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Favoritism in Organizations
Abstract
Objective measures of employee performance are rarely available. Instead, firms rely on subjective judgments by supervisors. Subjectivity opens the door to favoritism, where evaluators act on personal preferences toward subordinates to favor some employees over others. Firms must balance the costs of favoritism--arbitrary rewards and less productive job assignments--against supervisors' demands for authority over subordinates. We analyze the conditions under which favoritism is costly to organizations and the effects of favoritism on compensation, the optimal extent of authority, and the use of bureaucratic rules.
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Citations
Cited by
The Provision of Incentives in Firms
Prendergast, C. (1999) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.37.1.7 · Cited by 3,338
Self-citationThe Tenuous Trade‐off between Risk and Incentives
Prendergast, C. (2002) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/341874 · Cited by 995
Self-citationSubjectivity and the Weighting of Performance Measures: Evidence from a Balanced Scorecard
Ittner, C. D., Larcker, D. F., & Meyer, M. W. (2003) · The Accounting Review · doi:10.2308/accr.2003.78.3.725 · Cited by 936
Field Experiments on Discrimination
(2017) · Handbook of Economic Field Experiments · doi:10.1016/bs.hefe.2016.08.004 · Cited by 910
DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY-COMPETENCE TRADE-OFF
Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2011) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01033.x · Cited by 497
Metadata
- Authors
- Prendergast, C., & Topel, R. H.
- Venue
- Journal of Political Economy
- Publisher
- University of Chicago Press
- Published
- 1996-10
- Volume
- 104
- Issue
- 5
- Pages
- 958-978
- ISSN
- 0022-3808 (ISSN-L)
- 1537-534X
- OpenAlex
- W1999717957
- Cited by
- 445
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 6.67
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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