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Cited by 194

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights

de Meza, David, Gould, J. R.·1992·Journal of Political Economy

Abstract

Costs must be incurred if an owner is to enforce private property rights effectively. We show that, in a perfectly competitive economy, private decisions to enforce rights may result in either more or less enforcement than is socially efficient. Cases of multiple stable equilibria occur, and an equilibrium may be locally, but not globally, efficient. Resources may not be employed in their socially most valuable uses, and enforcement may be accompanied by inefficient investment in resource productivity.

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Metadata

Authors
de Meza, D., & Gould, J. R.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Published
1992-06
Volume
100
Issue
3
Pages
561-580
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
OpenAlex
W2063666460
Cited by
194
References
1
FWCI
8.14
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/261829
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de Meza, D., & Gould, J. R. (1992). The Social Efficiency of Private Decisions to Enforce Property Rights. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261829

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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.