Studies in the Logic of Explanation
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 32 of the 32 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
To explain the phenomena in the world of our experience, to answer the question “why?” rather than only the question “what?”, is one of the foremost objectives of all rational inquiry; and especially, scientific research in its various branches strives to go beyond a mere description of its subject matter by providing an explanation of the phenomena it investigates. While there is rather general agreement about this chief objective of science, there exists considerable difference of opinion as to the function and the essential characteristics of scientific explanation. In the present essay, an attempt will be made to shed some light on these issues by means of an elementary survey of the basic pattern of scientific explanation and a subsequent more rigorous analysis of the concept of law and of the logical structure of explanatory arguments.
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In the citing paper
“We argue that our highlight explanations constitute as an explanation given by the definition from [34].”
From Explanations Can Reduce Overreliance on AI Systems During Decision-Making (2023) · cites this paper as [34]
In the citing paper
“A core principle of scientific progress is reproducibility ( 16 ).”
From Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science (2015) · cites this paper as [2]
Citations
Cites
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Self-citationThe Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals
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I.—THE CONTRARY-TO-FACT CONDITIONAL1
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Self-citationExplanation, Mechanism, and Teleology
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Research works printed but not linked: 5
- Beard, Charles A. , and Hook, Sidney . [Terminology] Problems of terminology in historical writing. Chapter IV of Theory and practice in historical study: A report of the Committee on Historiography. Social Science Research Council, New York, 1946.
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Cited by
Estimating the reproducibility of psychological science
Open Science Collaboration (2015) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.aac4716 · Cited by 8,515
Social Theory of International Politics
Wendt, A. (1999) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511612183 · Cited by 7,664
Explanation in artificial intelligence: Insights from the social sciences
Miller, T. (2019) · Artificial Intelligence · doi:10.1016/j.artint.2018.07.007 · Cited by 5,302
Shmueli, G. (2010) · Statistical Science · doi:10.1214/10-sts330 · Cited by 2,517
The Nature of Theory in Information Systems1
Gregor, S. (2006) · MIS Quarterly · doi:10.2307/25148742 · Cited by 3,306
“This “covering law theory of explanation” was developed by Hempel and Oppenheim (1948) and is a tenet of logical empiricist philosophy.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Hempel, C. G., & Oppenheim, P.
- Affiliations
- Queens College, CUNY (US)
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1948-04
- Volume
- 15
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 135-175
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1983870751
- Cited by
- 3,174
- References
- 32
- Citations by year
- 2026: 118 · 2025: 179 · 2024: 116 · 2023: 160 · 2022: 195 · 2021: 132 · 2020: 144 · 2019: 197 · 2018: 124 · 2017: 100 · 2016: 82 · 2015: 104 · 2014: 91 · 2013: 94 · 2012: 99
- FWCI
- 69.98
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Philosophy of Science (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Philosophy of Biology and Scientific Explanation
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › History and Philosophy of Science › Logic and Philosophy of Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Keywords
- scientific explanation, logic of explanation, concept of law, rational inquiry
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
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