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The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights
Abstract
Costs must be incurred if an owner is to enforce private property rights effectively. We show that, in a perfectly competitive economy, private decisions to enforce rights may result in either more or less enforcement than is socially efficient. Cases of multiple stable equilibria occur, and an equilibrium may be locally, but not globally, efficient. Resources may not be employed in their socially most valuable uses, and enforcement may be accompanied by inefficient investment in resource productivity.
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Cites
Coase, R. H. (1960) · The Journal of Law and Economics · doi:10.1086/466560 · Cited by 18,255
Cited by
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Besley, T. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/262008 · Cited by 2,016
Property Rights and Economic Development*
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00006-9 · Cited by 646
Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property
Grossman, H. I., & Kim, M. (1995) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/601453 · Cited by 620
The Evolution of the World Bank's Land Policy: Principles, Experience, and Future Challenges
Deinlnger, K., & Binswanger, H. (1999) · The World Bank Research Observer · doi:10.1093/wbro/14.2.247 · Cited by 444
Land Registration, Governance, and Development: Evidence and Implications for Policy
Deininger, K., & Feder, G. (2009) · The World Bank Research Observer · doi:10.1093/wbro/lkp007 · Cited by 387
Metadata
- Authors
- de Meza, D., & Gould, J. R.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1992-06
- Volume
- 100
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 561-580
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W2063666460
- Cited by
- 194
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 8.14
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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- de Meza, D., & Gould, J. R. (1992). The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261829
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