
Orr, L. L. (1976) · American Economic Review · Cited by 181
Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition
Wilson, J. D. (1987) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/261489 · Cited by 134
American Federalism, Welfare Policy, and Residential Choices
Peterson, P. E., & Rom, M. C. (1989) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1962057 · Cited by 124
Migration selectivity and the effects of public programs
Rosenzweig, M. R., & Wolpin, K. I. (1988) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90042-4 · Cited by 118
Market models of local government: Exit, voting, and the land market
Rose‐Ackerman, S. (1979) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/0094-1190(79)90034-2 · Cited by 104
WHICH LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT SHOULD ASSIST THE POOR?
Ladd, H. F., & Doolittle, F. (1982) · National Tax Journal · doi:10.1086/ntj41862448 · Cited by 78
Matthews, S. A., & Moore, J. H. (1985) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 32
Cited by
Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions
Alesina, A., Baqir, R., & Easterly, W. (1999) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355399556269 · Cited by 2,328
Ethnic Diversity and Economic Performance
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105774431243 · Cited by 2,062
Participation in Heterogeneous Communities*
Alesina, A., & La Ferrara, E. (2000) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300554935 · Cited by 1,864
On the Number and Size of Nations
Alesina, A., & Spolaore, E. (1997) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355300555411 · Cited by 1,416
Incentives and Social Capital: Are Homeowners Better Citizens?
DiPasquale, D., & Glaeser, E. L. (1999) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1006/juec.1998.2098 · Cited by 1,221
Metadata
- Authors
- Epple, D., & Romer, T.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1991-08
- Volume
- 99
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 828-858
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2054527795
- Cited by
- 445
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 30.61
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.