The DOI matches its Crossref record; 1 of the 1 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Beliefs and Subdoxastic States
Abstract
It is argued that the intuitively sanctioned distinction between beliefs and non-belief states that play a role in the proximate causal history of beliefs is a distinction worth preserving in cognitive psychology. The intuitive distinction is argued to rest on a pair of features exhibited by beliefs but not by subdoxastic states. These are access to consciousness and inferential integration. Harman's view, which denies the distinction between beliefs and subdoxastic states, is discussed and criticized.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Run the check — free, no account needed. It reads the open-access text and checks the sources it cites.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Hess, E. H. (1965) · Scientific American · doi:10.1038/scientificamerican0465-46 · Cited by 515 · cited 1×
“Hess ([8]; see also [9]) presented male subjects with a pair of almost identical photos of a girl.”
Background
Cited by
On a confusion about a function of consciousness
Block, N. (1995) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00038188 · Cited by 3,364
Measuring consciousness: relating behavioural and neurophysiological approaches
Seth, A. K., Dienes, Z., Cleeremans, A., Overgaard, M., & Pessoa, L. (2008) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2008.04.008 · Cited by 458
“In philosophy, it has been described as inferential promiscuity [ 5 ], fame in the brain [6], the unified field theory [7] and global access; in cognitive psychology as broadcast within a global workspace [8] and in a more constrained way as the process dissociation framework [9]; and in neuroscience as a neuronal glo…”
Neither Fish nor Fowl: Implicit Attitudes as Patchy Endorsements
Levy, N. (2015) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12074 · Cited by 226
Consciousness in Artificial Intelligence: Insights from the Science of Consciousness
Butlin, P., Long, R., Elmoznino, E., Bengio, Y., Birch, J., Constant, A., Deane, G., Fleming, S. M., Frith, C., Ji, X., et al. (2023) · arXiv · doi:10.48550/arxiv.2308.08708 · Cited by 196
Dennett's realisation theory of the relation between folk and scientific psychology
Cussins, A. (1988) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00058659 · Cited by 4
Metadata
- Authors
- Stich, S. P.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1978-12
- Volume
- 45
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 499-518
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W1985034157
- Cited by
- 502
- References
- 1
- FWCI
- 219.95
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
How to cite
Cite CoChat for the checks on this page, and the paper for its own findings.
- This page
- CoChat. (2026). Citation check: Beliefs and Subdoxastic States. https://app.cochat.ai/papers/10.1086/288832
- The paper
- Stich, S. P. (1978). Beliefs and Subdoxastic States. Philosophy of Science. https://doi.org/10.1086/288832
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.
