The DOI matches its Crossref record; 22 of the 22 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Perceptual Plasticity and Theoretical Neutrality: A Reply to Jerry Fodor
Abstract
The doctrine that the character of our perceptual knowledge is plastic, and can vary substantially with the theories embraced by the perceiver, has been criticized in a recent paper by Fodor. His arguments are based on certain experimental facts and theoretical approaches in cognitive psychology. My aim in this paper is threefold: (1) to show that Fodor's views on the impenetrability of perceptual processing do not secure a theory-neutral foundation for knowledge; (2) to show that his views on impenetrability are almost certainly false; and (3) to provide some additional arguments for, and illustrations of, the theoretical character of all observation judgments.
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Cites
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Cited by
Is vision continuous with cognition?: The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception
Pylyshyn, Z. (1999) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x99002022 · Cited by 1,243
Cognition does not affect perception: Evaluating the evidence for “top-down” effects
Firestone, C., & Scholl, B. J. (2016) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000965 · Cited by 1,200
How we know our minds: The illusion of first-person knowledge of intentionality
Gopnik, A. (1993) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x00028636 · Cited by 967
The Advancement of Science: Science Without Legend, Objectivity Without Illusions
Kitcher, P. (1995) · doi:10.1093/0195096533.001.0001 · Cited by 780
An introduction to science and technology studies
(2004) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.41-3396 · Cited by 581
Metadata
- Authors
- Churchland, P. M.
- Venue
- Philosophy of Science
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press (CUP)
- Published
- 1988-06
- Volume
- 55
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 167-187
- ISSN
- 0031-8248 (ISSN-L)
- 1539-767X
- OpenAlex
- W13090314
- Cited by
- 326
- References
- 22
- FWCI
- 23.03
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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