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Cited by 902

The DOI matches its Crossref record.

Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium

Admati, Anat R., Pfleiderer, Paul, Zechner, Josef·1994·Journal of Political Economy
DOI 10.1086/261965
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Abstract

We develop a model in which a large investor has access to a costly monitoring technology affecting securities' expected payoffs. Allocations of shares are determined through trading among risk-averse investors. Despite the free-rider problem associated with monitoring, risk-sharing considerations lead to equilibria in which monitoring takes place. Under certain conditions the equilibrium allocation is Pareto efficient and all agents hold the market portfolio of risky assets independent of the specific monitoring technology. Otherwise distortions in risk sharing may occur, and monitoring activities that reduce the expected payoff on the market portfolio may be undertaken.

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Metadata

Authors
Admati, A. R., Pfleiderer, P., & Zechner, J.
Venue
Journal of Political Economy
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Published
1994-12
Volume
102
Issue
6
Pages
1097-1130
ISSN
  • 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
  • 1537-534X
DOI
10.1086/261965
OpenAlex
W1524082215
Cited by
902
References
0
FWCI
38.00
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed

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CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/261965
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Admati, A. R., Pfleiderer, P., & Zechner, J. (1994). Large Shareholder Activism, Risk Sharing, and Financial Market Equilibrium. Journal of Political Economy. https://doi.org/10.1086/261965

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.