The DOI matches its Crossref record; 14 of the 14 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimination
Abstract
We show that discrimination can occur even when it is common knowledge that underlying group characteristics do not differ and when employers do not prefer same-group candidates. When employers can judge job applicants' unknown qualities better when candidates belong to the same group and hire the best prospect from a large pool of applicants, the top applicant is likely to have the same background as the employer. The model has policy, empirical, and experimental implications. For example, the model predicts that "screening discrimination" is more likely to occur and persist in sectors in which underlying quality is important but difficult to observe, there are numerous applicants, interviewing (screening) is relatively cheap, and applicants have to acquire job-specific skills.
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Citations
Cites
A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance
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(2009) · Markets and Diversity · doi:10.2307/j.ctv1kz4h99.12 · Cited by 1,684
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Silent Messages: Implicit Communication of Emotions and Attitudes
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THE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEW: A SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RECENT RESEARCH1
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Cited by
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002561 · Cited by 4,504
Cultural Biases in Economic Exchange?*
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2009) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.1095 · Cited by 1,922
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.422902 · Cited by 1,020
Home Bias in Online Investments: An Empirical Study of an Online Crowdfunding Market
Lin, M., & Viswanathan, S. (2016) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.2015.2206 · Cited by 678
Bertrand, M., & Mullainathan, S. (2003) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w9873 · Cited by 612
Metadata
- Authors
- Cornell, B., & Welch, I.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1996-06
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 542-571
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1978385790
- Cited by
- 360
- References
- 14
- FWCI
- 16.38
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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